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ABSTRACT 
 
Reducing Arsenic Exposure from Private Well Water in the United States: The Use, Effect, and 
Potential of Testing Requirements 
by 
Sara V. Flanagan 
 
Advisor: Nicholas Freudenberg 
 
Over 45 million Americans drink from unregulated private well water of unknown 
quality. Arsenic is the most concerning groundwater contaminant for health because of its 
toxicity and widespread natural occurrence. Most residential wells in arsenic-affected areas have 
not been tested for arsenic; the success of community programs and efforts to motivate testing is 
limited by a range of psychological, situational, and socioeconomic barriers. However, testing 
only acts as screening and does not reduce exposure without effective and consistent actions to 
follow. Given the limitations in relying on individual well owners to be aware, willing, and 
capable of testing their water, state-wide regulations like New Jersey’s Private Well Testing Act 
(PWTA), which requires testing during real estate transactions, have the potential to make a 
significant contribution towards arsenic exposure reduction by acting as a screening intervention 
and allowing systematic collection of water test results. This dissertation describes the findings 
of three studies examining the PWTA: the circumstances of its origin, its impact on mitigation, 
and its potential to boost screening. 
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Chapter 2 is a comparative case study examining the context of the PWTA’s successful 
adoption into law, and failures to pass similar requirements in Maine. Viewed through Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams framework, the PWTA was the result of problem, policy, and politics streams 
successfully aligned during a significant political window of opportunity. By contrast the failures 
in Maine highlight the considerable work remaining to facilitate or overcome the philosophical 
evolution required for further private well legislative action. In Chapter 3, a follow-up survey to 
owners of wells with > 5 µg/L arsenic identified through PWTA-required tests (n=486) reveals 
that most current homeowners have taken some mitigation action to reduce exposure; however, 
without a mandate for remediation or compliance, a significant portion (28%) of surveyed 
households have not. Those not acting have lower perceptions of susceptibility, severity, and 
benefits; perceive greater barriers; and express lower levels of self-efficacy and commitment to 
reduce exposure than those who are taking some mitigation action. Poor monitoring and 
maintenance behaviors among those with arsenic treatment installed threaten to undermine 
mitigation intentions. Chapter 4 reports on a mailed testing intervention targeting “neighbors” of 
wells exceeding 5 µg/L tested under the PWTA. Overall, 16% of those notified (n=1743) of 
arsenic in their neighborhood requested a free test kit and 13% submitted a water sample. 
Significant participation differences based on wording suggested that messages of comparatively 
high arsenic, relative to standards, may be more compelling than messages of general risk. The 
intervention prompted testing among 230 households largely unreached by previous awareness-
raising activities and identified problems among a significant portion (25%), demonstrating the 
effectiveness of targeting outreach and messages to wells at high contamination risk.  
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the utility and the potential, as well as the 
limitations, of the PWTA. The fact that 45 million Americans are excluded from the federal and 
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state regulations that protect the right to safe drinking water in this country is an overlooked 
public health crisis. Practically, significant change may require many incremental, modest, 
and/or symbolic steps, by many local and state governments across the country; additional policy 
models must be tested and proven. Nevertheless, these studies demonstrate that legislation like 
the PWTA can make a significant contribution towards well screening and can be leveraged in 
many ways to reduce arsenic exposure in the private well population, beyond those directly 
affected by the law. It is a proven model that other states can now build on. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
United States drinking water policy 
Drinking water is critical to human development; water supply and management have 
been central to urban planning and economic development throughout history.1 Mortality rates in 
the United States fell most rapidly during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, due in part to the 
filtration and chlorination of public water supply – it has been credited for nearly half of the total 
mortality reduction, three-quarters of the infant mortality reduction, and nearly two-thirds of the 
child mortality reduction in major cities during that time period.2  Early regulation of water 
distribution systems was intended to prevent the spread of communicable diseases from 
bacteriological contamination as centralized water delivery services expanded to support 
growing urban populations.3 As new hazards were identified, clean water technologies and 
standards evolved to reflect new concerns and advances in toxicological assessment and 
chemical analysis of drinking water. Emphasis began to shift from infectious diseases to cancer, 
lead poisoning, heart disease, and others linked to toxic exposures, although many of the mid-
20th century federal standards set by the Public Health Service were voluntary.3  
A 1973 study identifying the presence of carcinogens in New Orleans and the Ohio River 
Valley raised the visibility of drinking water regulation and prompted Congressional action,3 
resulting in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (PL 93-523) signed into law in December 
1974 as an amendment to the Public Health Service Act, “to assure that the public is provided 
with safe drinking water.” Minimum national standards were set for drinking water and states 
were given primary enforcement responsibility. Before the passage of this Act, the federal 
government could only set and enforce standards for contaminants which cause communicable 
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disease. The SDWA expanded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) authorization 
to set standards for all harmful contaminants, consisting of nonmandatory health-based 
maximum contaminant level goals (MCLGs) and enforceable maximum contaminant levels 
(MCLs), and established mechanisms to assure compliance. After 1974 the US EPA formally 
established MCLs for 15 inorganic compounds; however, the development of additional drinking 
water regulations stalled during the Reagan administration. With amendments during the 
reauthorization of the SDWA in 1986, Congress established requirements and deadlines for 
setting standards for 83 contaminants and set a timeline for the regulation of additional 
contaminants. Today, all public water systems are federally mandated to meet drinking water 
quality standards for all contaminants with MCLs.  
While users of public water in the United States benefit from this regulatory oversight 
assuring the safety of their drinking water, over 45 million Americans relying on private well 
water are excluded from these protections.4 Monitoring and maintaining the quality of drinking 
water remains the responsibility of individual well owners. The “private” designation given to 
water sources supplying fewer than 25 people spares individuals the regulatory burden of 
compliance while denying equal assurances of safe quality drinking water and routine 
monitoring. This gap in the regulation of drinking water leaves a significant portion of the 
population vulnerable to exposure from a variety of natural and anthropogenic contaminants. 
Exceptions for individual household water supplies from drinking water regulation appear to be 
the norm worldwide where such laws are enforced, despite consistent evidence of poor water 
quality and increased health risks from private sources.5-7 Of global public health concern is 
geologically-sourced inorganic arsenic, naturally occurring in groundwater throughout the U.S. 
and around the world; elevated concentrations affect an estimated 140 million people drinking 
 3 
from well water in 70 countries.8 Arsenic is considered the most toxic and widespread of 
common private water contaminants in the United States.9 
 
Concern for health  
Chronic arsenic exposure through drinking water is associated with increased risks of 
cancer, cardiovascular disease, non-neoplastic respiratory changes, and neuropathy.10,11 In 
response to increasing evidence for the long-term health effects of exposure, the U.S. EPA in 
2001 lowered its enforceable drinking water MCL for arsenic to 10 µg/L from the 50 µg/L of the 
1974 Safe Drinking Water Act.12 Based on evidence from Taiwan,13-15 Japan,16 Argentina,17,18 
and Chile,19 combined cancer mortality risks for drinking water containing the previous MCL of 
50 µg/L were estimated to be on the order of 1 in 100, more than 100 times greater than any 
other drinking water contaminant with an MCL.20 At the new MCL of 10 µg/L, the estimated 
lifetime excess cancer risk of drinking water arsenic is still approximately 1 in 300.21 While 
standards for other carcinogens have been set to levels associated with risks between 1 in 10,000 
and 1 in 1,000,000,20 the choice of 10 µg/L reflects EPA’s discretionary authority to set less 
stringent standards based on a cost-benefit analysis, which at the time ruled out lower standards 
as being too expensive for small community systems to comply with. Unsatisfied with a federal 
MCL that would not provide the level of protection required by state law, New Jersey adopted an 
arsenic MCL of 5 µg/L in 2004,22 which remains the most protective in the nation. Consistent 
with other carcinogens, EPA’s MCL Goal for arsenic is 0 µg/L, meaning there is no dose of 
arsenic below which would be considered safe.  
In eastern New England private wells drilled into bedrock aquifers often have elevated 
arsenic concentrations.23 Incidence rates of bladder cancer mortality in Maine, New Hampshire, 
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and Vermont are about 20% higher than the U.S. overall, supporting a regional association 
between bladder cancer risk and low-to-moderate levels of arsenic in drinking water.24  Bladder 
cancer has the highest lifetime treatment costs of all cancers because it is chronic and often not 
fatal when caught early, representing a long-term burden on the health care system and 
individual patients.25  
Of particular concern is arsenic exposure during the critical in utero and early life 
exposure window.26 In Maine, arsenic was detected in 99% of blood samples from children aged 
1-6, with higher average blood levels in regions with a greater prevalence of wells with >5 µg/L 
arsenic.27 Among schoolchildren in Maine, drinking water with arsenic ≥5 µg/L was associated 
with reductions in IQ similar to those observed with modest increases in blood lead.28 Early life 
arsenic exposure is also associated with increased mortality from acute myocardial infarction,29 
and significantly increases risk of death from lung cancer and disease as a young adult at a 
magnitude not found for any other environmental exposure of early childhood.30 Given the gaps 
in regulation, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a policy statement in 2009 
recommending pediatricians ask whether a family drinks from a private well, encouraging 
regular biologic and chemical testing of private wells used for drinking by children, and 
advocating that the necessary tests for families be convenient and ideally free or inexpensive.31 
In general, children are more vulnerable to the health effects of contaminants in water because 
they drink more per kilogram of body weight than adults, and because they are experiencing a 
critical period of biological development. The widespread occurrence of arsenic and severity of 
its effects lends strong justification to these recommendations; arsenic was the most frequently 
detected chemical contaminant in water samples taken from private wells in a study of 188 low-
income rural families with young children, yet participants were not particularly concerned about 
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arsenic and most families had never tested their well water.32 A study of maternal perceptions 
and behaviors towards toxic chemical exposures found mothers had higher risk perceptions and 
engaged in significantly higher levels of exposure reduction behavior for pesticides than for 
arsenic, reflecting greater exposure to risk messages from health professionals and the media.33  
 
Extent of exposure and challenges in reduction 
It is difficult to estimate how many of the over 13 million U.S. households dependent on 
private well water34 are affected by arsenic, or the health and economic costs associated with that 
exposure, in part because private well water quality is not regulated and there is no systematic 
monitoring in place. Although non-random, USGS detected arsenic in 51% of 7580 private wells 
sampled nationwide, with concentrations exceeding 10 µg/L in 11% of wells.35 Arsenic most 
commonly exceeded its MCL out of 6 inorganic contaminants tested, including nitrate, and was 
more common than all anthropogenically derived organic contaminants with an MCL. Although 
arsenic has been detected in water across the country, concentrations in the crystalline-rock 
aquifers in New England, and basin-fill aquifers in the western and south-central U.S. most 
frequently exceed standards (Figure 1.1);36 these areas often have high rates of private well water 
supply.37 Research finds the probability of arsenic occurrence at regional and local scale can 
increasingly be predicted by geostatistical modeling,38,39 leading to new estimates that 2.1 
million Americans are drinking from wells with arsenic above the federal standard.40 However, 
due to high degrees of spatial variability the presence of arsenic in individual wells can only be 
determined by a specific water test, which must be arranged by the well owner. Therefore, every 
well must be tested. 
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While private well water quality is federally unregulated, there are some state and local 
requirements for testing specific contaminants during specific times, such as for bacteria when 
drilling a new well as part of the permitting process, or more rarely during a real estate 
transaction. Yet in their absence the stance of local authorities varies, ranging from actively 
encouraging well owners to test their water, to remaining hands off and leaving responsibility to 
the private market and to individuals who must be aware, willing, and capable to take the actions 
required to ensure safe drinking water for their household. Under current conditions any 
significant reduction in population exposure to drinking water arsenic will require a substantial 
portion of the private well population to take appropriate action on their own, therefore 
individual protective behavior remains essential to exposure reduction. Research indicates that 
the reasons private well owners do or do not act to reduce exposure are often complex, with 
additional challenges in the case of arsenic.  
 
Challenges to screening 
Sensory and visibility factors are consistently the strongest prompt for private well users 
to investigate the quality or safety of drinking water;41,42 prompts which are absent for arsenic. 
Even at high concentrations, arsenic-contaminated water will have no taste, odor, or color, 
defying common expectations for contaminated water and interfering with perceptions of risk, 
especially when arsenic awareness is low. The most common reasons households give for not 
testing water are inconvenience, time issues, and having no health issues or noticeable water 
changes;43 yet even when cost and convenience barriers are addressed through interventions, 
testing participation remains low.44,45 A survey of private well users in Nova Scotia found high 
confidence in water quality, unrelated to relative risk of arsenic exposure or routine testing 
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behavior.46 The study concluded that formal information channels largely fail to reach their 
audiences, and that well users’ assessments of risk are more influenced by personal experience, 
local knowledge, social networks, and testing convenience. Among private well owners in an 
arsenic hot-spot of rural Nevada, 71% of survey respondents who drink their tap water were 
exposed to concentrations above MCL.47 Despite public information efforts, most respondents 
reported not knowing whether there were health risks associated with their drinking water, and 
40% were less than “somewhat concerned” about arsenic. Even among respondents who reported 
they were highly concerned, 37% were consuming tap water with concentrations exceeding 
MCL.48 Another survey of residents with arsenic contaminated tap water concluded that the 
decision to buy bottled water is made on the basis of perceived risks; however, people 
systematically underestimate the true risk of mortality at their exposure level and therefore are 
unlikely to take sufficient action.49 Thus in many arsenic-affected areas, awareness is low, does 
not always cause concern, and concern does not always prompt action.   
Arsenic testing only detects a health risk and does not immediately reduce it, thus the 
factors influencing testing decisions can be more complicated than with other health behaviors. 
A close comparison is home radon testing, a similar action that requires subsequent protective 
action to effectively mitigate the hazard. In radon testing, higher threat perceptions are correlated 
with testing behavior, yet individual risk perception is often optimistically biased. This form of 
bias is assessed through comparative risk estimates, and is indicated when estimates of the risk to 
self are significantly lower than comparison group estimates.50 People tend to believe that their 
own risk for finding a problem is lower than their neighbors’, even if they live in known high-
risk areas.51,52 This same cognitive bias is observed for arsenic; survey participants more strongly 
agree with the risk that town wells are contaminated than with the risk for arsenic in their own 
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well, regardless of whether they have tested.42,46 This may explain why even residents informed 
of local risks may still not feel enough personal risk to warrant testing action. The proportion of 
private well owners reporting they would test their water after hearing a neighbor’s well is 
contaminated is twice that of hearing that wells in their town are.42,53 Personal experience with 
the “good” quality of one’s drinking water can also serve to reinforce cognitive biases.54 
Moreover, community members are more likely to underestimate environmental hazards such as 
arsenic because the problem is naturally occurring, not industrial, and because remediation is 
their own responsibility and not a government or corporate one.42,52 This presents a barrier not 
only to promoting individual protective actions but also to mobilizing community action for 
supporting policy change regarding private well water. 
Optimistically biased personal risk perceptions are a real and consistent barrier to 
promoting risk-reduction behaviors; a significant optimistic bias was found for 25 of 32 hazards 
studied in a random sample of New Jersey adults.55 Overcoming optimistic beliefs about 
drinking water quality will be a challenge; other optimistic biases have proved quite resistant to 
intervention and efforts to reduce them have had limited success. For example, a study of 4 
attempts to reduce optimistic biases through manipulation of the way risk-factor information was 
presented found each failed to have a consistent effect.56 Public media campaigns to raise 
awareness about health and safety risks assume that exposure to information can influence 
people’s perception of susceptibility, and thereby motivate precautionary action. However, 
investigations into the impact of mass media on individual judgments of risk have been 
inconsistent.57 One explanation for this is the impersonal impact hypothesis, supported by studies 
which suggest that personal and societal level judgements of risks are distinct and that the 
primary influence of media reports is on judgement at the societal level, i.e. about risks in the 
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larger community, rather than on judgement of risks to one’s self.58 People can be aware of a risk 
abstractly, but personal risk may seem too distant and unreal.59 Research into precautionary 
action suggests that in the absence of personal experience with hazards, public health programs 
emphasizing concrete, personalized information about likelihood, severity, and precautions, and 
attacking unrealistic optimism will be more successful than traditional attempts to disseminate 
general hazard information to the public.59 Studies suggest that information campaigns that can 
incorporate “vivid” and “self-relevant” information can influence both personal and societal 
level judgements.57 Detailed, imagery-provoking, and emotionally interesting information shares 
aspects of direct experience and therefore may influence risk judgements in a similar way 
compared to more neutral information. When people are exposed to information that involves 
others who are very similar to them, the information may also be as self-relevant as a direct 
experience. 
Community testing programs are the most common approach for generating arsenic tests 
and generally rely on mass media outreach methods. Periodic campaigns can be a trigger and 
convenient opportunity for those already thinking about testing, or for those most receptive but 
unaware of local risks. Yet testing campaigns are small scale and evidence suggests only a 
fraction of wells in a community get tested. When awareness on arsenic is low, more active 
outreach is needed. A community based intervention in the Quebec region motivated more to test 
for arsenic than a mass media campaign; however, despite a four-fold increase, the overall 
testing rate was only 16%.60 A 2-year community informational and testing campaign in the 
small town of Tuftonboro, NH, was able to test 28% of the wells in the town,61 while a well 
testing program in 19 towns of Wisconsin was able to motivate 30% of residents to participate.62 
Participants in Wisconsin towns which offered the well test program every year had stronger 
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perceptions of arsenic risk compared to those in towns where arsenic was highly publicized but 
the testing was offered only once over 3 years,62 suggesting ongoing testing efforts may be more 
effective than publicity alone. Resource constraints and sustainability for programs at the local-
level often remain a challenge. Furthermore, higher income and better educated households may 
benefit more from interventions intended for the whole community. For example, while town-
level testing promotion in New Jersey has succeeded in testing more wells for arsenic, it may 
have exacerbated disparities in testing if higher SES families are more receptive to risk 
information and more likely to take advantage of testing programs, even when they are free.45 
Arsenic testing in particular is significantly predicted by household income and education.42,53 
Cost of testing is not the only barrier; previously untested well owners with a bachelor’s degree 
were found significantly more likely to participate in a free testing opportunity than those 
without one.45 Lower-income and less-educated well users were found to be overall less 
psychologically favorable towards well testing on a number of risk perception, attitude, norm, 
ability, and self-regulation factors.63 Unlike with other environmental hazards, the contamination 
of any individual well with arsenic is independent of socioeconomic advantage, therefore 
disparities in arsenic exposure likely arise because of these disparities in testing behavior.63 
Socioeconomic and cultural diversity within geographic communities and across private well 
users nationwide precludes a one-size-fits-all approach to risk communication and health 
promotion. 
The disparate and dispersed population of private well users and general difficulty of 
communicating environmental health risks also present challenges to community engagement 
efforts to improve water quality. Butterfield et al.64 developed the TERRA (translational 
environmental research in rural areas) framework to clarify environmental health risks faced by 
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the rural poor, who, like most private well users living in rural areas, face particular challenges in 
obtaining environmental health risk reduction advice. The lack of rural public services gives the 
impression they are left to solve problems on their own, or to rely on equally uninformed 
neighbors for advice about drinking water quality and other household hazards. In many rural 
areas attitudes about environmental risks are influenced by economic concerns and persistent 
distrust of government oversight.64  
Health promotion in an environmental health context presents unique challenges such as 
the added complexity of communicating the science of metal pollution, specifically the 
uncertainties and factors which may impact toxicity.65 Risk communication strategies require the 
components of the traditional model of communication – a credible source, an easily understood 
message, an effective channel for reaching the intended audience, and consideration for attitudes 
that will affect how the message is perceived.66 Trust and credibility of the communication 
source are especially crucial for environmental risks and effective risk management; depending 
on the source, perceptions of expertise, openness, and care can influence perceived credibility.67 
Messages need to be relevant to intended audiences and clearly explain the severity of the 
hazard; however, the audience must also be physically, emotionally, socially, and financially 
capable of taking the recommended action and must believe it will work in order for the message 
to produce action.66,68 Fitzpatrick-Lewis et al.69 systematically reviewed articles reporting 
measurable outcomes for community-based and media-based interventions and found that 
response to environmental risk communication is influenced by personal risk perception, 
experience with risk, and trust in information sources. Understanding what a community already 
believes about the risk is important; successful messages will account for key public concerns 
and existing beliefs and be tailored to a community’s needs to make informed decisions.66 The 
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review concluded that no single method of message delivery is most effective for communicating 
environmental health risks, but a multi-media approach is more effective than any single 
approach, and printed material with a combination of information types is more effective than 
just text.69  
This is likely because neither risks nor communities are uniform, and so the effectiveness 
of communication strategies will vary based on the details of a given situation. The American 
population of private well users, while largely rural, represents a diversity of class, race, age, and 
gender, challenging efforts to generalize and engage. To raise awareness in a community about a 
particular health risk and to motivate action, the audience at risk needs to receive messages more 
than once and in different ways.66 Multiple channels of communication can include news media, 
paid placements, social media, and opinion leaders and community groups. Through such social, 
institutional, and cultural channels, risk messages can be amplified or weakened in ways that 
influence individual perceptions of risk and response behavior.70 For example, social linkages in 
communities have predicted perceptions about adverse health risks of a hazardous waste site 
cleanup, supporting a social network contagion theory of risk perception.71 Therefore, it is 
necessary to direct risk messages not just to individuals but to their communities, as they can 
endorse and reinforce the protective actions promoted. Appropriate channels can vary; while 
people are more likely to rely on mass media in more pluralistic communities, residents of less 
heterogeneous communities tend to rely on interpersonal channels of communication.72 
Furthermore, media use is broadly associated with community involvement;73 presenting an 
opportunity for message amplification or a further challenge to outreach. For example, during a 
campaign on cardiovascular disease residents with more ties to community groups were found 
more likely to recall nonspecific and specific health messaging; conversely, residents in small 
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communities without group ties recall the fewest health messages due to their information poor 
environment and low media exposure.  
Despite local efforts to promote private well testing, a majority of households in many at 
risk areas have not tested and therefore are unaware of the arsenic in their water; surveys in 
affected areas of Maine, NJ, and Nevada reveal more than half of private well households have 
never tested for arsenic.42,47,53 When well owners are unaware of the contamination, they won’t 
know to act on it; so at present the greatest barrier to arsenic exposure reduction is a lack of 
testing. In the areas where efforts are being made to bring attention to private well water as a 
public health concern, the focus is primarily on motivating well owners to test, with the 
assumption that more tests will reduce exposure. However, testing can only act as a screening 
tool; testing itself does nothing to reduce the exposure of that household without actions that 
follow. Yet without a test and information on risk, it is unlikely that homeowners will know 
enough to act, whether they are risk averse or not. Once a well is tested and arsenic found, a 
household must then decide on further action – they can remove the arsenic from drinking water 
by treatment, they can avoid the arsenic by drinking bottled water, or they can do nothing. 
Individuals will systematically update their exposure and health risk perceptions based on water 
test results and accompanying information;74 however, studies on safe water consumption have 
shown that risk perception is often a weak predictor of health behavior change.75,76 To effectively 
reduce arsenic exposure from private water it will be just as important to understand how well 
users respond to actual health risks presented by arsenic in their water, compared to the unknown 
risks that prompt them to test their water. 
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Challenges to mitigation after screening 
When local campaigns succeed in testing private wells for arsenic, very rarely do they 
follow up with participants to determine what actions, if any, have been taken to reduce the 
discovered exposure. Follow-up surveys of the 545 well owners identified by the Wisconsin 
testing program as having arsenic levels exceeding the MCL revealed only about half were 
taking actions that reduced their exposure. Information on arsenic level and perceptions of water 
quality and health effects had substantial effects on protective behavior; those that identified a 
water problem were likely to reduce their exposure.54 However, 20% of respondents reported a 
lower arsenic level than their test result and those with higher levels selected a higher threshold 
they considered safe, indicating psychological defensiveness when perceived experience of good 
quality water does not align with a test result. Information mailed with the result was the most 
used source for informing water decisions, yet over 60% still perceived their water as at least 
somewhat safe.62  
A 2013 follow-up survey of 256 households in Maine, 3-7 years after they participated in 
a well testing program and were notified that the concentration of arsenic in their water exceeds 
the MCL, revealed that 43% of participants with arsenic concentrations exceeding MCL had 
installed treatment, 31% reported switching to bottled water, but the remaining 27% took no 
protective action to reduce their exposure.77 Common reasons for not taking action included lack 
of concern and expense of treatment. Those with higher arsenic levels were more likely to act, 
indicating that results can influence risk perception; belief their untreated well water is not safe 
to drink was the strongest predictor of acting to reduce exposure. Use of any water treatment is 
significantly predicted by household income and education,63,78 and while acting to reduce 
exposure was not associated with SES in Maine, choice of mitigation action was; higher SES 
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households were more likely to install treatment, while lower SES households were more likely 
to drink bottled water to reduce exposure.28,77 This is likely because the upfront installation costs 
(average $700-2,740)79 can be prohibitive for many, yet purchasing water to avoid arsenic is not 
cost-effective for households of more than one person.80 Although several states such as Florida 
and New Jersey have established funds to support homeowners with remediation of chemicals 
when the water contamination is through no fault of their own, often funded by industry 
settlements, naturally-occurring contaminants such as arsenic are explicitly excluded from such 
programs, leaving private well owners to bear the full expense. At best, homeowners may qualify 
for no-interest (e.g. New Jersey) or low-interest (e.g. Minnesota) loans towards remediation of 
water quality problems. When households decide against more expensive whole-house treatment 
and depend on bottled water or less expensive point-of-use treatment to reduce their arsenic 
exposure, as did 89% of those taking mitigation action in the Maine survey,77 consistent behavior 
is required for it to be effective – the occasional use of untreated water contributes to continuing 
exposure.81,82  
 
Ineffective mitigation  
Beyond water use behavior, efforts to reduce arsenic exposure can fail when treatment is 
ineffective, because technical methods are inappropriate for removing arsenic and/or for the 
chemistry of the well water, or because well owner treatment maintenance and monitoring 
behavior is inadequate. Once a decision has been made to treat water for arsenic, well owners are 
left to a private treatment sector that is unregulated and often locally inexperienced to handle the 
complexity of arsenic removal. Even technically appropriate treatment systems require proper 
maintenance and regular testing to monitor and ensure water quality; a well owner must be fully 
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aware and capable of handling their responsibility going forward. Treatment failure is a serious 
risk; 15% of home treatment systems in Maine (n=68)77 and 23% in NJ (n=22)45 were failing to 
produce water below each state’s MCL; in all cases the owner was unaware. The state of New 
Jersey recommends a whole-house two-tank granular ferric adsorption system because it 
removes both species of inorganic arsenic found in well water, generates low waste, and has 
more simple maintenance.79 A treatment study in a NJ township which requires such dual tank 
arsenic systems found that 4 out of 55 systems (7%) were still failing to deliver water below the 
MCL.83 Other treatment systems have been found more problematic; in the Lahontan Valley of 
Nevada, arsenic concentrations in treated water samples from 18 of 59 household reverse 
osmosis (RO) systems studied exceeded the drinking water standard of 10 µg/L. Systems failed 
to lower arsenic concentrations to safe levels when arsenic in the well water was very high or 
when As(3) was the dominant species.84 The study authors conclude that while RO systems can 
be an effective method of treating for arsenic, regular measurement of the treated water is 
necessary to ensure that the concentrations are indeed being reduced to safe levels. 
 
Private well water conceptual framework 
As long as domestic well water maintains the designation of “private” and therefore is 
excluded from the Safe Drinking Water Act’s protections and assurances for public water supply, 
reduction of population exposure to arsenic from well water will require many individuals to take 
a series of effective and consistent actions on their own to protect their health (Figure 1.2). As 
described above there are various barriers to these actions that result in persistent exposure to 
arsenic and other water-borne contaminants, each requiring a range of strategies at the 
individual, community, and policy levels to address. Regulations requiring these actions have the 
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potential to overcome many barriers faced to motivating individual behavior, yet are not widely 
applied for private well water. 
 
Need and potential for policy action 
Relying on individual and community outreach alone is unlikely to overcome all barriers 
to individual protective action and population exposure reduction described above. Combining 
community-based efforts with changes to policies that affect a community’s environment 
provides better opportunities to target such determinants of health.85 However, community-level 
may not always be the most effective target for policy change when those determinants of health 
are the result of factors operating at higher levels of organization.86 The challenge in aiming for 
higher level change is that the communities experiencing disproportionate exposure to 
environmental risk also face the most obstacles to participating in the policy process.87 How to 
mobilize a community around a shared environmental health threat depends on the structure of 
the community and nature of the issue.65 Social and economic conditions can challenge 
formation of collaborative partnerships and their effectiveness to improve community health and 
behavior outcomes.88 Such broad social factors influence how individuals and populations 
respond to environmental health hazards in ways that may either reduce or exacerbate harmful 
health effects.87 Furthermore, even when local community groups are engaged they often lack 
the political power to effect change at a higher level. Effective partnerships will recognize not 
only the importance of community participation but the value of cultivating relationships with 
those who have political power, to work more effectively across the policy landscape.87  
Navigating this course will be a challenge; particularly for the geographically disparate 
rural and disadvantaged populations relying on private well water who may already lack the trust 
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and power to negotiate with government over the environmental risks they face. Strategies of 
community empowerment, the progression from individual action to collective social and 
political change,89,90 will be insufficient to tackle arsenic in well water considering the unique 
nature of the problem and the widespread population affected. Participants in successful 
environmental health campaigns are often brought together by a sense of community identity, 
including racial and ethnic identities, parental identity, or a shared history of struggle or 
victimization, while shared values or distrust in government and corporations can unite 
communities for collective action.91 A shared natural threat without geographical boundaries and 
with no one to blame may be harder to rally around. External and internal processes that 
undermine social cohesion, disrupt social networks, or overwhelm individuals with more 
pressing concerns can also destroy community capacity to respond to environmental health 
hazards.91  
Successful community mobilization to promote environmental health involves residents 
uniting against a shared external threat, either industry hazards or a failure of public authorities 
to protect against them, and leveraging political insider and outsider strategies to effect change.91 
Sandman92 writes that outrage is the principal determinant of perceived hazard; when people are 
upset they tend to think they’re more endangered, when they’re not upset they don’t perceive 
risks to themselves. Strong environmental justice groups have emerged to leverage outrage and 
politically mobilize resource-poor communities to advocate for local and federal policy changes 
to reduce environmental health disparities.93,94 Disparities caused by an uneven distribution of 
anthropogenic hazards are often the result of these underlying political power differentials.87 
Less visible are the disparities that may arise from a naturally occurring threat rather than policy 
decision. In such cases when the distribution of a hazard in the environment is essentially 
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random, disadvantaged residents may face disproportionate exposures not because of a flawed 
policy decision-making process but because of an absence of political jurisdiction, attention and 
support for these problems.63 Such is the situation of geogenic arsenic contamination of 
groundwater. Moreover, the designation of domestic well water as the private responsibility of 
individual households undermines the community identity that may be necessary to mobilize 
affected populations for collective change. Whether affected communities can be engaged by 
water quality issues beyond the promotion of well testing and towards increased institutional 
support and policy change is unclear; motivating individuals to appreciate risks and take 
protective action for their own water is still a significant challenge. Studies on radon mitigation 
suggest particular difficulties in engaging the public to appreciate environmental risk when 
hazards are naturally occurring, with no one else to blame or responsible for their remediation.52  
As an invisible poison naturally occurring in groundwater across the country with no 
anthropogenic cause or responsible party to blame, arsenic in private well water remains a 
challenge for health promotion and community engagement. Protection from toxic exposure is 
solely the responsibility of individual well users and remains a private matter within the home, 
divorced from the public spheres of community and policy. To take appropriate protective 
actions, well users must first become aware of the risks and then empowered to make decisions 
about their management. Most private well users remain unaware of arsenic risks, and many 
more will underestimate them, especially when the protective actions required may be at 
significant cost and effort. Local conservation commissions, town boards, and local health 
departments concerned about the health effects of arsenic and other private water contaminants 
have become key players for instituting local programs and pushing residents to test their wells. 
But community engagement efforts usually end with a tested well, rarely extending into 
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subsequent actions to reduce exposure, much less mobilization towards changes in private well 
water policy or practice. Despite 45 million Americans dependent on private well water for 
drinking,4 collective water quality issues stemming from a lack of regulation are not well 
recognized or acknowledged. Naturally occurring hazards are not geographically confined to 
communities or political jurisdictions, and those who actually face well water arsenic problems 
often remain a silent minority in any particular area.  
The private nature of domestic well water both exposes households to risk from a lack of 
oversight and hampers community engagement efforts by requiring a focus on the protective 
actions of individual well owners. Yet there is potential for policy to contribute significantly 
towards universal screening of private well water. Although the exception, fourteen states do 
require water to be tested for at least coliform bacteria when constructing new private wells, and 
3 require water to be tested during a real estate transaction (Figure 1.3). However, only 5 require 
arsenic as a parameter of the mandated test. Other states have attempted to introduce regulations; 
bills modeled off New Jersey’s 2002 Private Well Testing Act (PWTA) which requires testing 
during real estate transactions were vetoed in Vermont and died in the New York and Maine 
legislatures, indicating ongoing policy obstacles. Some proactive local governments have passed 
stricter ordinances, requiring testing at construction or sale, or even for water to meet drinking 
standards prior to its use as a domestic source. Although the current patchwork of local and state 
government efforts provides models for policy action, it highlights that much more can be done. 
Better understanding of the factors that contribute to or impede the adoption of such local private 
well testing regulations and the role of the public in these efforts, if any, would help to guide 
future policy efforts. 
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Household survey data reveals that New Jersey’s PWTA identifies significantly more 
wells with arsenic than voluntary testing alone, thereby reducing exposure as homeowners act in 
response to test results.95 Testing requirements that will eventually reach all wells are a partial 
answer to disparities in testing behavior observed among households for whom testing it is not 
required.53,63 An added benefit of testing at real estate transaction is that families purchasing 
houses are younger and more likely to include children vulnerable to arsenic effects.95 However, 
such a requirement is not the full answer. In 13 years, only a fraction (25%) of private wells have 
been tested under the PWTA due to the slow pace of housing turnover. Therefore, sustained 
community engagement efforts and resources to support private well testing and follow-up 
actions among vulnerable groups are still necessary. The PWTA database of over 35,000 
geocoded well tests, is now a significant resource for targeting these efforts. Furthermore, despite 
more wells tested under the PWTA, surveys suggest these new well owners frequently forget or 
misremember arsenic test results, are more likely to not know what kind of treatment they are 
using, and do not report better maintenance or monitoring of treatment, suggesting challenges to 
reducing exposure remain even when testing is required.95 The specific effect of PWTA-required 
testing on subsequent protective actions among those with arsenic exceedances has not been 
studied and warrants further research if that is the direction that future policy interventions will 
take. 
 
Dissertation aims 
Millions of Americans drink from unregulated private well water of unknown quality. 
Arsenic is the most concerning contaminant for health because of its toxicity and widespread 
natural occurrence (Figure 1.1). Most wells in arsenic-affected areas have not been tested for 
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arsenic; community testing programs and other efforts to motivate individual action have had 
limited success. State-wide private well testing regulations like the New Jersey PWTA have the 
potential to make a significant contribution towards arsenic exposure reduction by acting as a 
screening intervention that alerts individuals to take protective action, and allowing targeted 
outreach to those geographically most at risk based on the systematic collection of water test 
results. To evaluate the feasibility and utility of replicating such legislation, it is important to 
understand how the PWTA came into being as well as the impact it can have on private well 
water arsenic screening and mitigation. Therefore, the aims of this study and its 3 respective 
papers are as follows: 
 
Aim 1. Analyze the circumstances under which the state of New Jersey adopted the PWTA 
in 2002, and compare to those under which other states, such as Maine, failed to pass similar 
legislation. 
 
Aim 2. Assess the arsenic mitigation behavior of households with wells identified by the 
PWTA as having arsenic concentrations exceeding the New Jersey drinking water standard, 
and estimate PWTA-related exposure reduction. 
 
Aim 3. Pilot and evaluate a mailed arsenic testing intervention targeting high risk wells not 
tested under the PWTA, “neighbors” of wells exceeding the drinking water standard, and 
assess short-term impact. 
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This study recognizes the New Jersey’s PWTA as an opportunity to examine a case of 
successful state policy adoption (Aim 1), and takes advantage of its database of arsenic-
contaminated wells to survey the households whose water was tested through the Act about 
subsequent mitigation behavior (Aim 2), as well as to target untested neighboring households 
with a risk communication intervention promoting well water testing (Aim 3). 
While private well water quality remains the responsibility of individual owners, the 
limitations of traditional community engagement to motivate water testing and other protective 
actions are clear. A majority of private wells remains untested for arsenic, and there are 
significant disparities in testing and likely exposure by socioeconomic status. In the absence of 
federal regulations, some states and local governments have assumed the authority to require that 
private wells be tested during specific occasions, such after drilling new wells or during real 
estate transaction. Such requirements have the potential to make a significant contribution to well 
water screening and subsequent exposure reduction to arsenic as well as other contaminants. Yet 
few states have adopted private well testing legislation and several that have attempted to have 
failed. The first paper in this dissertation takes a comparative case study approach to examine the 
larger context behind these policy successes and failures. The findings of such a study may be 
critical for future strategies relying on policy change to reduce exposure to arsenic and other 
private well water contaminants. 
The New Jersey PWTA’s database of over 35,000 private well arsenic tests provides a 
significant opportunity to follow-up with households whose wells were required under law to be 
tested during their real estate transaction. Because the PWTA is a “right to know” law, it does 
not mandate that any action be taken to reduce exposure. Little is known about the new 
homeowners’ awareness of test results or subsequent mitigation action taken. In previous 
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surveys, arsenic-affected private well owners were identified by voluntary participation in a 
community testing program or water sampling study; water testing was the active decision of the 
well owner. Those surveys revealed that private well owners with arsenic frequently 
misremember their results and that a portion will not act to reduce their exposure.54,77 A random 
survey of private well households in arsenic-affected towns of New Jersey indicates that recall of 
arsenic test results is also problematic among the subset purchasing their home since the PWTA, 
and that they are more likely to report not knowing what kind of treatment they are using 
compared to those who purchased their home prior to the PWTA, perhaps because treatment was 
installed by a previous owner.53 The survey study in the second paper is the first to follow-up 
with private well households who received arsenic test results during real estate transactions 
according to state law, as opposed to voluntary participation in a testing program. 
Written into the PWTA was a provision allowing local health departments to notify 
residents located within at least 200 feet of a well found to have elevated levels of any 
contaminant that they should test their own water. However, this provision was optional, there 
was no designation of resources to support these efforts, and there were concerns that 
notifications so soon after a visible real estate sale would break confidentiality. It has been 14 
years since the PWTA came into effect, over 4000 well tests have found arsenic exceeding the 
NJ MCL, yet no local health departments are known to have implemented this notification 
provision in practice for arsenic. The third paper aims to establish proof of concept for this 
notification approach as an intervention for screening of high-risk wells, and to demonstrate the 
utility of such a database generated by required testing to complement traditional public health 
outreach to private well owners in at-risk areas. When only 40% of private well owners in New 
Jersey would test their well water after hearing that wells in their town are contaminated, but 
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74% say they would after hearing that their neighbors’ wells are contaminated,53 highly localized 
risk-messaging could have a clear advantage at motivating private well users to test. This type of 
scalable intervention to promote arsenic testing has not been attempted or evaluated before. 
Together these three papers present an original in-depth study of New Jersey’s unique private 
well testing law, examining the original context of its policy-making success, its impact on 
household arsenic mitigation behavior, and its potential contribution to private well screening 
beyond the mandated tests at real estate transactions. 
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Figure 1.1: Location and arsenic concentration of 31,350 USGS groundwater samples 
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 Figure 1.2: Series of protective actions required at the individual/household level to effectively reduce arsenic 
exposure (top); individual-level barriers to each action and potential strategies of varying effectiveness to address 
them (bottom) 
 28 
 
Figure 1.3: Occasions for well testing requirements by state, from Zheng & Flanagan 2017 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO 
REQUIRE PRIVATE WELL TESTING IN NEW JERSEY AND MAINE 
 
Abstract 
At present the greatest barrier to reducing exposure to naturally occurring arsenic from 
unregulated private well water is a lack of well screening. The New Jersey Private Well Testing 
Act (PWTA) has since 2002 required arsenic testing during real estate transactions. Given the 
limitations in relying on individual private well owners to be aware, willing, and capable of 
testing their own wells, such state-wide testing regulations have the potential to make a 
significant contribution towards universal screening and arsenic exposure reduction. To evaluate 
the feasibility and utility of replicating such legislation, it is important to first understand how the 
PWTA came into being. This study examines the New Jersey PWTA as a case of testing 
requirements successfully adopted into law; failed attempts to pass similar requirements in 
Maine are examined for comparison. Although the PWTA is the result of a long history of 
drinking water problems in New Jersey due to population density, an industrial past, and 
vulnerable aquifers, several high-profile events in the years immediately prior focused attention, 
drawing renewed public and legislator interest and mobilizing environmental advocacy groups to 
push for expansion of a local private well testing ordinance statewide. Viewed through 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework, the PWTA was the result of problem, policy, and 
politics streams successfully aligned during a significant political window of opportunity created 
by the timely gubernatorial aspirations of the two most powerful state legislators. In Maine, 
where naturally occurring arsenic, not industrial contamination, is the primary well problem, 
powerful private sector opposition and an obstructive administration fundamentally resistant to 
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any government involvement in “private” well water, all played a role in blocking attempts to 
require testing. Coalition building and compromise eventually succeeded in passing a modest 
education and outreach bill without mandates in 2017, but also highlighted the considerable work 
remaining for further legislative action to be taken. For policy to be an effective tool to achieve 
universal well water screening, a philosophical evolution on the role of government in private 
well water may be required first at the local and state-levels. New Jersey may prove to be the 
exception, not the rule, for state regulation of private well water. Further research is needed into 
how other states have dealt with, if at all, the fundamental questions underlying such efforts to 
take policy action regarding private well water. 
 
Background 
Despite legislative efforts to ensure safe drinking water for the public under the federal 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), over 44 million Americans relying on water supplies which 
serve fewer than 25 people or 15 households are excluded from its protections.40 The majority 
(>98%) of private domestic water supplies are from groundwater sources,4 which are vulnerable 
to a range of natural and anthropogenic contaminants. While many states and local governments 
regulate the construction, siting, and use of private wells through permitting processes under 
broad authority related to water management and environmental health, they do not regulate 
water monitoring, and notably, some states like Pennsylvania do not even require construction 
standards or permitting for private wells. Although several states do have requirements for water 
samples to be collected at the time of private well construction, primarily for bacteriological 
analysis, most do not.9 The majority of private wells in this country have never faced a water 
quality testing requirement. Residential well water has traditionally been considered a private, 
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not public, issue, with responsibility for quality and safety falling on individual well owners. 
Without any systemic monitoring of private well water quality in place, the true extent of 
population exposure to contaminated drinking water is unknown. A USGS study of 1,400 wells 
across the country found at least 1 SDWA contaminant present at concentrations greater than an 
MCL or health-based screening level (HBSL) in 23% of wells tested.37 Arsenic is the most toxic 
and widespread of common private well water contaminants.9 Predictive modeling estimates that 
approximately 2.1 million people are drinking from wells with naturally occurring arsenic above 
the federal standard of 10 µg/L,96 and millions more above the Maximum Contaminant Level 
Goal (MCLG) of zero µg/L arsenic. There is increasing evidence for long-term health effects of 
arsenic exposure, including cancer, cardiovascular disease, non-neoplastic respiratory changes, 
and neuropathy,10,11 as well as reduced IQ among children.28  
In the absence of federal, state, and local regulation over private wells, homeowners are 
entirely responsible for monitoring and maintaining the quality of their drinking water. This 
burden is placed on millions of individuals who must be aware of the various invisible natural 
and anthropogenic contaminants in their area, who must be able to arrange and cover the costs of 
regular water testing, and who must be willing and committed to continuous monitoring despite 
any challenges or hardship faced. Research indicates that the reasons well owners do or do not 
take protective actions regarding their water quality are often complex.43,44,97-99 As a result, a 
majority of households in many at risk areas have not tested their wells for arsenic and therefore 
likely remain exposed to the invisible poison in their water.42,47,53 Given the limitations in 
motivating individual private well owners to act and the self-selective nature of voluntary testing, 
there is potential for policy to make a significant contribution towards universal screening of 
private well water quality.9 The New Jersey Private Well Testing Act has since 2002 required 
 32 
arsenic testing during real estate transactions to ensure that home buyers are aware of the quality 
of their drinking water. Surveyed private well owners who faced PWTA requirements to test 
report arsenic problems at five times the rate of those in the same area who have not been 
required to test.95 An added benefit of the requirement to test during real estate transactions is 
that families purchasing homes are younger and more likely to include pregnant women and 
children, groups particularly vulnerable to the health effects of arsenic.95 Yet New Jersey’s 
private well testing policy is the exception, not the rule; very few states have adopted testing 
requirements and several that have attempted to introduce similar legislation have failed. 
Why do policymakers adopt some policies but not others? John Kingdon argued that 
there are three separate “streams” – problem, policy, and politics – which must come together at 
the same time, during critical moments, or  “windows of opportunity,” for significant policy 
change to occur.100 The problem stream consists of the various conditions that stakeholders want 
addressed through government action, which policymakers find out about through indicators, 
focusing events, and feedback.100 The policy stream includes all the ideas floating around 
competing to win acceptance in policy networks, only a few of which ever receive serious 
consideration based on technical feasibility, value acceptability, and resource adequacy. The 
politics stream consists of the national mood, interest group advocacy campaigns, and executive 
or legislative turnover. A policy entrepreneur possesses the right knowledge, resources, and 
connections to bring the streams together during the brief opportunity windows opened by events 
in the problem or political streams. These elements are considered universal and the analytical 
framework flexible enough to apply in nearly any policy situation,101 which has become common 
in comparative policy analysis.102 Viewing the PWTA through this framework may provide 
important insight into its successful policy outcome.  
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Methodology 
Research design and rationale 
State-wide private well testing regulations like the New Jersey PWTA have the potential 
to make a significant contribution towards arsenic exposure reduction. To evaluate the feasibility 
and utility of replicating such legislation, it is important to first understand how the PWTA came 
into being, and examine cases where similar legislation failed to pass. Identifying the factors that 
contribute to or impede the adoption of such private well water regulations can help guide future 
policy change efforts. Here, I take a retrospective comparative case study approach to examine 
state-level policy decisions on private well water testing, following a “two-tail” design in which 
cases from both extremes (positive and negative outcomes) are chosen.103 
Case study research is particularly suited for in-depth investigation into a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context and is preferred over other social research methods when 
(a) the research question is “how” or “why,” (b) the investigator has little control over other 
events, and (c) there is a contemporary focus within a real-life context.103 The strategy of using 
multiple case studies represents a balance between gathering in-depth insight into particular 
cases to capture their complexity while still allowing one to produce some level of 
generalization.104 The comparative research design entails studying several individual cases of 
state policy decisions, and then drawing a single set of cross-case conclusions. Comparative case 
study methodology has already been used to study public health policy adoption, 
implementation, and evaluation at the state and federal level.105 
In this study, a case is defined as a state-level policy decision on private well testing 
requirements. Here, “policy decision” refers to an event which happens when either there is a 
new policy adopted, or an existing policy has been upheld by the purposeful action of authorities, 
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or by an informal action that prevents new policy from being made.106 Bills can fail because they 
are not considered by a committee, are not reported favorably out of committee, do not pass a 
vote in both legislative houses, or are vetoed. Bills may also be amended to remove the testing 
requirement, which for this study is also considered a failure. Each case entails a descriptive 
examination of the active participants and the important processes behind each decision event, 
including problem recognition, policy generation, and politics.107  
 
Case identification and selection 
Cases were limited to states in which a policy decision regarding private well water 
arsenic testing has occurred. States where no attempt has been made to introduce private well 
testing legislation were excluded from consideration for lack of decision event. New Jersey was 
decided a priori as the primary case, because its successful adoption of the Private Well Testing 
Act represents the strongest state-level testing law for arsenic in the country. This was confirmed 
by a national review of state-level requirements for private well testing, described in further 
detail in Appendix A. To identify efforts to introduce testing requirements that aren’t reflected in 
current law, i.e. failed cases, a search was conducted in the National Conference of State 
Legislature Database. Only two states – Maine and New York – have introduced bills to require 
testing at each of the three occasions required in New Jersey, and included arsenic as a specified 
parameter. For time and feasibility reasons, only one state, Maine, was chosen for in-depth study 
as the contrasting case for New Jersey. Even a study with only two cases chosen because they 
offered contrasting situations can be an important step towards theoretical replication and still 
produces much stronger findings compared to a single case alone.103  
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While New Jersey’s 2001 PWTA was selected as the successful case and Maine’s 2007 
LD 1175 as the primary failed case, further investigation identified a series of bills in both states 
which proposed testing requirements, ultimately failing to become law, which were also 
considered here to better understand the context of the primary decision event. New Jersey and 
Maine share a common legislative process at state-level, further described in Appendix A. 
 
Data collection 
To ensure construct validity this study relies on multiple sources of evidence, specifically 
documentation, archival records, and interviews, three of the six major sources of evidence for 
case studies.103 Although cases were selected based on a single policy decision event, data 
collection spanned a broader timespan to better understand the historical context. Data were 
collected from relevant publicly available documents and archives, as well as from interviews 
with government staff and policy advocates in each state. Documents were identified through 
internet-based searches of media and legislative sources or from direct contact with interview 
respondents and state agencies. Evidence includes legislative bills, voting records, written 
testimonies, and meeting summaries; advocate and state websites, reports, and statements; local 
news articles and other mass media.  
Documents were collected until data saturation was reached (no more relevant search 
results), and were used to identify potential key informants for interview. Recruitment criteria 
were that individuals were primary stakeholders at the time of the bill (legislator, government 
agency staff, non-governmental advocate) that were involved in its passage or failure, or can 
offer important perspective on the event. In-depth interviews were meant to give insight into the 
events of interest, and were guided conversations rather than structured queries,103 with slight 
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variation in questions asked based on the participant’s role in the policymaking process. Potential 
interview respondents were contacted and requested to participate in a telephone interview via 
letter or email, with repeated attempts to non-responders. Attempts were made to reach a 
sponsoring legislator, a non-governmental advocate, and a state agency staff member with key 
perspectives on the legislative process in each state. Although interviews were sought with 7 
current or former state legislators in New Jersey, and 5 current or former state legislators in 
Maine, none responded except the New Jersey PWTA’s primary sponsor, who explained that as 
an acting State Judge he is not permitted to speak about his former legislation. Stakeholders who 
did respond signed written consent forms; interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim by the researcher. Interviews in New Jersey were conducted with David Pringle, 
Campaign Director for Clean Water Action New Jersey (formerly the New Jersey Environmental 
Federation); Jane Nogaki, retired New Jersey Environmental Federation board member and 
South Jersey activist; and Sandy Krietzman, Safe Drinking Water Bureau Chief of the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Interviews in Maine were conducted with 
Michael Belliveau, Executive Director of the Environmental Health Strategy Center and Andrew 
Smith, State Toxicologist for the Maine Center for Disease Control and Protection. This study 
was approved as exempt by the CUNY University Integrated Institutional Review Board. 
 
Data analysis 
For each case, news and legislative archives were reviewed to identify additional 
attempts to introduce testing legislation before or after the primary event bill, to build a 
comprehensive chronology103 of efforts and events. All relevant legislation identified in each 
state was reviewed line-by-line for comparison of critical components between bills and 
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meaningful changes between proposed and amended bills. Compiled legislative timelines, 
sponsor lists, and tables of components for each bill examined are included in Appendix A. 
Qualitative content analysis was used to examine the case study documents and interview 
transcripts.108 Within-case analysis took an inductive approach to category development in which 
codes were derived from several close readings of case data, examined for meaningful patterns 
and emerging themes,109 and triangulated by integrating the various materials and evidence.110 
Each case analysis followed a consistent descriptive framework:103 bill history and timeline, bill 
components from proposal to outcome, advocates’ framing of the problem and solutions, 
opposition and effect on final bill, and factors influencing the decision outcome. Findings from 
the individual state studies were compared to identify cross-case themes and lessons learned. 
Finally, each case is discussed considering Kingdon’s multiple streams framework.100  
 
New Jersey 
Introduction 
New Jersey has the highest population density in the country.111 A history of heavy 
industry and decades of dumping waste has left a legacy of environmental pollution. Although 
one of the smallest states, New Jersey is home to 114 active federal Superfund sites, the greatest 
number in the country.112 Despite the highly dense population, over 1 million residents are 
believed to rely on private well water for drinking.113 Common industrial solvents, gasoline 
additives, and other volatile organic compounds (VOCs) occasionally reach ground and surface 
water supplies after leaking from underground storage tanks, septic systems, gas stations, and 
landfills, and reports of contamination have frequently drawn public attention to the issue.114,115 
Although enacted in 2001, the idea behind the Private Well Testing Act was not new in New 
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Jersey. Review of print media archives reveals that attempts to require monitoring of private well 
water date back at least 2 decades before, in step with growing awareness in New Jersey of the 
potential chemical contamination of drinking water.116  
 
Timeline and bill history 
Reports of public water contamination prompted the 1983 amendments to New Jersey’s 
Safe Drinking Water Act which expanded enforceable testing parameters for public water 
systems, requiring regular monitoring and reporting to NJDEP.117 Although there was 
recognition by that time that a significant portion of New Jersey residents also experiencing 
frequent contamination116,118-120  was left out of these regulations, early legislative efforts at 
state-level to expand protections among private water supplies through testing requirements were 
unsuccessful.117,119,121,122  
The first real steps toward requiring testing of private wells in New Jersey were taken at 
the local level. Middlesex Borough led the way for other municipalities with a 1982 ordinance 
that required all private wells be tested for bacteria and 34 VOCs before any home sale or change 
of occupancy.123 According to the Courier News this ordinance developed from former Mayor 
Martin Matuskiewicz’s concern in the 1970s about chemical discharges along roads and NJ 
Transit railroad tracks.123 Despite increasing discoveries of contaminated hazardous waste sites, 
official DEP attention remained focused on its public water testing program; figuring out what to 
do with contaminated private wells was increasingly “put on the backs of the county health 
departments,” according to one respondent. Prompted by repeated contamination of wells from 
industrial pollution,116 sandy soil conditions through which pollution spread quickly, and under 
pressure from local environmental groups,124,125 the Ocean County Board of Health voted 
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unanimously to introduce a countywide ordinance requiring testing of private wells in new 
homes and during real estate transactions, beginning June 1987. Although many local 
governments had already required new well water to be tested for bacteria by that time, Ocean 
County went further by requiring an extensive analysis for 26 hazardous chemicals and giving 
the Health Department the final say in determining whether private well water was safe to 
drink.124,126127  
According to news coverage at the time, efforts by the Senate president from Ocean 
County (D) in 1988128 and the Ocean County assemblypersons (D) in 1990129 to expand these 
requirements state-wide respectively met resistance by NJDEP130 and by an Ocean County Board 
of Health concerned about having its own ordinance superseded.131,132 The 1990 “Private Well 
Testing Act” was passed by the State Assembly, but ultimately ran out of time in the Senate that 
session. It was not reintroduced the following session because the Ocean County legislators lost 
their seats in what was described as the 1991 “Republican Landslide,” when Democrats lost 
control of both the State Senate and Assembly and handed the Republicans veto-proof majorities 
in both chambers; an angry message to the Democratic Governor from voters about his 
unpopular tax package.133 After an expansion of environmental protection programs during the 
1980s, they shrank in the mid-‘90s and there were layoffs at NJDEP.  
It took several more years and new reports of widespread contamination in New Jersey 
for private water issues to begin receiving media attention again. Investigation into a child cancer 
cluster in Toms River in 1997 identified unsafe levels of radium in drinking water,134,135 and a 
USGS study released in June 1998 showed that such problems of radium contamination were in 
fact widespread throughout most of South Jersey.135-137 The source for the contaminated water 
was the Kirkwood-Cohansey aquifer, 17 trillion gallons of water under 3000 square miles of 
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southern and central New Jersey, which supplies water to about 200,000 private wells.136 The 
aquifer is especially vulnerable to contamination because it lies close to the surface; any 
chemicals or pollutants on the ground can easily find their way into the underground water 
supply, which in some places lies only several feet beneath land that has been used for 
agriculture, industry, and waste dumping.138 While radium is naturally occurring in rock 
formations, USGS scientists discovered that it had been entering the aquifer in larger quantities 
over the previous decades because of the overuse of agricultural and lawn fertilizers, lime, and 
road salt, which release radium from the rocks or further acidify the aquifer, preventing radium 
from reattaching to rocks.134 Mercury was also found in unsafe levels throughout the Kirkwood-
Cohansey aquifer by USGS in 1997,136 but media coverage over mercury poisoning blamed for 
one Monroe Township woman’s severe illness in October 1998 amplified the concerns raised by 
the more recent radium report.139,140 Ellen Harbinson was described by the Philadelphia Inquirer 
as “the first person publicly known to be diagnosed with a mercury-related illness linked to 
South Jersey’s major water supply – a supply that has an extensive history of contamination.”141 
Her neighbor, Ed Knorr, was the vocal head of Monroe’s environmental commission and 
personally spearheaded an effort to draw attention to the plight of residents.142 Prompted by the 
reports of aquifer contamination and the pressure of his constituents in Monroe Township, and 
with the assistance of the NJ Environmental Federation, Assemblyman George Geist (R-
Gloucester), together with Assembly Speaker Jack Collins (R-Salem), re-introduced the Private 
Well Testing Act legislation in November 1998, to expand the Ocean County model statewide by 
requiring testing of private wells for radium, mercury, and VOCs when wells were drilled or 
properties sold or leased.  
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With the pressure of environmental advocates, a concerned public, and the sponsorship of 
an Assembly Speaker with gubernatorial ambitions during an Assembly election year, the PWTA 
bill cleared the Assembly Environment Committee in late March 1999 with unanimous 
approval.143 Like the original Private Well Testing Act of 1990, the new bill was passed by the 
assembly in May 1999 by a vote of 68-7.144 However, despite passing overwhelmingly in the 
Assembly, the duplicate bill sponsored by Senator John J. Matheussen (R-Gloucester) ultimately 
died in the Senate Committee when no action was taken on it before the end of the session.  
In the following session, the Assembly Environment committee again unanimously 
approved Geist and Collins’s reintroduced bill,142,145 and in May 2000, for the second year in a 
row, the Assembly voted overwhelmingly (67-6) to approve, passing the bill on to the Senate.146 
In October 2000, Assembly Speaker Collins formally dropped out of the 2001 gubernatorial race 
he had not officially entered, and in November 2000 his presumptive primary challenger Senate 
President Donald DiFrancesco (R) announced a platform which included a 16-point plan for 
clean water, taking up the PWTA as a signature point. In December 2000, for the first time, an 
amended PWTA cleared the Senate Environmental Committee on the way to a Senate vote.147 
Upon the appointment of Governor Christine Todd Whitman to head the EPA for the new 
George W. Bush administration in Washington in January 2001, as directed by the state 
constitution, the president of the state Senate stepped in as acting governor for the first time since 
1935. According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, that effectively put two-thirds of the New Jersey 
state government in the hands of Senator DiFrancesco in a year in which he planned to run for 
Governor.148  
As part of the package of water quality bills pushed by then acting Governor 
DiFrancesco, the Senate’s amended version of the PWTA passed the Senate unanimously (38-0) 
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on February 15, 2001, and was sent back to the Assembly for approval, where it was passed on 
March 8 (72-5).149 On March 23, acting Governor DiFrancesco signed the bill into law in a 
ceremony inside the Municipal Building of Monroe Township alongside local legislators, 
environmentalists, and the town’s mayor and council.150 However, barely a month after signing 
the PWTA into law, DiFrancesco abruptly quit the governor’s race following weeks of intense 
and critical media coverage of his past business and legal dealings, although he remained as 
acting governor to serve out the remaining term.151 
In September 2002 New Jersey became the first state in the nation to require in-depth 
testing of private wells as the PWTA went into effect.152 Results from the first few months of 
PWTA sampling revealed that 28% of just over one thousand wells tested violated health-based 
standards, higher than what had been expected by DEP.153 Based on the surprising early results a 
cosponsor of the original bill and new co-president of the State Senate, Richard Codey (D), 
began pressing a two-pronged bill that would require all private wells to be tested every five 
years and for any contamination to be cleaned up. Codey was the sole sponsor of S2414, which 
raised immediate concerns about costs and logistics154 and was referred to the Senate 
Environment Committee where no action was taken.155 In response to a state report on the first 5 
years of testing, environmental advocates highlighted several failings of the PWTA that required 
legislative reform: 1) pollution problems discovered are not required to be fixed, 2) neighbors of 
polluted wells are not required to be warned, and 3) no state agency has the ability to verify that 
all transactions subject to testing have been reported to the DEP.156,157 There has been no further 
legislative action to address these failings.   
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Bill components from proposal to outcome 
The original versions of the PWTA introduced in 1998 (A2635), 1999 (S2007), and 2000 
(A1306 / S635) were modeled on the original 1990 proposal (A-17, itself based on Ocean 
County’s ordinance) and required private wells be tested to obtain a certificate of water quality, 
required before any new private well could be used and necessary for any sale or lease of 
property served by a private well (Appendix Table A.4). Transactions could not be completed 
without a certificate of quality in force, or an agreement to bring the water supply into 
compliance within 60 days. Certified labs would submit test results to the County, which would 
issue a certificate of water supply if no standards were exceeded, to be valid for 6 months. The 
County would notify the state DEP if any standards on a test were exceeded. Sellers in violation 
of the Act would be liable for the costs of bringing the property’s water supply into compliance 
and would be subject to a civil penalty of $500 to $1000. There was an appropriation of $75,000 
from the General Fund to administer the law, and Counties could collect fees for testing 
sufficient to recover costs of administration. 
The amended version that passed out of the Senate Environment Committee late 2000 
and was eventually approved by both chambers had significant differences from the original 
proposal based on the Ocean County ordinance. Gone was the certificate of water quality 
requirement. Instead, a well test was required as a provision in the contract of sale, but no 
remediation action or compliance with water quality standards were required. Gone were the 
penalties for any violations of the law. Certified labs test for total coliform, nitrates, iron, 
manganese, pH, VOCs, lead and gross alpha to screen for radium, and additional contaminants 
such as arsenic and mercury depending on the county. Instead of test results going to Counties, 
they are compiled by the state DEP for the purposes of studying groundwater quality in the state. 
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Counties are notified by DEP of failed tests; the County then has sole discretion whether to issue 
a general notice to property owners in the vicinity. In all cases DEP and the County must keep 
water test results confidential; only general data compilations are available to the public. The 
State DEP is tasked with managing public information and education on the Act, groundwater 
problems and health effects, and testing and treatment. One million dollars was appropriated 
from the Safe Drinking Water Fund for the initial costs of implementing the PWTA. 
The proposed revision to the PWTA introduced by Senator Codey in 2003 would have 
required all private wells in the state to be tested every 5 years, with arsenic and mercury 
required across the state. Each violation offense would incur a civil penalty of at least $1000. 
This proposal never made it out of the Senate Environment Committee. 
 
Advocates’ framing of the problem and solutions 
Over the decades of attempts leading to the PWTA’s final passage, the strongest 
advocates for legislative action framed New Jersey’s legacy of industrial pollution and 
vulnerable groundwater supplies as a threat to public health. The president of the state Senate in 
1988 described the problem of contaminated drinking water as “deadly and pervasive” crisis.128 
Local newspapers reported growing frustration and fears among New Jersey residents as an 
increasing number of wells were found to be contaminated.125 Repeated discoveries of 
widespread cancer-causing organic compounds, radiation contamination, and mercury poisoning 
re-elevated these concerns. Legislation was seen as necessary to protect public health, and 
according to one advocate “the reason we decided to focus state-wide was that there wasn’t any 
county that was untouched by these contamination issues.” The status of drinking water as 
essential for life,129 the secrecy and perniciousness of unknown contamination from industrial 
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sources, and the struggles of many residents to get clean, safe water won the attention of local 
and state legislators. Bill sponsors argued it is the responsibility of government to assure the 
quality and integrity of drinking water,158 and that the state had a responsibility to protect health, 
especially of children who are often more vulnerable to water contamination.154 In an interview, 
sponsor Geist explained, “A primary responsibility of government is to assure the quality and 
integrity of drinking water. While it may not be a constitutional responsibility, it should be. The 
quality of our water is sacrosanct.”158 Advocates felt that new laws would be critical to public 
health and safety. State laws had already been passed to require termite inspections and radon 
testing at home sale; advocates believed something as important as drinking water quality should 
not be left out.159 New Jersey’s overdevelopment in rural areas and industrial pollution were also 
seen to exacerbate problems. For many new housing developments, private wells and septic 
tanks were significantly cheaper than paying to connect to the public mains. 
Advocacy for private well legislation was often structured in the language of rights and 
equity. The PWTA and earlier proposals were promoted as “right to know” laws, advancing the 
public’s right to know what is in the water they drink, and to know about the contamination 
problems in their area.160 State efforts to educate consumers about the need to test water were 
seen as insufficient and ineffective. Many parallels were drawn to the state’s Safe Drinking 
Water Act, which required public drinking water supplies to be tested for an extensive list of 
contaminants and reported to the DEP at least twice a year, to highlight the absence of a 
comparable program for private wells.161 The test results of public water supplies must be made 
available to the public and any contamination found must be treated. One to two million New 
Jersey residents relying on private wells were seen as lacking the access to information and 
protection that public water users enjoyed from the state, even though the groundwater sources 
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they relied on were often the same; new legislation could be the chance to bring protections up to 
par with residents on public water. While state agencies stressed for decades that well water was 
a private responsibility and not that of the government,162 after the PWTA was passed and new 
regulations were introduced, DEP Commissioner emphasized that “every family has the right to 
know their drinking water is safe.”163  
Environmental advocacy groups and the New Jersey residents affected by private well 
water contamination were the most vocal supporters of legislative action to require testing. 
Grassroots mobilization in towns like Monroe drew the attention of the media, local government, 
and local state representatives who pushed the issue at higher levels. One respondent noted 
“there wasn’t really any part of the state that wasn’t touched, where you couldn’t find a local 
example of this kind of thing happening.” The mercury poisoning in Monroe Twp emboldened 
Ed Knorr, who recruited the New Jersey Environmental Federation (NJEF) and Assemblyman 
Geist to introduce legislation. One suppoter recalled “going up to Trenton a couple of times, to 
testify in support of the bill. And Ed Knorr would of course be there, and I believe the family 
that had the mercury issue in their well and had the health effects, that was always very powerful 
testimony.” The NJEF and The NJ Sierra Club were both active advocates for the PWTA in the 
press, and endorsed politicians that advanced the bill, regardless of party. The state’s private 
chemical testing labs also saw an opportunity to get more business out of a new market created 
by the legislation. 
The bills proposed and the one eventually passed reflected compromises, but advocates 
for stronger legislation still promoted them as a good and necessary “first step” or “step in the 
right direction” towards addressing water contamination problems and increasing protections for 
private well users, by increasing the frequency of well testing and creating a database that could 
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be used to study the problem. Advocates argued that private well owners must first have the 
opportunity to know about a problem if they are expected to be responsible for the solution. 
Many homeowners won’t test their water on their own if it is not mandatory. The state and 
counties had a limited idea of the water quality in many areas; data collection through the PWTA 
would allow authorities to be aware of problems more quickly and act on them, serving as a form 
of surveillance for new sources of pollution. While the final bill no longer included requirements 
for compliance with standards, leaving it to negotiation between parties, it was hoped that the 
knowledge of a problem and the pressure to complete a home sale would lead to safer water. 
Although the final PWTA was not as strong as proposed, and did not include an enforcement 
mechanism, it was still recognized as the most comprehensive testing bill any state had signed 
into law and in its absence, the status quo of zero regulation at state-level would persist. One 
respondent reflected, “I think the first step was the right way to go, because I don’t know if we 
ever would have gotten to the next step. And in fact, we haven’t.”  
 
Opposition and effect on final bill 
The positions of other stakeholders towards the PWTA were less straight-forward and 
often variable, including that of the NJDEP, County governments, and the private sector. Sandy 
Krietzman does not recall NJDEP taking an active role lobbying for private well legislation, “We 
kind of kept in our lane a little bit. The thrust of our efforts was geared towards regulation of the 
public water systems… We generally kept out of the private well arena and it wasn’t necessarily 
grassroots on the part of DEP to get this legislation passed.” According to another respondent,  
“They were in between, they weren’t outright saying no, partially because they knew they 
would look bad if they came out in opposition. And they also had some legitimate concerns 
about how to implement this. They were fairly saying you’re telling us to do more but you’re 
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not giving us the resources to do more. The million-dollar appropriation was a lot to bring 
DEP along.” 
In the absence of state regulation, several municipal and county governments had already passed 
their own ordinances to require testing and in some cases required compliance with standards. 
Many of these local authorities at the forefront of private well water regulation after widespread 
contamination in their districts often became hesitant or even critical when similar legislation 
was proposed at state level. There were concerns that they would lose the flexibility to identify 
and address local problems if a state-wide approach were applied, and that it might result in 
unnecessary testing for contaminants not present in all counties which would inflate costs to the 
consumer. Local government concerns about costs were echoed among residents and on their 
behalf by private sector groups like real estate agents. Estimates of testing costs ranged from 
$100 to $1000 depending on the number of chemicals required.125,131,163 It was due to cost 
concerns that amendments to the PWTA gave DEP partial discretion over which parameters to 
require in which counties based on occurrence data, rather than mandate all state-wide. 
Tying testing requirements to real estate transactions also raised concerns that the 
mandated tests and subsequent remediation could affect property values. After Ocean County’s 
ordinance passed, agents reported to the newspaper that they did not see it having a negative 
effect on sales or home values, and was only an impediment from the point of view that there 
were added pre-closing costs involved.127 When efforts shifted to expand the Ocean County 
model to the rest of the state one respondent recalled the realtors as “the only real opposition” to 
the bill, saying “they weren’t thrilled about the idea, they were afraid it would stop sales in 
areas.” Inspections were already expanding around that time to include termites, radon, lead, and 
asbestos; the realtors were concerned private well testing would increase the timeline and could 
send already high closing costs soaring.123 Furthermore, newly discovered problems could add 
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thousands in unexpected costs for remediation. However, there were already different levels of 
scrutiny for private well water during home sales in different counties based on local ordinances; 
realtors acknowledged that a state-wide law could serve to level the playing field and make it 
easier for potential buyers looking at homes in different counties.164  
Although it moved quickly through the Assembly Environment Committee, the PWTA 
required compromises to be released by the Senate committee. One advocate described most of 
the amendment process as “working with the real estate industry and fiscally conservative 
Republicans to get the ball across the finish line.” Dropping the compliance requirement for 
property transfers was a necessary compromise. Fiscal conservatives were also concerned about 
government costs. “This bill was moving in a Republican Senate, a Republican Assembly, and 
with a Republican Governor, all of whom were elected on a very strong anti-tax revolt in 1991.” 
One respondent’s take on the amendment process is that, “while the law is weaker than the bill, I 
think it absolutely made the difference in getting it to become law, number one, and number two, 
in a lot of ways it did actually make the bill better,” including additions that water test data 
would be compiled to study groundwater in the state and made publicly available, and that there 
was a mechanism for neighbor notification included. 
 
Factors influencing the decision outcome 
Recent highly publicized events like the Toms River child cancer cluster, the reports of 
radium contamination of the Kirkwood-Cohansey aquifer, and the mercury poisoning in Monroe 
“were very much in people’s minds” as the PWTA was developing at the end of the decade. One 
respondent describes New Jersey’s special circumstances: 
“We’re still living in the vestiges of the ‘70s and ‘80s and all of the environmental advances 
that happened back then. New Jersey was really in the forefront of that, one, partially because 
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we’re a progressive state, but partially because by definition we’re the most densely 
populated state, we’re one of the ones with the most heavily industrialized history, and so 
more than any other state we literally live on top of and next to our drinking water. So, it was 
already pretty well known that New Jersey had more problems than most, not because we 
were bad actors, but mostly because of the nature of our history, and as such we needed, and 
had, a long history of having stronger protections. In fact, a lot of New Jersey’s protections 
ultimately have been models for other states in the country.” 
Another cites New Jersey’s population density and a history of grassroots environmental 
advocacy as a result of this industrial past: “I’d say that there were probably over 100 grassroots 
groups that formed during the Superfund campaign, identifying toxic sites and getting them 
cleaned up, because they were in everyone’s backyards.” Further credit goes to the visibility of 
cases of health impact like mercury poisoning:  
“It was the fact that this woman’s health had been compromised. Because most of these 
drinking water contaminants are silent for a long time, until you develop cancer, and so 
they’re not sexy contaminants in that people are not going to drop dead from them. So 
everybody says oh I’ve been drinking this water for years and I’m fine. So there isn’t a toll 
until later on. Unless there’s a place like Toms River where they had the children’s cancer 
cluster… When kids get sick, when this woman got sick with the mercury poisoning and 
couldn’t walk, and totally lost all function and she’s only 40 years old, that grabs people’s 
attention. Definitely, put a face on the problem to help get the bill passed.” 
 
The two strongest members of the state legislature are the Assembly Speaker and the 
Senate President. According to one respondent, Speaker Collins “putting his seal of approval on 
the bill” as a co-primary sponsor “certainly helped it a lot.” 1999 was an election year for the 
Assembly, which may have moved quickly to pass publicly favorable legislation, and Collins 
was considering a run for governor in 2001 and saw the PWTA as good for him too. The Senate 
may not have moved quickly on the PWTA in 1999 or 2000 because Senate President 
DiFrancesco was also planning a run for governor and so “didn’t want to go out of his way to 
help Collins.” Within weeks of Collins announcing he would not run for governor, DiFrancesco 
publicly launched his clean water platform which included the PWTA, and it was released with 
amendments by the Senate Environment Committee soon after. “Now that the PWTA was no 
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longer a vehicle for Collins’ gubernatorial aspirations, it could become and did become, a vehicle 
for DiFrancesco’s. And that’s why he put it as part of the package.” According to the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, DiFrancesco’s sudden championing of legislation on drinking water and 
health care rankled Senate Democrats who “accused him of coming aboard ‘their’ issues for 
political gain.”165 One Senator noted at the time, “after eight years of not really seeming to care 
about those issues, in the year or year and a half before the 2001 gubernatorial election, he has 
shown a great deal of interest.”165 DiFrancesco was acting governor by the time the bill was 
passed in both Houses, and signed it into law himself. DiFrancesco continued to stress that clean 
water was a top priority for his agenda, and PWTA sponsor Geist was quoted as saying “Fast 
track is the right track. We will accomplish more on clean water in six months than we’ve 
accomplished in the last decade.”166 According to a respondent, “DiFrancesco was definitely 
using the PWTA as part of his platform of why people should support him, and he certainly saw 
it as a good thing to help him advance.” DiFrancesco’s ambitions were certainly a significant 
factor in the PWTA’s success. 
 
Maine 
Introduction 
In contrast to New Jersey, Maine is the 13th least densely populated state in the country, 
and only has 12 designated Superfund sites. Although the population dependent on private well 
water in Maine, approximately 600,000 people, is smaller than in New Jersey, this group 
represents almost half of the total population, the largest proportion on private well water in any 
state.4 Water testing in the state is performed by both the state’s Health and Environmental 
Testing Laboratory (HETL) and private commercial labs. Although there are some instances of 
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anthropogenic contamination of groundwater, naturally occurring elements like arsenic, 
manganese, and uranium, are the biggest concerns for drinking water. Two neighboring towns, 
Buxton and Hollis, were the first communities in Maine to have documented arsenic 
contamination of well water,167 drawing media attention in 1993-94. From 1993 through 2003 
there were 121 articles published in the state’s two main newspapers on arsenic contamination of 
drinking water as it became known that arsenic in well water was a statewide problem.168  
 
Timeline and bill history 
Maine’s answer to New Jersey’s PWTA was LD1775, “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking 
Water from Private Wells,” introduced in 2007 by Representative Gary Moore (R) and almost 
completely modeled after the final NJ law (Appendix Table A.7), with the requirement that tests 
must include arsenic and uranium. The bill was brought to Representative Moore by the 
Environmental Health Strategy Center (EHSC) in Maine, which was looking for a more 
“mainstream” environmental health issue to work on while waiting for a taskforce on their 
signature issue, toxic chemicals in consumer products, to make policy recommendations later 
that year. They saw arsenic in well water as an “old environmental health issue, well-established, 
robust science, not new.” LD1775 was referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Health and 
Human Services where a public hearing was held and testimony accepted. A week later it was 
unanimously reported out of committee as “Out Not to Pass” (ONTP). One respondent describes, 
“We had a week between the hearing and the work session, that’s when you work out the 
compromise, and there was no ready pathway in the limited time available, so they summarily 
killed it, probably without a lot of thought. But that’s just the nature of the process.” Per Maine 
Legislature Rule 310.3, when a joint standing committee votes unanimously to report a bill 
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ONTP, it is shelved unless 2/3 of both House and Senate vote to re-consider it. Therefore, 
LD1775 was effectively dead less than 2 months after its introduction. 
Although there was little or no news coverage at the time, the failed attempt to introduce 
legislation was often referred to in later years during media coverage of a pair of studies by 
USGS and Columbia University that brought attention to the extent and health effects of arsenic 
contamination in the state, respectively.169-171 The 2010 USGS report analyzed results of 
thousands of private well tests performed by HETL to demonstrate widespread contamination of 
arsenic, approximately 1 in 10 wells in the state, as well as to identify hotspots where exceedance 
rates were as high as 62% or concentrations as high as 3100 µg/L.172 The 2014 Columbia 
University study of several hundred Maine schoolchildren in Kennebec County found 
significantly reduced IQ among children drinking water with arsenic >5 µg/L compared to those 
drinking water with lower levels.28 Furthermore, the Maine Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) indicated low rates of well testing for arsenic, confirmed by another 2015 
Columbia University study which estimated more than half of residents had never tested for 
arsenic.97  
The EHSC took up the drinking water problem again in 2015, facing a second term under 
Republican Governor Paul LePage where there wouldn’t be much opportunity to advance their 
chemical policy reform agenda. A new bill was introduced, LD 1162 “An Act to Ensure Safe 
Drinking Water for Maine Families,” that approached the testing issue in different ways, 
informed by EHSC’s experience in 2005 creating a lead poisoning prevention fund. “We thought 
it was premature to come out of the block proposing mandatory, universal testing, which would 
invite a right-wing reaction that would be very difficult to overcome.” Instead, funds would be 
established to improve arsenic testing rates and educational outreach and to provide affordable 
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treatment for low-income households, tests would be required upon construction of private wells, 
and landlords and sellers of property would have to results tests conducted within the previous 
three years. EHSC’s initial aim with this legislation was to make incremental progress, to “put 
this issue back on the map in a highly visible way, to reach for something that is actually 
winnable, given that there hadn’t been any serious policymaking on it in sometime and there was 
a certain complacency about the problem to overcome. So, we wanted to enact modest policy 
that was winnable, that we could build on.” The bill was also timely because a federal grant to 
Maine CDC that was supporting well testing and arsenic education efforts was set to expire and 
the LePage administration in 2015 prevented the state from reapplying; the proposed fund would 
compensate for some of that loss. 
LD 1162 generated significantly more public testimony than the previous testing act bill, 
in part because an EHSC’s advocacy partner, Prevent Harm, actively reached out to stakeholders 
and recruited supportive groups and individuals to submit testimony to the standing committee. 
Similarly, more representatives of the private sector came forward to speak against the bill. 
Overall 19 people gave testimony in favor of the bill during the initial hearing, 8 opposed, and 1 
neutral. In the next several weeks Prevent Harm and members of the private sector met to discuss 
their concerns and advise on amendments to LD 1162. Compromises to eliminate opposition 
resulted in an amended LD 1162, described by the Kennebec Journal editorial board as a 
“streamlined bill free from burdensome mandates,’173 because testing requirements were no 
longer included. It was voted out of committee with a divided report, with the majority voting 
“Out to Pass As Amended” (10-3). The House and Senate both accepted that majority report 
after floor debates and approved the bill, whereby it went to the Governor’s desk and received 
one of 170 vetoes given that year by Governor LePage.174 Although about 70% of those vetoes 
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were eventually overridden in the legislature, LD 1162 died when it failed by only a few votes to 
get the 2/3 majority required (94-52-5). The Kennebec Journal editorial board criticized Le Page 
for vetoing the bill as “unnecessary” because it would “pay for work that is already being done,” 
when he knew that work couldn’t continue without the federal grant he had already blocked.175 
Much of LD 1162 was revived in the 2017 session as LD 454, which did not require 
testing new wells but did include a requirement for landlords to provide test reports to tenants 
every 3 to 5 years, or when new leases are signed. Prevent Harm again helped gather 23 
testimonials in favor of the bill at the Committee’s public hearing, against only 2 in opposition. 
However, after the hearing, amendments removed the requirement for testing private wells at 
rental properties. The amended LD 454 was voted out of the committee with a divided report, 
although majority in favor, and both Houses again voted to enact the law. Like in 2015, 
Governor LePage vetoed the bill, but this time there were enough votes to override it (113-33-5 
in House, 33-0-5 in Senate). The final bill successfully became law, but did not include any 
requirements for wells to be tested, at any time. 
 
Bill components from proposal to outcome 
LD 1775 in 2007 borrowed much of its text almost exactly from the final NJ PWTA, and 
included all the primary components (Appendix Table A.7). Testing would be required as a 
provision of contract of sale, and for rental properties at least once every 5 years. Whereas in 
New Jersey the DEP was given responsibility for implementing the PWTA, lab results for tests 
in Maine would be submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), who 
would compile the data to study groundwater and notify local governments of failed tests. Unlike 
in New Jersey where an initial appropriation of one million dollars was made to cover 
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implementation costs and an allowance was made to request funding for ongoing costs as part of 
NJDEP’s regular budget, LD 1775 did not include mention of a budget appropriation. 
LD 1162 of 2015 avoided testing during real estate transactions and focused on required 
testing during the construction of new private wells, assigning responsibility for requesting a 
certified lab test to the drilling company, while still including a provision for mandatory 
disclosure of testing results within the previous 3 years when renting or selling a property. The 
bill also included the creation of two funds, the Private Well Safe Drinking Water Fund to 
increase education and testing, supported by fees added on to private water tests, and an 
affordable treatment fund to be established and administered by the Maine State Housing 
Authority, supported by fees of up to 3% of installation costs for water treatment systems. The 
compromise amendment of LD 1162 removed the requirement for drillers to test new wells and 
for sellers of property to disclose recent well tests, and the treatment fund was removed because 
of a parallel bill with similar aims. The testing fee to establish the outreach Fund would be for 
samples tested through HETL only, and a percentage of the fund would go towards 
administrative costs for data collection from the private labs. The final LD 1162 ended in veto. 
The amended LD 1162 was revived as LD 454 in 2017; the only change was from 
requiring landlords to disclose recent water tests to a requirement that those wells must be tested 
every 3 to 5 years and that results be provided to tenants and new renters. However, after 
amendments, the landlord requirement was removed, as was the provision for a copy of well test 
results from private labs to be forwarded to DHHS annually. Added was an appropriation of a 
small amount of funding for DHHS to cover the costs of testing and duties related to the bill’s 
requirements. LD 454 was successfully enacted into law. 
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Advocates’ framing of the problem and solutions 
Advocates for legislation consistently framed the water quality problem almost entirely 
around naturally-occurring arsenic in groundwater. The unique importance of this issue to Maine 
was emphasized through repetition of a few basic points: 1) the size of the population relying on 
private well water (50%), 2) the widespread occurrence of arsenic contamination (10% in state 
and 62% in some towns), 3) low public awareness and testing rates, and 4) the serious health 
effects of arsenic. Maine private well owners were described as being “in the dark with their 
health at risk”176 and “unaware of the widespread threat to the health of their family”176 given the 
lack of safeguards against contaminants that “threaten public health.” The health effects of 
arsenic, and overwhelmingly those effects on children, especially the IQ effects, took a 
prominent role in supportive testimony during the 2015 and 2017 bills, after the Columbia IQ 
study was published in 2014. Each testing bill was described as an important, common sense, or 
necessary step towards keeping Maine families safe. The fact that a controversial administration 
had denied renewal of federal funds already supporting testing and education efforts in 2015 
meant timely action was needed. 
Based on committee records, Michael Belleveau, the executive director of the EHSC in 
Maine, and William Johnson, a citizen of Standish affected by arsenic contamination, were the 
only two to speak in favor of LD 1775 in 2007. The primary Sponsor of the bill, state 
representative and moderate Republican Gary Moore, also from Standish, had partnered with 
Belliveau because he was concerned about his constituents’ problems. In his testimony, 
Belliveau contrasted public water system regulation requiring that groundwater supplies be 
tested and treated for arsenic with the fact that there was “no similar safety net in law to protect 
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public health from the very same contaminants in water supply drawn from private wells.”176 
From his perspective,  
“Maine’s current program of low-level public education and voluntary testing has failed to 
protect public health from contaminants like arsenic and uranium present in private wells… 
We leave it to chance that half the population will be sufficiently educated and motivated to 
take action in their busy lives to address an issue that everyone else takes for granted – the 
very safety of their drinking water… We need LD 1775 because the current system is broken 
and is not delivering adequate public health protection in a timely manner.”176 
 
LD 1775 would expand the public’s “right to know” and would “empower” the potential buyer 
of a home with information they can use to negotiate treatment installation.176 Belliveau argued 
that “LD 1775 provides a concrete step in the direction of universal testing of all wells;” given 
the long recognized public health threat of unsafe drinking water and new realization that 
voluntary testing and public education are not enough to ensure private well water safety, 
“Mandatory testing is on its way as a public health priority.”176  
For 2015’s LD 1162 and 2017’s LD 454, Prevent Harm rallied many more testimonials 
from affected private well owners, representatives of public health and medical associations, 
research scientists, and concerned citizens, to advocate for the legislation. They echoed many of 
the same talking points about the scale and severity of the arsenic problem being equivalent to a 
public health crisis and expressed concern for its impact on Maine citizens and children. Senator 
Christopher Johnson (D), co-sponsor of LD1162 argued during floor debate: 
“Public safety is not a free market responsibility. We don’t ask people to hire their own cops. 
We don’t ask people to hire their own State Police. We don’t ask people to hire their own 
experts to provide the function that Maine’s CDC provides. This is one of the roles, 
appropriately, of government. We should be informing people of the risks that we know have 
real cost to our economy, have real cost to their lives, and we should be helping them live 
better lives through acting on that knowledge.”177 
 
According to one respondent there was “certainly plenty of good testimony and press, and I don’t 
think anyone ever really disputed that having arsenic in your well is a bad thing and that people 
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should know to test.” While submitted testimony emphasized generally that anything to increase 
arsenic testing in Maine was important and would help with the problem, very few supportive 
testimonials mentioned the need for the specific testing requirements incorporated in the bills. 
 
Opposition and effect on final bills 
Speaking against LD 1775 in 2007 were the legal counsel for the Maine Association of 
Realtors (MAR) and Andy Smith, the State Toxicologist from DHHS, who clarified on behalf of 
the administration that while the Department supported the intent of the legislation, they opposed 
the means. Much of the responsibility to implement the law would fall on DHHS, which would 
require extensive new resources not provided for in the bill. DHHS also opposed designating 
private well water data as confidential information since “such privacy is not afforded to public 
water supplies, nor should it,” and would inhibit the Department’s “cluster response” to results of 
wells unusually high in arsenic.178 Smith also questioned the utility of relying on real estate 
transactions as the primary time to ensure testing since it puts real estate agents in a difficult risk 
communication position. The MAR legal counsel expressed strong opposition to the proposed 
regulations, pointing out that of all the private wells in Maine, very few are sold in any year, and 
so placing the burden of compliance on realtors was unfair given the little effect such a mandate 
would have. She also emphasized the current efforts of the association, which through their 
informational guide for clients and their standard purchase and sale agreement they already 
“strongly encourage a prospective buyer to educate themselves on the condition of the property 
they are seeking to purchase,” including water quality.179  
The various requirements included in the 2015 and 2017 bills provoked opposition from 
other private sector groups, ultimately resolved through amendments. Anticipating the realtors’ 
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opposition, the testing disclosure during real estate transactions was primarily included by 
sponsors as a bargaining chip that could be given away to keep the bill alive. The Maine Well 
Drillers Commission and the Maine Groundwater Association were opposed to LD 1162 because 
it placed responsibility for taking and testing samples on the well driller, potentially increasing 
the costs to drill a well by $1000 or more. They argued they already actively educate their 
customers: “Our experience shows that we can achieve a high rate of water quality testing 
through effective communication and education without the need to create high legal compliance 
costs which must then be passed on to the homeowner.”180 To overcome their opposition, the 
testing requirement in LD 1162 was replaced with an educational component. One treatment 
company and four laboratory representatives also came out in opposition to the fees on testing 
and treatment installation, arguing they would only increase expenses to homeowners and 
therefore have a counteractive effect. Furthermore, the private labs in Maine expressed strong 
resentment of the public HETL, believing it to offers state-subsidized testing at rates they can’t 
possible compete with to stay in business. After a compromise to only levy fees on tests 
performed at HETL and not private labs, opposition to the bill was dropped, although there was 
still suspicion that HETL would be the primary benefactor of a bill to increase testing. When LD 
454 later faced private lab opposition because the requirement to report all private well tests to 
DHHS was seen as too burdensome, that provision was also removed. 
Although not reflected in the public testimony for LD 454, according to respondents there 
was opposition to the testing requirement for rental properties from Republicans on the Health 
and Human Services Committee, purely because it was a government mandate, although a 
similar requirement for radon was just passed in 2013. According to one respondent, the point 
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should have been made is “Why would you the legislature say you need to do this for radon but 
you don’t need to do this for arsenic in water?” Nevertheless, that provision was also removed. 
Testimony submitted by the Director of the Environmental Health Division of DHHS in 
2015 for LD 1162, was neutral, expressing concerns about burdens placed on the Department 
and foreseeable challenges in rule-making. Testimony submitted on behalf of the Administration 
by the Chief Operating Officer of DHHS in 2017 was in outright opposition to LD 454, arguing 
that many of the provisions were unnecessary, there was already a lot of educational outreach 
underway, and the fees would both create disincentive to test and be inadequate to cover the 
legislation’s administrative costs. These positions were not surprising to the bill advocates, who 
focused their efforts to compromise with other opposing parties: “we knew the state was going to 
be opposed anyway just on ideological reasons, so we didn’t care about the state opposition, but 
the private company opposition was problematic.” 
Legislative floor debate around LD 1162, which passed in 2015 but did not have the 
support required to override a veto, revealed that while many considered the bill “well-
intentioned” several legislators were concerned about the fee funding mechanism or privacy 
rights.177,181 One representative who was opposed to confidential reporting of test results to 
DHHS stated:  
“If you look back through the years, any time there’s a list being generated, a list being 
collected, it’s not long before that list is acted upon, so if I have bad water and the 
Department finds out, how soon is it going to be before they’re knocking on my door and 
asking me what remediation I’ve taken? Frankly it’s none of their business.”181  
 
Another argued that there was already a federal grant going towards this issue, which he didn’t 
believe was being spent “wisely enough.” Although by 2015 it was known that the 
administration had prevented renewal, the current funding had not yet expired. One respondent 
believes that by 2017 the expired grant “probably pushed some additional people over to 
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supporting the issue that didn’t the first time. Because it was harder to make the case we’re 
already doing enough when they had decided not to renew a federal grant that was providing 
money.” 
 
Factors influencing the decision outcome 
In the end, LD 1775 had too much working against it. Without strong support in favor of 
the bill, the opposition was too strong to overcome. One respondent said of the realtors, “They 
are a formidable political opponent, they have a lot of clout in the legislature…. They have 
members in every legislative district, they have grassroots power.” He summarized its failure to 
pass out of committee as follows: 
“I think it was the fatal combination of strong opposition from the realtors to mandatory 
testing at point of sale and the strong opposition from the administration on fiscal impact. 
There was no way around the realtor opposition, it wasn’t a fully-fledged campaign. It was 
good policy ideas, the beginning of trying to figure out a pathway to improving public policy 
in Maine in this area, but we didn’t have a fully developed coalition and public education 
campaign, and earn media and grassroots mobilization and all the other things that are 
necessary to build a critical mass of support, interest, attention, priority, in order to advance 
public policy, particularly in the face of opposition. So that spelled its quick death.” 
 
LD 1162 and 454 were more politically successful, the first getting as far as the 
governor’s desk for death by veto, and the second garnering enough support to override the 
inevitable veto and become law, but the compromises to get there could be considered a failure if 
well testing requirements are the primary goal. Supportive public testimony focused on the 
problem of arsenic and why more testing would be good, none specifically advocated for these 
different mechanisms to require testing, and each were subsequently removed once they faced 
specific opposition. However, to supporters of the bill, the testing requirements were not the 
main objective:  
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“Our objectives were putting the issue on the map, raising awareness, and building bipartisan 
support… The central priority was raising money to fund the educational outreach, and in 
drafting the bill, we said what is every other conceivable mechanism by which we could 
mandate testing, absent a universal testing requirement? And so we had the new well 
construction, we had the realtors piece, we had the landlord piece… Part of effective 
legislative advocacy is knowing what is really important to you, to win, and what is actually 
achievable. And then being able to make as much of the opposition go away as possible… 
So, we gave up on a lot of those things. But again, the priority was to pass an incremental 
policy, a first step towards a long-term solution which was to get the legislature to agree that 
this was a priority public policy issue and was worth raising money to try to address.” 
 
According to another respondent: “I would say that the major accomplishment of the bill… the 
more important thing from a policy point of view is that this bill in the first one to clearly 
establish a role for state government in private well water safety… It has staked out a position 
that state government should be playing a role in promoting the testing of private wells.”  
The political environment in Maine, particularly the current LePage administration, set a 
high bar of opposition to overcome, requiring greater consensus in the legislature to override 
vetoes and enact any laws, and a more modest approach to advancing policy. According to one 
respondent, “It was a reality with this governor who has vetoed more bills than any Maine 
governor in history and is extreme right wing and not even coherently, or consistently, that it was 
getting much harder to advance public health policy.” Another’s take on the political 
environment in Maine is that “It’s philosophical. We have a governor that strongly believes in 
small government and individual responsibility. So, if you put those two things together it’s not 
surprising they would say, ‘private well water, that’s the responsibility of the property owner and 
there’s no need for a government program for that.’ It is more a philosophical stance on the role 
of government rather than a political position.” With the combination of individual households 
and the primary drinking water problems in Maine being naturally occurring, the question of 
responsibility gets more complicated. One respondent believes “If we were dealing with a man-
made pollution problem, this would be a totally different issue. The people would have 
 64 
demanded action a long time ago.” Another admits “there’s no singular villain to stoke the 
outrage around, which sometimes often mobilizes people to do something.” 
 
Lessons learned across cases 
Although the 2-case design of this study is a limitation to generalizing beyond these 
states from cross-case comparison, there are several themes consistent across the cases examined 
here which are worth noting for further research into private well policymaking or for future 
attempts to pass statewide testing policy. 
In both states, environmental advocacy groups partnered with an interested legislative 
sponsor and took charge of lobbying efforts. While the NJEF was enlisted by community 
activists to help move things at the state level, the EHSC spearheaded its own legislative efforts 
in Maine, building up a coalition of support around its more recent bills. Although there were 
varying strategies used to varying degrees of success, these cases demonstrate that a committed 
non-governmental advocate may be important to bridge the public and political spheres, keeping 
attention and building momentum on the issue. 
Even though all parties express they support “the intent” of the legislation, opposition 
from private sector groups can be expected to reflect the mechanism chosen for a proposed 
testing mandate, based on how it will affect their business. For example, placing the burdens of 
compliance on realtors for tests tied to home sales, or well drillers for tests tied to well 
construction, clearly provokes strong opposition. The professional associations representing 
realters or well drillers from across legislative districts of a state may be politically formidable. 
Fees levied against well services to raise funds for education and assistance will incite those 
businesses affected as well. Whereas a testing mandate in New Jersey is a boon to private water 
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testing labs, attempts to increase water testing, or its costs, in Maine where there is a state-
subsidized public health laboratory, are viewed suspiciously by the private labs. Many states 
have their own public health labs, so this dynamic between the state and private labs must be 
considered. The private sector for water treatment does not have a public competitor and so may 
be more welcoming of attempts to increase water screening that would generate more business, if 
additional mandates like fees and taxes on their services are not included. Compromises to 
appease diffuse private sector opposition may be necessary for legislative committee members to 
come on board if constituent demand is not overwhelming; one respondent described many 
policymakers as very simplistic: “They don’t really dig deep into the merits, it’s like how many 
groups are opposed, how many groups are in favor? Ok more groups are opposed? Bad.” 
 Opposition from government agencies can reflect the philosophical stance of a state 
administration and the reluctance to assume new responsibilities previously considered outside 
the public sphere, especially when mandates are assigned without additional resources 
appropriated for the task. Opposition from legislators and individuals often stem from concerns 
over property/privacy rights and fiscal conservatism; a right to privacy and a rejection of the 
involvement of government rather than the existence of a problem.  
 Private well water can be a bipartisan issue if constituents are directly affected and put 
strong pressure on their representatives. The primary sponsors of the New Jersey PWTA were 
Republican and the bill passed through a Republican-controlled Assembly, Senate, and 
administration. Maine had bipartisan bill sponsors and support in the legislature as well. 
 Naturally occurring water contaminants may be harder to rally support for action around 
than contaminants from an industrial source, where the existence of a polluter to blame also 
suggests possible funding mechanisms for remediation. While there are challenges in engaging 
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the majority unaffected public, visible health effects on residents like the mercury poisoning in 
Monroe township, although rare for most water contaminants, can be a focusing event for 
attention, as can effects on children such as the Toms River brain cancer cluster and the arsenic 
child IQ study in Maine. Scientific reports and studies demonstrating the scope and magnitude of 
the problem are useful tools for getting media and policymaker attention. 
 Several attempts may be required to pass private well testing legislation, as well as 
legislative turnover. As each bill gets further through the political process it helps build 
precedence for those to follow, reinforcing that the issue is worth the attention and consideration 
of policymakers. An earlier PWTA bill was blocked in the New Jersey Senate; nearly a decade 
later it took two successive legislative sessions to get it through in amended form. The Maine 
PWTA equivalent was essentially dead on arrival in committee, and nearly a decade later it took 
two successive sessions to get an alternative bill to increase testing through, although much 
scaled back in ambition. Despite ambitious goals for universal testing, achieving a “first step” 
may be a necessary compromise to advance policy. 
While long-term policy strategies may require commitment to this step by step approach, 
it is also important to be ready for the rare window of opportunity that allows for more 
significant advancement. The further developed the evidence base for the problem, potential 
policy solutions, and advocacy coalitions can be, the better positioned policy entrepreneurs will 
be to take advantage of the right moment when it arises. 
 
Discussion 
Viewing each case through Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework helps to summarize 
why legislation with private well testing requirements was successful in New Jersey, and gives 
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clues to why it failed in Maine. While New Jersey is a clear case of these critical streams coming 
together within a window of opportunity, Maine is more complicated. Although there was no 
opportunity window to leverage, weaknesses in all three streams relative to the New Jersey case 
may have also contributed to the failure of mandated testing policy.   
Problem Stream: In New Jersey, the problem of drinking water contamination, often by 
industrial chemicals, had received waves of media attention over the previous decades, which 
occasionally became the concern of legislators. However, new studies released in the years 
immediately leading up to the PWTA on the scope of groundwater contamination combined with 
media coverage of specific devastating health effects like child brain cancer and mercury 
poisoning focused the attention of the public and policymakers. While the arsenic drinking water 
standard is the most commonly exceeded based on testing since the PWTA,182 it was not one of 
the chemicals that initially concerned the public and motivated legislators. In Maine, naturally 
occurring arsenic in well water is the primary concern for public health, and while in more recent 
years there has been increased media coverage and constituent interest drawing the attention of 
policymakers to the issue, the fundamental question of whether there should be a 
government/policy role in addressing the problem is still debated. 
Policy Stream: In New Jersey, the policy model of tying testing requirements to real 
estate transactions had already been implemented at the county-level, proving a certain level of 
feasibility and acceptability, and had previously been introduced to the state legislature, passing 
the Assembly at least once, a decade before. In Maine, the PWTA model of testing mandates was 
new, faced significant opposition, and therefore would not be acceptable or feasible without 
considerable efforts to counter that resistance. The mandates in the more recently introduced bills 
were also not treated as serious objectives by the Environmental Health Strategy Center, the 
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policy entrepreneurs guiding the process, rather as bargaining chips to make opposition go away, 
leaving behind the one policy considered most acceptable to advance the issue – a small fund to 
support education and outreach around well testing, especially since the governor had blocked a 
federal grant already supporting similar efforts. 
Politics Stream: The public’s growing interest in their water quality and their right to 
know health risks mobilized existing environmental advocacy coalitions in New Jersey to 
actively push the PWTA policy agenda forward. The New Jersey Environmental Federation in 
particular seems to have taken on the role of policy entrepreneur, partnering with Assemblyman 
Geist to effectively harness all three of Kingdon’s streams. In Maine, the comparative success of 
the more recent education bills also reflected the efforts of an environmental advocacy group, 
Prevent Harm, to rally legislative support and build a coalition campaign, an effort missing from 
the earlier LD 1775 attempt. Furthermore, relatively high legislative turnover meant that there 
were new policymakers coming in open to the issue, even from one session to the next. This 
legislative turnover was necessary to overcome the lack of executive turnover and consistent 
political stance of the administration between bills LD 1162 and LD 454, which were both 
vetoed by Governor LePage. 
Window of Opportunity: Potentially most critical to the New Jersey PWTA’s success 
was the significant window opened by the timely gubernatorial aspirations of the two most 
powerful legislators in the state. The Assembly Speaker’s sponsorship of the PWTA and seeing 
it through the Assembly twice while considering a run, and the Senate President’s taking it up 
and championing it through the Senate to become law by his own signature as acting governor 
once the Speaker was not a primary threat, could be the main reason the PWTA is law today. 
Given that DiFrancesco dropped out of the governor race himself just weeks after the PWTA 
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was signed, the window was a limited opportunity that could have been missed. Notably, there 
has been no legislation to build on or strengthen the PWTA in the years since. In contrast to the 
significant window of opportunity opened for New Jersey’s PWTA, Maine exemplifies the 
challenges in a lack of opportunity. Although Kingdon’s three streams have been developing and 
in some ways aligning together during the recent well testing bill campaigns, there is an 
incredibly difficult political environment in the state, embodied by an extremely conservative 
executive branch guaranteed to veto any efforts to involve government in private well water. 
This sets an especially high threshold of legislative support required for any potential policy to 
become law. 
While definite and generalizable conclusions about state-level private well policy-making 
cannot be drawn from these two cases alone, the contrasts between New Jersey and Maine 
suggest further lines of research and lessons for future action. Beyond the limits to generalization 
of a 2-case study design, differences in the sources available for data collection and analysis 
between these two cases may have also influenced findings. The longer history of well water 
problems and legislative attempts in New Jersey was reflected in rich contemporary news 
coverage which was a valuable resource for building a several decades long narrative timeline in 
the absence of historical legislative documentation. The history of legislative attempts in Maine 
is much shorter and more recent; the state legislative law library has made all committee 
documents including meeting attendance, submitted testimony, and voting records available 
online or by request. Transcripts of floor debate are also released online after the legislative 
session is closed. Such archival records are not available in New Jersey and so news articles and 
accompanying quotes were the primary source for understanding the contemporary positions and 
arguments of various stakeholders. Given the variation of source documentation relied on for the 
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individual case studies, the key informant interviews were critical for filling in knowledge gaps 
to allow consistent analysis across cases. 
One respondent pointed out, “Every state and every year is different. When you are 
passing a law, it’s a lot easier to kill a bill than to pass a bill. Depending on how you count, it’s a 
ten, fifteen, twenty step process. So, to pass a law, you need to go undefeated. You have to win 
every single battle. You have to clear every single hurdle.” Reflecting on the failure of testing 
requirements in Maine, another respondent advised to “think about this more as a 
political/philosophical issue than as a process issue.” In Maine, and elsewhere, there is a 
significant philosophical stance that “this isn’t a role for government” which will need to be 
overcome to advance more ambitious policy agendas to tackle the issue of private well water 
quality. When the primary problem is naturally occurring arsenic, and there is no polluting entity 
to blame, there is no villain to rally against. According to one respondent, “The villain actually is 
state government, which is a more contested and diffuse kind of villain.” The opposition to 
overcome is a tradition of public complacency and neglect. For policy to be an effective tool to 
achieve universal screening of well water it may first require a philosophical evolution on the 
role of government in private well water, and it will need to happen at the local and state-levels 
first. In some ways New Jersey was decades ahead of other states, forced to actively confront this 
drinking water issue because of its population density, industrial past, and vulnerable aquifers; 
even then, it took decades for the right conditions to build within the three streams and the right 
window of opportunity to arise, for significant change to occur. Further research is needed into 
how other states have dealt with, if at all, the fundamental questions underlying such efforts to 
take policy action regarding private well water. 
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Municipality 
1982 Middlesex 
Borough ordinance 
requires private well 
testing during real estate 
transaction 
County 
1987 Ocean County 
ordinance requires 
private well testing 
during real estate 
transaction 
State 
2001 New Jersey 
PWTA requires 
private well testing 
during real estate 
transaction 
Figure 2.1: Timeline of first testing requirements at local, county, and state level in New Jersey 
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CHAPTER 3: HEALTH PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING ARSENIC 
TESTING REQUIRED BY THE NEW JERSEY PRIVATE WELL TESTING ACT 
 
Abstract 
 Naturally occurring arsenic in groundwater is a public health concern when unregulated 
private wells are used for drinking; its presence can only be detected through specific testing and 
individual well owners are solely responsible for monitoring and maintaining the quality of their 
water. At present the greatest barrier to arsenic exposure reduction is a lack of private well 
testing; given the limitations in motivating individual private well owners to act, there is 
potential for policy to make a significant contribution towards universal screening of private well 
water quality. New Jersey’s Private Well Testing Act (PWTA) has since 2002 required well tests 
for arsenic during real estate transactions, although no remediation action is required. A follow-
up survey to owners of wells with > 5 µg/L arsenic identified through PWTA-required tests 
reveals a range of mitigation behavior among respondents (n=486), between taking no action to 
reduce exposure (28%) to reporting both treatment use and appropriate maintenance and 
monitoring behavior (15%). Although 86% of respondents recall their well was tested during 
their real estate transaction, only 60% report their test showed an arsenic problem. Treatment 
systems are used by 63% of households, although half were installed by a previous owner. 
Among those treating their water (n=308), only 31% have tested the treated water within the past 
year and 57% report that maintenance is being performed as recommended. Perceived 
susceptibility and barriers are strong predictors of mitigation action, while perceived severity is 
associated with recent monitoring and level of commitment is associated with proper 
maintenance among those treating for arsenic. Mention of a treatment service agreement is also a 
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strong predictor of appropriate monitoring and maintenance behavior; treatment installed by a 
previous owner is less likely to be maintained as recommended. While the PWTA requires that 
the well test be conducted, this study finds that not all current well owners are aware the test has 
happened or have understood the implications of their arsenic results. Among those that have 
treatment installed to remove arsenic, poor monitoring and maintenance behaviors threaten to 
undermine intentions to reduce exposure. Findings suggest that additional effort, resources, and 
support to make sure that home buyers pay attention to, understand, and act on test results at the 
time they are performed may help improve management of arsenic water problems over the long 
term, thereby more effectively reducing population exposure. 
 
1. Background 
Arsenic is naturally occurring in groundwater across the United States and is a public 
health concern when private wells are relied on for domestic water supply. Chronic exposure to 
arsenic through drinking water is associated with various cancers, cardiovascular disease, lung 
disease, and diminished child IQ.183 Although users of public water systems benefit from the 
federal Safe Drinking Water Act and its regulatory oversight ensuring their drinking water meets 
government standards for arsenic and other contaminants, the 15% of Americans who rely on 
private well water are excluded;184 monitoring and maintaining the quality of drinking water 
remains the responsibility of individual well owners. The “private” designation of water sources 
supplying fewer than 25 people or 15 households spares individuals the regulatory burden of 
compliance while denying equal assurances of safe drinking water. 
It is difficult to estimate how many of the over 13 million U.S. households dependent on 
private well water34 are affected by arsenic, or the health and economic costs associated with that 
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exposure, in part because private well water quality is not regulated and there is no systematic 
monitoring in place. Research finds the probability of arsenic occurrence at regional and local 
scales can increasingly be predicted by geostatistical modeling;38,39 a recent study estimates over 
2.1 million Americans are drinking from wells with arsenic above the 10 µg/L federal standard.40 
However, high degrees of spatial variability mean the presence and concentration of arsenic in 
individual wells can only be determined by a specific water test; therefore, every well must be 
tested. In the absence of federal regulations, individuals must be aware, willing, and capable to 
take the actions required to ensure safe drinking water for their household; individual protective 
behavior is therefore currently essential to exposure reduction. Research indicates that the 
reasons private well owners do or do not act to reduce exposure are often complex, with 
additional challenges in the case of arsenic.43,44,97-99 As a result, a majority of households in 
many at risk areas have not tested their wells for arsenic and are unaware of their exposure;42,47,53 
therefore, at present the greatest barrier to arsenic exposure reduction is a lack of well testing. 
The private nature of domestic well water exposes households to risk from a lack of 
oversight while hindering community engagement efforts through a necessary focus on the 
protective actions of individual well owners. Community testing campaigns often have limited 
success,60-62 and socioeconomic disparities in exposure likely arise from differing rates of testing 
participation.98,99 Given limitations in motivating individual private well owners to act, there is 
potential for policy to make a significant contribution towards universal screening of private well 
water quality. With its Private Well Testing Act (PWTA), New Jersey is one of only two states 
in the country, the other Oregon, to require testing of private well water for arsenic during real 
estate transactions. New Jersey also has the most protective drinking water standard for arsenic 
in the country, at 5 µg/L. Since September 2002 the PWTA has generated over 35,000 well tests 
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for arsenic in the 12 northern counties where it is required; the resulting geocoded database is 
now a significant resource for studying groundwater in the state and targeting local outreach 
efforts to the areas of greatest risk. The law provides a model for practical and feasible state-
level policy action in the absence of other regulations to ensure that more private wells are tested 
for arsenic, and, in the long run, that all wells be eventually tested. State and local policies 
requiring private well testing could be a significant and necessary tool for achieving universal 
well screening in this country.9 
Although the PWTA and other public health efforts focus on testing private wells, testing 
can only act as a screening tool; after arsenic is found in a well, a household must then decide on 
further action to reduce exposure – treatment, avoidance through bottled water, or no action. The 
PWTA has no requirement that any protective action be taken, only that the test occur. 
Legislators’ assumption that the pressure of the home sale would prompt negotiations resulting 
in corrective treatment is supported by anecdotal stories, but there is no evidence available to 
confirm this assumption. Environmentalists have since pointed to the lack of required treatment 
as a serious failing of the PWTA and have called for legislative reform.157 Follow-up surveys to 
participants of voluntary well testing programs in other states find that a third to a half of 
households notified of high arsenic in their water may not be taking action to reduce their 
exposure,54,77 suggesting that protective behavior even among informed well owners is not 
guaranteed. The specific effect PWTA-required testing during home purchase, as compared to 
voluntary testing,10 may have on subsequent protective actions among those with arsenic 
exceedances,95 is still unknown. Findings from a random survey of private well households in 
northern New Jersey suggest that these newer well owners may frequently forget or 
misremember arsenic test results, are more likely to not know what kind of treatment they are 
 76 
using, and do not report better maintenance or monitoring of treatment than those who had 
voluntarily tested their well water.53 This suggests challenges to reducing exposure remain even 
when testing is required.  
This study is the first to follow-up with owners of high-arsenic wells tested through the 
New Jersey PWTA; its aim is to estimate the proportion of households acting to mitigate arsenic 
exposure, the proportion appropriately monitoring and maintaining their treatment systems, and 
to investigate the factors that influence these mitigation behaviors. Understanding the arsenic 
mitigation behavior among this population will help to evaluate the impact of the PWTA, will 
aid development of public resources to support these and future well owners through their 
subsequent exposure reduction needs, and can inform the design of future private well testing 
and treatment policy.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Study population 
Over one million people (11% of the population) in New Jersey rely on private well 
water for drinking.4 Only 25% of private wells are estimated to have been tested through the 
PWTA since 2002 due to the slow pace of housing turnover.53 The PWTA requires testing 
untreated well water for arsenic in the northern 12 counties of the state where arsenic 
concentrations as high as 250 µg/L are naturally occurring in the bedrock aquifers of the Newark 
Basin (Figure 3.1).185 Of the private wells tested under the PWTA in these counties, 8.9% have 
exceeded the state arsenic standard for drinking water; arsenic has been found more common 
than any other contaminant.182 From September 2002 through March 2014 there were 3,996 tests 
with arsenic values of 5 µg/L or greater; 3,476 unique wells after reducing wells with multiple 
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tests to the most recent or only test with a qualifying value. Public and commercial properties, 
based on property tax records, and several addresses which had been randomly selected for a 
previous mailed survey on arsenic testing and treatment in 201495 were excluded from selection 
for the survey. The final sample of 1,500 addresses included all wells with ≥25 µg/L arsenic 
(n=175), all wells with 10-25 µg/L (n=872), and an approximately 20% selection (n=453) of all 
wells with 5-10 µg/L, drawn randomly across all time periods. 
 
2.2 Data collection 
Data was collected via self-administered mailed questionnaire (Appendix B). The 
questionnaire was adapted from those used for arsenic-affected private well users in 
Wisconsin186 and Maine77 to fit the context of the PWTA, and has been reviewed by key 
stakeholders in New Jersey for content validity. Questions covered arsenic testing experiences, 
water treatment practices, and basic demographic information. A series of statements based on 
health behavior theory with Likert scale responses were included to explore the relative influence 
of psychological beliefs on mitigation behavior outcomes. Survey items were categorized into 
psychological constructs that may explain arsenic mitigation behavior (see Appendix B), as 
outlined by the Health Belief Model: Perceived Susceptibility – feelings of personal vulnerability 
to arsenic exposure; Perceived Severity – feelings on the seriousness of consequences of arsenic 
exposure; Perceived Benefits – perceived effectiveness of actions to reduce exposure; Perceived 
Barriers – feelings on the obstacles to reduce exposure; Self-efficacy – level of confidence in 
one’s ability to reduce exposure; and Cue to Action – advice to reduce exposure from a local 
authority.187 This model was modified with the additional factor of “Commitment,” or the feeling 
of obligation to reduce arsenic exposure, taken from the RANAS model of integrated health and 
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social psychology theories188 because it has been found a significant predictor of arsenic 
mitigation behavior in Bangladesh.189,190 
Contact strategy was based on Dillman’s Tailored Design Method,191 employing repeated 
contact to increase the response rate. Survey materials were addressed to the current owner listed 
in the NJ property tax records, “or current resident.” Selected addresses (n=1,500) were mailed a 
letter notifying of the forthcoming survey several days before receiving a cover letter, 
questionnaire, and pre-stamped return envelope. Enclosed with the survey was a $2 bill as a 
“token of appreciation,” which is known to increase response more effectively than post-paid 
incentives contingent on participation.192,193 The deadline for returning the survey was set four 
weeks out. A week after the surveys were mailed all addresses were sent a thank you/reminder 
postcard, and several weeks later non-responding addresses were mailed a follow-up reminder 
letter, extending the deadline for participation by another month. The survey was described as a 
collaboration between Columbia University, the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH), 
and the New Jersey Geological and Water Survey. All survey materials were signed by both 
Columbia and NJDOH investigators (see Appendix B). The study protocol and survey 
instrument were approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Columbia University and the 
City University of New York. 
 
2.3 Data analysis 
All survey data was analyzed using Stata/IC 14.2. First, descriptive statistics (frequency, 
mean, median) for variables of interest were computed. Second, correlations and multiple 
logistic regressions were performed. For these analyses, 26 survey items were categorized into 
psychological constructs and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to assess the 
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model fit of each scale alone and together in a single model (Appendix B). Each of the scales 
exhibited adequate internal consistency (α≥.70) and CFA model statistics indicated adequate fit 
for each scale and the overall model, following accepted criteria (CFI>0.93, SRMR<0.08, 
RMSEA<0.08).194 Two items were dropped from the Perceived Severity scale due to weak factor 
loadings (<.40). All responses to individual items were on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 6 (strongly agree); survey items were averaged to build composite scales for use in the 
multivariate analyses. 
Spearman correlation analyses were performed to identify significant associations (p<.05) 
between responses to key variables and sociodemographic and psychological factors. Significant 
factors were retained for subsequent logistic regression analyses, performed to estimate the 
effects of select explanatory variables on the odds of the outcome behaviors (Tables 3.4-8). First, 
univariate models predicting primary outcomes (mitigating, treating, monitoring, maintaining) 
from theorized situational factors and significantly associated sociodemographic and 
psychological factors were calculated. Then, separate multiple logistic regressions were 
calculated to identify the most influential of these situational, sociodemographic, and 
psychological factors within groups (models 1 and 2). Finally, a combined model including all 
significant factors of these previous regressions was computed to suggest the relative importance 
of significant predictors (models 3). The primary outcome “Mitigation” is defined as reported 
use of arsenic treatment or avoidance of the water, i.e. reporting “rarely or never” using the well 
for drinking. “Treating” is defined as reporting use of a water treatment system specifically 
installed to remove arsenic. “Monitoring” is defined as having ever tested the treated water, 
while “Recent Monitoring” is having tested the treated water within the past year, the minimum 
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frequency recommended when treating for arsenic. “Maintaining” is defined as reporting that 
maintenance on the treatment system is performed “as recommended.” 
Finally, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess potential non-response bias. If 
known values for the target population are not available for comparison, one method to estimate 
non-response bias is to use extrapolation, based on the assumption that participants who respond 
less readily are more like nonrespondents. For example, individuals who respond in later waves 
of a survey, i.e. after follow-up contacts, are assumed to have responded because of the increased 
stimulus and therefore expected to be similar to nonrespondents.195 For this survey a follow-up 
letter was mailed near the initial deadline to respond, reminding recipients to participate and 
extending the time to return the survey by an additional month. Participants who returned the 
survey after the initial deadline were classified as “late responders” for comparison to the full 
sample. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Characteristics of respondents 
Out of the 1500 surveys mailed, 106 were undeliverable. The survey response rate among 
delivered surveys (n=1394) was 36%; 500 surveys were returned. Surveys returned from 
households now on public water supply (n=14) were excluded from analysis. Four surveys 
returned completed but with barcodes removed are retained in the sample but cannot be linked to 
PWTA test results. 
Survey respondents are overwhelmingly home owners, have a median age of 51 years, 
and are highly educated; over 75% have a bachelor’s degree (Table 3.1). Additionally, 
respondents have very high incomes; over half of participating households have incomes greater 
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than $150,000. Nearly half of households include at least one child under 18, while 10% of 
respondents live alone. Most households (85%) report that they rely on their well water for 
drinking from some to all of the time. The distributions of arsenic level and assessed property 
value among respondents reflect the overall sample and are not significantly different from non-
responding households. 
 
3.2 Testing recall and response 
Selection for the survey was based on test results submitted to the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) following real estate transactions, and most 
respondents (86%) could indeed recall that a well test occurred at that time (Table 3.2). Another 
7% who did not recall a test occurred at that time reported that their water has been tested for 
arsenic since, while the remaining 7% are unaware that their well water has ever been tested.  
Although most recall the PWTA test occurred, only 60% of respondents report that their well test 
showed an arsenic problem. The longer it has been since the last PWTA test and the lower the 
arsenic value of that test, the less likely that a respondent identifies their well as having an 
arsenic problem. Only 30% of private well owners with arsenic levels between 5 and 10 µg/L 
whose wells were tested before the new NJ MCL went into effect in 2006 (n=47) identify an 
arsenic problem, half the rate of those with the same level who were tested since 2006 (n=97). 
Less than a quarter of respondents could accurately report the range of the arsenic concentration 
of their well. Underestimation was more common among incorrect responses, although over half 
were not able to answer at all. Yet, only a small portion of respondents (8%) reported that they 
had any difficulty understanding their water test results, while 31% said the test report was 
neither easy nor difficult to understand (Table 3.2). Water treatment professionals and real estate 
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agents were the most common to have discussed arsenic results with. Overall, 60% of survey 
respondents reported that they had discussed their arsenic level with somebody outside their 
household; 87% among those who identified having an arsenic problem. A significant portion of 
respondents were unable to select the highest level of arsenic they would consider safe, many 
writing in that they did not know enough to make a choice. Half of survey respondents selected 
below 5 µg/L, the drinking water standard in New Jersey, while 17% indicated they considered 
levels above safe to drink.  
 
3.3. Mitigation behavior 
Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicated that they have treatment installed to remove 
arsenic from their water, almost evenly split between systems installed by a previous owner and 
systems installed by the current resident (Table 3.2). Another 8% of households indicate they 
drink from their well water “rarely or never” and thus can also be considered mitigating their 
exposure to arsenic, despite not using treatment. Thus, the remaining 28% of surveyed 
households are apparently not acting to reduce their exposure to arsenic (Figure 3.2).  
The most common reasons for not installing treatment were not concerned about the 
arsenic level (27%), drinking bottled water to reduce exposure (11%), and not knowing what 
kind of treatment to get (9%). The hypothetical situations most commonly selected to prompt 
treatment installation were if a test showed their arsenic level has increased above what it is now 
(48%), if they learned that arsenic in their drinking water could increase their risk for cancer 
(34%), and if a doctor recommended they treat their water (30%). Although 31% said that they 
would treat their water to remove arsenic if it caused a change in the taste, smell or appearance 
of their water, arsenic unfortunately will never be seen, smelled, or tasted in water. 
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Among those who report having arsenic treatment installed (n=308), 46% report that at 
least part of their water treatment system in place came with the home when they purchased it 
(Table 3.3). The median age of treatment systems was 7 years, and the median cost to install 
among the half who could give an estimate was $3000. Arsenic treatment systems were 
overwhelmingly whole-house, rather than point of use. Most respondents (74%) with arsenic 
treatment report that the treated water has been tested at least once since installation, although 
only 31% indicated their most recent test was within the past year. Just over half (57%) of 
treating private well users report that their systems are maintained as recommended, while 18% 
report that maintenance has rarely or never been performed. When asked to describe their 
treatment maintenance process, only a quarter of treating households mentioned regular service 
visits by an outside company. Several respondents commented that although an arsenic system 
came with their home at purchase, the cost to replace treatment tanks is too expensive and so 
they have disconnected the treatment or have not replaced the media since moving in. Despite 
the high household incomes in this sample, over half (54%) of all survey respondents agreed 
with the statement “treating my water is too expensive.” 
 
3.4 Correlation analyses 
Well arsenic level as measured in the most recent PWTA test is positively and 
significantly associated with both mitigation and treatment use (p<.001); 80% of survey 
respondents with arsenic > 25 µg/L are taking mitigation action, while only 62% of those with 5 
to 10 µg/L are. Generally, other sociodemographic characteristics are not significantly associated 
with survey responses in this sample. Of primary outcomes, mitigation and use of arsenic 
treatment are both significantly (p<.001) and negatively associated with number of years lived in 
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this home. Age is also negatively associated (p<.05) and having a bachelor’s degree positively 
associated (p<.01) with treatment use. Monitoring and maintenance behaviors among treating 
households are not significantly associated with sociodemographic characteristics.  
All psychological factors based on the modified health belief model (Appendix B) are 
significantly (p<.001) associated with mitigation and use of arsenic treatment. Among those 
using treatment, only self-efficacy and commitment are significantly associated with having ever 
tested treated water, while perceived severity, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers are 
additionally significantly associated with having tested treated water within the past year. All 
factors except perceived susceptibility and cue to action are significantly associated with 
maintaining treatment as recommended. 
 
3.5 Predictors of mitigation behavior 
Significant predictors of taking mitigation action (either treating or avoiding water) in 
unadjusted regression models (Table 3.4) include identifying a well arsenic problem, having 
discussed their arsenic level with somebody, the actual arsenic concentration of their well, and 
the number of years lived in this home. Furthermore, all psychological factors significantly 
predict mitigation in unadjusted models. In multivariate models only identifying an arsenic 
problem and having discussed arsenic with somebody (Table 3.4, Model 1), and the behavioral 
factors perceived susceptibility, perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cue to action remaining 
significant (Table 3.4, Model 2). Beyond years lived in their home, no sociodemographic 
characteristics were significantly associated with mitigation behavior in this sample. In an 
adjusted model stratified by years in the home (Table 3.4, Model 3), having discussed arsenic 
with somebody (OR=3.83) is an important predictor of mitigation among those who purchased 
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their home less than 8 years ago, while identifying an arsenic problem (OR=5.54) is the most 
significant predictor of mitigation among those who have lived in their home for longer. 
Perceived barriers (OR=0.65), and self-efficacy (OR=1.36) are also significant predictors of 
mitigation, only among those living in their home for at least 8 years. 
For arsenic treatment use alone, identifying an arsenic problem and perceived 
susceptibility remain significant predictors in stratified adjusted models (Table 3.5, Model 3). 
For respondents who have lived in their home less than 8 years, having a bachelor’s degree 
becomes highly significant (OR=11.51), an effect not seen in the mitigation models. The average 
marginal effect of a bachelor’s degree among this group is a 21% increased likelihood of 
treatment use (p<.001). For respondents who have lived in their home at least 8 years, the effect 
of education is not significant. Instead, commitment (OR=1.94), and arsenic concentration join 
perceived barriers (OR=0.60), and self-efficacy (OR=1.47), as significant predictors of treatment 
use.   
Among those treating for arsenic, having ever tested the treated water is significantly 
predicted by self-efficacy and having discussed arsenic with somebody (Table 3.6, Model 3). If 
the homeowner has discussed their arsenic level with an outside person, they have nearly 3 times 
greater odds of having ever tested their treated water (p=.002). When narrowing to having tested 
the treated water within the past year, as 31% of treating households report, only perceived 
severity (OR=1.35) and mention of a treatment service agreement with an outside company 
(OR=1.86) remain significantly associated with recent monitoring in an adjusted model (Table 
3.7, Model 3). 
Only 57% of well owners treating for arsenic report that maintenance on their treatment 
system is performed as recommended. Who was responsible for installing the treatment matters 
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(Table 3.8); if the previous owner installed the arsenic treatment system, then the current resident 
is 15% less likely to be properly maintaining it as one who installed it themselves (p<.01). 
However, in a model adjusting for psychological factors, only level of commitment (OR=1.64) 
and whether the respondent mentioned a treatment service agreement (OR=3.5) (Table 3.8, 
Model 3) are significant predictors of maintenance as recommended. 
 
3.6 Non-response sensitivity analysis 
Approximately 21% of participants returned the survey after the initial deadline and were 
therefore classified as “late responders” for comparison to the full sample. There are no 
significant differences between this subset and the full sample on any socio-demographic 
characteristics or well arsenic concentration. A comparison of responses for key variables (Table 
3.9) reveals that late responders are moderately less likely to report that their well was tested for 
arsenic at purchase (80% vs. 86%, p=.09), significantly less likely to report that their well has an 
arsenic problem (47% vs. 60%, p<.05), and moderately less likely to correctly recall their arsenic 
level (13% vs. 21%, p=.08). Differences between late responders and the full sample on primary 
outcomes are not statistically significant. Only 64% of late responders report behavior to mitigate 
their arsenic exposure, compared to 72% in the full sample (p=.09), while 57% report arsenic 
treatment is installed compared to 64% in the full sample (p=.17). Differences in rates of 
maintenance and monitoring among treating households are not statistically significant (p>.4). 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Most take protective action after PWTA testing 
Since 2002 the PWTA has required tens of thousands of private wells in northern New 
Jersey to be tested for arsenic; testing which may not have occurred otherwise. Previous research 
has suggested that 4 out of 5 households with high arsenic who have not yet been required to test 
under the PWTA are likely unaware of their water problem.95 The PWTA has been described as 
a “right to know” law because it gives buyers the opportunity to know what will be in the water 
of the home they are buying and the opportunity to protect themselves against it. This study 
suggests that of the thousands of home buyers notified their well has arsenic levels above the NJ 
drinking water standard, a majority have acted on that knowledge to reduce exposure.  
In this survey sample, being aware that a test occurred and that the results showed an 
arsenic problem are important predictors of arsenic mitigation action. Most (92%) well owners 
who report they have a “problem” are acting to mitigate their exposure. The fact that some 
respondents were unaware of the PWTA testing (14%) or their specific arsenic result (79%) 
suggests that there is room for improvement in communicating test results to home buyers so that 
the implications are understood. However, this recall of testing among high arsenic households is 
still better than in the general population tested under the PWTA. Only 59% of 140 randomly 
surveyed homeowners correctly reported that their well has ever been tested for arsenic.95  
Perceived susceptibility to arsenic contamination remains a significant predictor of 
mitigation action, even after adjusting for other significant psychological and situational factors, 
regardless of how long a well owner has been living in their home (Table 3.4, Model 3). 
However, well owners who have been living in their home longer appear more entrenched in 
their original mitigation decisions; perceptions of barriers such as cost, time, and effort, and 
 88 
beliefs about self-efficacy are stronger predictors of action. Influences on treatment use are 
similar to mitigation behavior, although commitment to safe drinking water may play a stronger 
role among those who have lived in their home longer. Among more recent home buyers there 
may be a socioeconomic effect on treatment use; private well owners with a bachelor’s degree 
have significantly greater odds of having arsenic treatment installed than those with less 
education, a relationship between education and treatment previously observed in New Jersey 
and elsewhere.98 However, education does not seem to have a significant effect on mitigation in 
general. This echoes a Maine study which found no relationship between socioeconomic 
measures and mitigation, but found that among those taking action, higher educated and higher 
income well owners were more likely to install treatment while lower educated and lower 
income well owners were more likely to rely on bottled water to reduce their exposure.196 This 
divergence may stem from the prohibitive upfront costs of installing treatment, despite it being 
more cost-effective over the long term than purchasing water for households of more than one 
person.80 The ratio of arsenic treatment to bottled water use among mitigating households is 
much higher in New Jersey (7.9 to 1) than in Maine (1.2 to 1),196 perhaps reflecting the higher 
income population or that arsenic treatment options are more readily available. 
Importantly, arsenic concentration remains a significant factor in mitigation decisions;196 
rates of mitigation increase at higher levels of arsenic. However, it should be noted that self-
reported mitigation actions do not guarantee exposure reduction. Households that rely on bottled 
water or point-of-use treatment may remain exposed through occasional use of untreated 
water.81,82 Furthermore, exposure can persist because of ineffective or failing treatment 
systems.53,84,196 
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4.2 Monitoring and maintenance behavior could undermine treatment intentions 
Installing a water treatment system is not a guarantee of exposure reduction. Treatment 
units can be ineffective for arsenic due to the geochemistry of the well water, or fail from 
improper maintenance. Without regular monitoring, this failure and the resulting exposure to the 
household can go unnoticed by well-intentioned homeowners. In Maine, 10 of 68 treatment 
systems tested were failing to deliver water with arsenic below 10 µg/L.196 In New Jersey, 4 of 
22 treatment systems tested in one study,99 and 7 of 65 systems tested in another focused on a 
township which requires whole-house dual tank treatment systems,83 were failing to deliver 
water below 5 µg/L. In all cases the homeowners were unaware. Private well owners treating for 
arsenic or any other contaminant are encouraged to regularly test their treated water to ensure the 
system is functioning, at a minimum annually, but consistent monitoring at that frequency is rare. 
Less than a third (31%) of the arsenic-treating households in this study report having tested that 
recently, and a quarter (26%) cannot confirm the treated water has ever been tested. Self-efficacy 
beliefs and having discussed arsenic with somebody were the strongest predictors of having ever 
tested, while perceived severity of the adverse effects of arsenic and having an arrangement for 
regular servicing of the treatment system emerge as significant predictors of recent testing 
among respondents.  
Having a service agreement, more common among those who moved in more recently, 
and the strength of the respondent’s commitment to decreasing exposure are the most significant 
factors predicting proper treatment maintenance. Maintenance contracts are not required with the 
purchase of water treatment systems in New Jersey; the entire private water treatment sector is 
unregulated. While many survey respondents described following a regular testing schedule on 
their own and then arranging for treatment maintenance as needed, those who report receiving 
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regularly scheduled contacts or visits from an outside company also report better monitoring and 
maintenance behavior. However, few treating households (27%) mention such an arrangement, 
although it is significantly more common among well owners who more recently moved into 
their home. Only 57% of all treating households in this study report that their system is being 
maintained as recommended, compared to 79% in the Maine follow-up study of voluntary 
testing.196 Although the effect was no longer statistically significant after adjusting for 
psychological factors, treatment installed by a previous homeowner, as half of the systems 
reported in this survey were, is significantly associated with reduced odds of proper 
maintenance. A quarter of those who said their system was installed by the previous owner report 
that maintenance has rarely or never been performed, compared to 10% among those who 
installed the treatment themselves. Current homeowners who did not manage the treatment 
installation may be less committed to its maintenance or not understand how the system works or 
should be maintained; in fact, current owners of seller-installed systems do report significantly 
lower levels of self-efficacy and commitment. Respondents with seller-installed arsenic 
treatment systems are also significantly more likely to report that they “don’t remember” the 
arsenic level of their well revealed by the PWTA test. Previously installed systems are more 
common among recent home purchases, which could reflect a trend of more successful 
negotiation for new systems on the part of educated buyers or that treatment had already been 
installed after earlier arsenic screening. Either way, this trend suggests that effective maintenance 
of existing arsenic treatment systems will be a growing challenge. 
That so many households (54%) in such a high-income sample would consider arsenic 
treatment too expensive is concerning, considering that most arsenic-affected populations on 
private well water will be less affluent than this northern New Jersey population. While the 
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PWTA did not include requirements for treatment, it was assumed that a “failed” test would be 
resolved through negotiation between buyer and seller; prospective buyers could insist on 
remediation as a condition of the purchase.197 While that may be the case for a number of 
surveyed households, and is perhaps why nearly half of arsenic treatment systems in this sample 
were installed by the previous owner, the costs of installation are a one-off. Treatment systems 
require frequent and often expensive maintenance, especially to replace costly treatment media 
when it’s spent. Respondents describe needing to replace the media in their arsenic treatment 
tanks every 2-3 years, at around $1000 to $2000 each time, on top of other water treatment 
needs. Annual water tests can run up to several hundred dollars. The ongoing cost of monitoring 
and maintenance can be a barrier to mitigation beyond the costs to install treatment; more than 
one respondent in this survey mentioned that they have “switched off” the arsenic system 
because they can’t afford to replace the media. Of note, 13% of households not currently treating 
their water reported that receiving an interest-free loan would prompt them to install treatment; 
the New Jersey Housing & Mortgage Finance Agency already has such a program in place to pay 
for appropriate treatment technology, although it is not clear whether this potable water loan 
program can be used to pay for ongoing maintenance costs. 
 
4.3 About one third of exposed do not act after testing 
The portion of surveyed households not taking action to reduce arsenic exposure (28%) 
in this study is similar to the rates found by surveys in Maine (27%)196 and Wisconsin (40%)54 
that followed-up with voluntary testing program participants, and a recent Minnesota survey 
(35%) that followed up on testing after new well construction.198 Together these studies confirm 
that a significant portion of private well users will not act on arsenic testing results. The 
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expectation that screening programs or requirements will cause individuals to take subsequent 
protective action on their own is only partially true. For the full benefit of universal screening 
towards exposure reduction, it will be necessary to identify and address the psychological and 
situational barriers to mitigation action after testing among the affected populations.  
While we don’t fully understand why the rates of non-action are so similar across 
populations and across testing conditions, in this particular New Jersey population we see the 
psychological differences most clearly between the 15% of respondents who could be considered 
“doing everything right,” i.e. treating their water, maintaining as recommended, and have tested 
in the past year (Figure 3.2), and those who are not taking any actions to reduce exposure. The 
differences in all psychological factors between these “super-actors” (n=74) and non-actors 
(n=138) are highly significant (p<.001) (Table 3.10). Super actors are also more likely to have a 
bachelor’s degree and higher household income. However, most respondents (57%) fall in 
between these extremes of action; they (or a previous owner) took some action to reduce arsenic 
exposure but they may not be practicing the maintenance and monitoring behavior necessary to 
be confident in its effectiveness. 
Only 41% of non-acting respondents report their well has an arsenic problem, the rest 
either do not believe they have a “problem,” or are unaware of the arsenic level in their water, 
both reflected in low perceived susceptibility. Some misremembering may be due to confusion 
over the relevant drinking water standard for arsenic. Just before the PWTA went into effect in 
2002, the federal government adopted a new arsenic standard of 10 µg/L, replacing the previous 
50 µg/L standard. In late 2004, the state of New Jersey adopted a more protective standard of 5 
µg/L. Both new standards, enforceable only for public drinking water systems, went into effect 
in January 2006. Although these standards had been adopted prior to 2006, it is not known 
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whether they were made clear to private well owners who tested before then; laboratory reports 
from the time still appear to use the old standard as a reference value, perhaps with a footnote 
mentioning the new federal standard. Current homeowners who last tested their well when 
purchasing their home before 2006 may not be aware that their arsenic result at that time would 
be considered a “problem” now. Year of most recent PWTA test is a highly significant predictor 
of identifying an arsenic problem and mitigation action (p<.001); the longer ago the test, the less 
likely a problem is identified or action was taken. When excluding tests before 2006 the effect of 
the test year is no longer significant.  
Regardless of standards at the time of testing there is a lack of present engagement with 
the issue of arsenic in drinking water among this surveyed population. Only a small portion of 
respondents could report the range of their well arsenic concentration correctly and half were not 
able to decide on a level of arsenic in drinking water they considered safe. While more 
respondents (60%) did mention having discussed their arsenic level with somebody, a significant 
predictor of taking mitigation action, it is concerning that so many apparently made their 
decisions to act or not to act without consultation. Only 10% of those who spoke to someone 
about their arsenic have not taken mitigation action, compared to 57% of those who did not 
speak to someone. Local authorities are apparently not playing an active role in mitigation 
promotion; only 21% of all respondents agree that they have been advised by a local authority 
not to drink their well water untreated.  
 
4.4 Study limitations 
Although survey research into behavior necessarily relies on self-reporting, and therefore 
data quality depends in part on respondents’ willingness and ability to provide accurate 
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answers,199 it is often the most appropriate method to obtain personal information not available 
elsewhere.200 There is no requirement to act on PWTA test results, thus assessment of mitigation 
behavior requires collecting data from affected individuals themselves, even if they are reporting 
events from many years ago. A thorough assessment of current treatment use and actual arsenic 
exposure would require on-site inspections and water sample collection,83 which were beyond 
the means of this study.  
Despite efforts to minimize and evaluate survey non-response, it is possible that the 486 
participants do not fully represent the overall population they were drawn from. Although there 
is no socio-demographic data available for non-responding households, we find no significant 
difference in the distribution of assessed property value, a proxy measure for other 
socioeconomic measures, among responders and non-responders. The median assessed home 
value among survey responders ($457,100) is not significantly different from that of non-
responders ($456,400). Similarly, there is no significant difference in the distribution of most 
recent arsenic test results or average arsenic concentration (15.1 vs. 14.6 µg/L) between groups. 
These findings indicate there may not be significant differences in the population of responders 
and non-responders in terms of socioeconomic characteristics and potential arsenic exposure. 
The sensitivity analysis comparing late responders to the full sample also shows no difference in 
sociodemographic characteristics or primary outcomes, although it suggests that non-responders, 
if more like late-responders, may be less likely to identify having an arsenic problem than survey 
respondents.  
Finally, since this northern New Jersey population is generally very educated and of high 
household income, this may not be the best sample to further explore socioeconomic influences 
on the target behaviors. Additionally, less than 2% of survey respondents here are renters, and 
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only 2 of 7 identify an arsenic problem in their well despite concentrations ranging from 10.0 to 
39.5 µg/L. Although the PWTA applies to rental properties and landlords are supposed to 
provide renters with a well test report when they sign a lease, a shortcoming of the law is that 
there is no record-keeping or enforcement system. The total number of rentals that should be 
regulated under the PWTA is unknown, and many required tests may not be happening (see 
Chapter 4). Potential survey non-response and exposure reduction among this population is 
therefore difficult to assess. 
Despite its limitations, this study is the only investigation into arsenic mitigation behavior 
among PWTA-affected households, its findings are supported by previous studies of arsenic 
mitigation behavior, and it identifies several factors which contribute to persistent exposure 
among a rare population that has been universally screened through testing requirements. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Regulations to require testing like the Private Well Testing Act can make a significant 
contribution towards universal screening of private well water quality; eventually every well will 
be tested and every high arsenic level identified. While this study finds the PWTA results in 
mitigation action taken among most affected households, not all well owners are aware the test 
has happened or have understood the implication of their arsenic results. That so many do act to 
reduce exposure is an achievement of the legislation to require well water testing; however, as 
long as there is no requirement for remediation a significant portion of those affected will not 
take action due to a combination of situational and psychological factors. 
Among those that have treatment installed to remove arsenic, poor monitoring and 
maintenance behaviors, especially among prior-installed systems, threaten to undermine 
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intentions to reduce exposure. The ongoing costs of treatment may contribute to this, as could 
other barriers to the self-efficacy and commitment beliefs required to manage these ongoing 
responsibilities or to arrange for a service contract. Most affected households fall in this middle 
range of behavior where there may be an interest or intention to reduce exposure, even if 
monitoring and maintenance behavior are not perfect; these may be the lower-hanging fruits for 
exposure reduction intervention. Among those who bought their home many years ago and have 
not taken mitigation action since, perceived barriers to treatment are stronger and interventions to 
change beliefs and behavior now are more likely to face additional challenges.  
Notably, most private wells in New Jersey have still not been tested under the PWTA; 
this requirement to test at home purchase provides an opportunity for upfront intervention, before 
mitigation decisions are made. Additional effort, resources, and support to make sure that new 
home buyers pay attention to, understand, and act on test results at the time they are performed 
could lead to higher mitigation rates and help to instill the commitment required to manage 
arsenic water problems over the long term, thereby more effectively reducing population 
exposure.
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Figure 3.1: Location and treatment use among households mailed the survey; Percent of PWTA wells tested that exceed the New 
Jersey MCL within 2x2 mile areas (Source: NJDEP) 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of survey respondents with private wells (n=486) 
Variable Frequency 
Home Owners 97% 
Years in Home Median 8, Range 0-55 
Age Median 51 
18-44 24% 
45-64 63% 
65 and older 13% 
Male/Female 54% / 46% 
Education  
High school or less 5% 
Some college 18% 
Bachelor’s degree 38% 
Graduate Degree 38% 
Household Income  
<$50,000 5% 
$50,000 – 100,000 18% 
$100,000 – 150,000 21% 
$150,000 – 200,000 17% 
> $200,000 40% 
Children in Home 49% 
Living Alone 10% 
Water Use  
Mostly or Always 73% 
Sometimes 12% 
Rarely or Never 15% 
PWTA Arsenic Measure†  
Less than 5 µg/L 4% 
5 to 10 µg/L 30% 
10 to 25 µg/L 53% 
25 to 50 µg/L 11% 
> 50 µg/L 2% 
†
Most recent value if the property was sold more than once since 2002 
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Table 3.2: Testing recall and response actions (n=486) 
Variable Frequency 
Recall Test at Sale Occurred 86% 
Not tested at sale, but tested since 7% 
Report Test Showed Arsenic Problem  60% 
Recall Arsenic Results  
Not able to answer 58% 
Reported level range correctly 21% 
Reported higher range 3% 
Reported lower range 18% 
Understand Test Results  
Very easy 31% 
Easy 30% 
Neither easy nor difficult 31% 
Difficult 6% 
Very difficult 2% 
Have Discussed Arsenic Level With…  
Real estate agent 25% 
Testing lab representative 21% 
Water treatment professional 37% 
Local health department 3% 
Neighbor 16% 
Friend/Relative 16% 
Plumber/Well driller 11% 
Other 5% 
Nobody 26% 
Highest Arsenic Level Consider Safe  
5 µg/L or less 53% 
5 to 10 µg/L 14% 
10 to 25 µg/L 2% 
25 to 50 µg/L 1% 
> 50 µg/L 0.2% 
No answer 30% 
Arsenic Treatment Installed 63% 
By me / my family 31% 
By previous owner or landlord 33% 
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Figure 3.2: Reported mitigation behavior among all respondents (n=486).  
Green box indicates the "super actors" who are appropriately maintaining and monitoring their treatment system; 
Red box indicates those taking no action to reduce arsenic exposure. Percentages represent respective portion of all 
households. 
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Table 3.3: Arsenic treatment (n=308) 
Variable Frequency 
Came with Home 46% 
Median Cost $3000 
Median Years Since Installation 7 
Mention Service Agreement 27% 
Treated Water Has Ever Been Tested 74% 
Within the past year 31% 
Within 5 years 52% 
Maintenance is Performed  
As recommended 57% 
Less often 17% 
Much less often 6% 
Rarely or never 18% 
Don’t know 2% 
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Table 3.4: Logistic regression models predicting mitigation (either treating or avoiding water) (n=486).  
 
Univariate Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
<8 years 
Model 3 
≥ 8 years 
Memory Variables      
Recall Test 
2.24** 
(1.33-3.79) 
0.74 
(0.27-1.98) 
   
Report Correct Level 
1.92* 
(1.08-3.39) 
0.76 
(0.37-1.57) 
   
Identify Arsenic 
Problem 
17.5*** 
(10.4-29.5) 
8.40*** 
(4.42-15.97) 
 
1.86 
(0.53-6.48) 
5.54*** 
(2.22-13.8) 
Difficulty 
Understanding Report 
0.98 
(0.78-1.23) 
    
Discussed Arsenic 
with Somebody 
12.43*** 
(7.67-20.2) 
3.96*** 
(2.19-7.14) 
 
3.83* 
(1.12-13.12) 
1.56 
(0.65-3.73) 
Arsenic Value 
1.04** 
(1.01-1.06) 
  
0.98 
(0.95-1.02) 
1.03 
(0.98-1.08) 
Behavioral Factors      
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
2.54*** 
(2.10-3.08) 
 
2.16*** 
(1.67-2.79) 
1.86* 
(1.16-2.99) 
1.77** 
(1.23-2.54) 
Perceived Severity 
1.97*** 
(1.63-2.38) 
 
1.31 
(0.93-1.84) 
  
Perceived Benefits 
2.11*** 
(1.70-2.61) 
 
1.03 
(0.75-1.43) 
  
Perceived Barriers 
0.82* 
(0.70-0.96) 
 
0.73** 
(0.58-0.93) 
1.06 
(0.65-1.74) 
0.65** 
(0.48-0.89) 
Self-Efficacy 
1.50*** 
(1.28-1.77) 
 
1.45** 
(1.15-1.82) 
1.48 
(0.94-2.33) 
1.36* 
(1.02-1.81) 
Commitment 
1.92*** 
(1.56-2.35) 
 
1.20 
(1.20-1.61) 
  
Cue to Action 
1.62*** 
(1.35-1.95) 
 
1.38** 
(1.11-1.71) 
1.52 
(0.97-2.37) 
1.21 
(0.91-1.61) 
Sociodemographic      
Bachelor’s degree 
1.57 
(0.99-1.52) 
    
Years in Home 
0.95** 
(0.92-0.98) 
    
AUC  .8428 .8642 .8936 .8988 
Model 3 is stratified by time since home purchase (< 8 years and ≥ 8 years). AUC = area under ROC curve. *p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 103 
Table 3.5: Logistic regression models predicting Treatment use (n=486).  
 
Univariate Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
<8 years 
(n=193) 
Model 3 
≥ 8 years 
(n=277) 
Memory Variables      
Recall Test 
3.73*** 
(2.19-6.36) 
1.17 
(0.42-3.25) 
   
Report Correct Level 
2.12** 
(1.25-3.59) 
0.91 
(0.45-1.83) 
   
Identify Arsenic 
Problem 
22.58*** 
(13.9-36.7) 
7.38*** 
(4.02-13.55) 
 
3.88* 
(1.06-14.17) 
8.41*** 
(2.78-25.5) 
Difficulty 
Understanding Report 
0.80* 
(0.65-0.98) 
0.73* 
(0.56-0.95) 
 
1.00 
(0.54-1.83) 
0.86 
(0.55-1.36) 
Discussed Arsenic 
with Somebody 
19.1*** 
(11.9-30.6) 
5.76*** 
(3.24-10.2) 
 
3.93* 
(1.06-14.5) 
1.25 
(0.43-3.62) 
Arsenic Value 
1.03** 
(1.01-1.06) 
  
1.00 
(0.96-1.05) 
1.07* 
(1.01-1.14) 
Behavioral Factors      
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
2.83*** 
(2.32-3.46) 
 
3.10*** 
(2.31-4.16) 
1.75* 
(1.04-2.95) 
2.03** 
(1.26-3.25) 
Perceived Severity 
1.80*** 
(1.52-2.14) 
 
1.00 
(0.71-1.41) 
  
Perceived Benefits 
1.91*** 
(1.56-2.34) 
 
0.80 
(0.57-1.13) 
  
Perceived Barriers 
0.74*** 
(0.64-0.86) 
 
0.65*** 
(0.51-0.83) 
0.78 
(0.43-1.41) 
0.60** 
(0.41-0.87) 
Self-Efficacy 
1.80*** 
(1.52-2.14) 
 
1.48** 
(1.17-1.86) 
1.21 
(0.74-1.98) 
1.47* 
(1.02-2.10) 
Commitment 
2.44*** 
(1.97-3.03) 
 
1.72** 
(1.25-2.38) 
1.87 
(1.00-3.49) 
1.94** 
(1.24-3.06) 
Cue to Action 
1.41*** 
(1.23-1.63) 
 
1.17 
(0.97-1.42) 
  
Sociodemographic      
Bachelor’s Degree 
1.89** 
(1.23-2.92) 
  
11.51** 
(2.90-45.74) 
1.56 
(0.57-4.26) 
Years in Home 
0.95** 
(0.92-0.98) 
    
AUC  .8662 .8899 .9109 .9346 
Model 3 is stratified by time since home purchase (< 8 years and ≥ 8 years), *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3.6: Logistic regression models predicting monitoring (have tested treated water ever), among 
treating (n=308) 
 Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Treatment Variables     
System Age 
1.07 
(0.99-1.16) 
   
Seller Installed 
0.88 
(0.53-1.46) 
   
Difficulty 
Understanding Report 
0.73* 
(0.57-0.94) 
0.73* 
(0.58-1.04) 
 
0.82 
(0.62-1.08) 
Discussed Arsenic 
with Somebody 
3.33*** 
(1.79-6.21) 
3.11** 
(1.60-76.02) 
 
2.96** 
(1.50-5.84) 
Service Agreement 
1.85 
(0.99-3.48) 
   
Arsenic Value 
1.01 
(0.99-1.03) 
   
Behavioral Factors     
Self-Efficacy 
1.52** 
(1.21-1.90) 
 
1.41** 
(1.10-1.82) 
1.38* 
(1.07-1.78) 
Commitment 
1.46** 
(1.09-1.95) 
 
1.22 
(0.88-1.68) 
 
AUC  .6403 .6479 .6757 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3.7: Logistic regression models predicting recent monitoring (have tested treated water in last year), 
among treating (n=308) 
 Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Treatment Variables     
System age 
0.92* 
(0.86-0.99) 
0.92* 
(0.86-0.99) 
 
0.94 
(0.87-1.01) 
Seller installed 
0.64 
(0.39-1.04) 
   
Difficulty 
Understanding Report 
0.71** 
(0.55-0.91) 
0.70* 
(0.55-0.93) 
 
0.74 
(0.55-1.00) 
Discussed Arsenic 
with Somebody 
1.75 
(0.85-3.57) 
   
Service Agreement 
2.42** 
(1.43-4.11) 
2.33** 
(1.28-4.22) 
 
1.86* 
(1.00-3.45) 
Arsenic Value 
1.01 
(0.99-1.02) 
   
Behavioral Factors     
Perceived Severity 
1.36** 
(1.09-1.68) 
 
1.24 
(0.97-1.58) 
1.35* 
(1.05-1.74) 
Perceived Benefits 
1.32 
(0.99-1.75) 
   
Perceived Barriers 
0.82* 
(0.68-0.98) 
 
0.89 
(0.73-1.08) 
 
Self-Efficacy 
1.54** 
(1.17-2.02) 
 
1.36* 
(1.00-1.85) 
1.32 
(0.96-1.80) 
Commitment 
1.74** 
(1.22-2.47) 
 
1.22 
(0.80-1.86) 
 
AUC  .6617 .6610 .6865 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3.8: Logistic regression models predicting maintenance as recommended among treating (n=308) 
 Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Treatment Variables     
System Age 
0.96 
(0.90-1.02) 
   
Seller Installed 
0.55* 
(0.35-0.86) 
0.54* 
(0.33-0.89) 
 
0.60 
(0.36-1.02) 
Difficulty 
Understanding Report 
0.73** 
(0.58-0.91) 
0.71** 
(0.55-0.91) 
 
0.79 
(0.60-1.03) 
Discussed Arsenic with 
Somebody 
1.84* 
(1.00-3.38) 
1.54 
(0.78-3.04) 
  
Service Agreement 
3.24*** 
(1.84-5.72) 
4.08*** 
(2.17-7.66) 
 
3.50*** 
(1.83-6.70) 
Arsenic Value 
1.03* 
(1.00-1.05) 
  
1.02 
(0.99-1.04) 
Behavioral Factors     
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
1.16 
(0.94-1.41) 
   
Perceived Severity 
1.39** 
(1.15-1.68) 
 
1.23 
(0.95-1.59) 
 
Perceived Benefits 
1.40* 
(1.09-1.81) 
 
0.89 
(0.63-1.27) 
 
Perceived Barriers 
0.80* 
(0.68-0.95) 
 
0.90 
(0.75-1.09) 
 
Self-Efficacy 
1.68*** 
(1.33-2.12) 
 
1.41* 
(1.08-1.84) 
1.18 
(0.89-1.56) 
Commitment 
2.17*** 
(1.60-2.95) 
 
1.64* 
(1.11-2.43) 
1.64** 
(1.15-2.33) 
AUC  .7126 .7093 .7536 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3.9: Comparison of all (n=486) to late responders (n=105) on key variables 
Variable All Late 
Recall Test at Sale Occurred 86% 80% 
Not tested at sale, but tested since 6% 10% 
Report Test Showed Arsenic Problem  60% 48%* 
Recall Arsenic Results   
Not able to answer 58% 69% 
Reported level range correctly 21% 13% 
Reported higher range 3% 2% 
Reported lower range 18% 16% 
Understand Test Results   
Very easy 31% 33% 
Easy 30% 23% 
Neither easy nor difficult 31% 36% 
Difficult 6% 6% 
Very difficult 2% 2% 
Discussed Arsenic with Somebody 60% 53% 
Mitigating 72% 64% 
Arsenic Treatment Installed 63% 57% 
By me / my family 31% 30% 
By previous owner or landlord 33% 27% 
Treated Water Has Ever Been Tested  74% 66% 
Within the past year 31% 29% 
Maintenance Performed as Recommended 56% 61% 
*p<.05 significantly different from the full sample 
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Table 3.10: Mean scores and 95% confidence intervals for psychological constructs by level of mitigation 
action 
Psychological Construct 
Non-Actors 
(n=138) 
Average Actors 
(n=274) 
Super Actors 
(n=74) 
Perceived Susceptibility 2.89 (2.68,3.11) 4.39 (4.24,4.54) 4.71 (4.45,4.96) 
Perceived Severity 3.31 (3.12,3.49) 4.15 (4.01,4.28) 4.71 (4.43,4.99) 
Perceived Benefits 4.17 (3.96,4.37) 4.93 (4.82,5.03) 5.16 (4.92,5.41) 
Perceived Barriers 3.62 (3.41,3.83) 3.36 (3.19,3.52) 2.88 (2.55,3.21) 
Self-Efficacy 4.29 (4.06,4.53) 4.80 (4.65,4.95) 5.58 (5.39,5.77) 
Commitment 4.54 (4.35,4.73) 5.18 (5.06,5.31) 5.69 (5.52,5.86) 
Cue to Action 1.56 (1.38,1.74) 2.57 (2.35,2.80) 2.38 (1.95,2.80) 
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CHAPTER 4: TARGETED OUTREACH TO PROMOTE PRIVATE WELL TESTING 
AND IDENTIFY ARSENIC-CONTAMINATED WELLS 
 
Abstract 
 Naturally occurring arsenic in groundwater is a public health threat for those relying on 
unregulated private wells. Presently, the greatest barrier to arsenic exposure reduction is a lack of 
well water testing; most households in affected areas have never tested, in part due to low 
awareness and optimistic biases about risks. Research into precautionary action suggests 
interventions to raise awareness with personally-relevant risk information may help overcome 
such biases and provoke testing. New Jersey’s Private Well Testing Act (PWTA) has since 2002 
required testing for arsenic during real estate transactions; the resulting database of over 35,000 
geocoded well tests is an opportunity for targeted outreach in arsenic-affected areas. In this 
study, residents of properties (n=1743) located within 1000 feet of a well tested under the PWTA 
and found to have arsenic above the New Jersey standard of 5 µg/L were mailed a notice of the 
high arsenic result in their neighborhood and offered a free water test. Overall 16% requested a 
test kit and 13% ultimately submitted a water sample; with significantly higher participation 
rates among those told that their neighborhood well had an arsenic concentration over 5 times 
higher than the drinking water standard, compared to those told the concentration was above it. 
Most testing participants (70%) had never tested their well for arsenic before, because most of 
them (80%) didn’t know arsenic was a problem in their area. Overall 25% of wells tested 
(n=230) exceeded the standard for arsenic; both the arsenic level of and distance to the 
neighboring well were significant predictors of exceedance. Given the high proportion of 
untested wells, this intervention succeeded in motivating testing among many households 
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unreached by any previous awareness-raising activities and identified problems among a 
significant portion, demonstrating the effectiveness of geographically and personally-relevant 
risk targeted messaging and outreach. 
 
1. Introduction 
Inorganic arsenic is naturally occurring in groundwater throughout the U.S. and is a 
concern for public health when groundwater is a source for drinking. More concerning is that 
private well water, relied on by 15% of the U.S. population,184 is unregulated under the 1974 
Safe Drinking Water Act. There is no requirement that private water be monitored or meet 
drinking water standards for quality. As a result, it is difficult to estimate how many of the over 
13 million U.S. households dependent on private well water34 are affected by arsenic, or the 
health and economic costs associated with that exposure. Although non-random, USGS 
nationwide sampling detected arsenic in 51% of 7580 private wells, with concentrations 
exceeding the federal Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) of 10 µg/L in 11% of wells.35 
Recent modeling predicts that 2.1 million people (95% CI: 1.5 – 2.9 million) living in the 
conterminous United States are currently drinking from wells that exceed 10 µg/L arsenic.40  
Chronic arsenic exposure through drinking water is associated with increased risks of 
cancer, cardiovascular disease, non-neoplastic respiratory changes, and neuropathy.10,11 Evidence 
continues to grow for the critical exposure period in utero and early life, where arsenic at even 
relatively low concentrations impairs intellectual development and increases the risk of adverse 
health effects later in life.19,26,28,29 In 2004 New Jersey became the only state to adopt an arsenic 
MCL lower than the federal standard, and at 5 µg/L remains the most protective in the nation.22 
Nevertheless, enforceable MCLs apply only to publicly-supplied water which is protected under 
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strict regulatory oversight. Consistent with other carcinogens, EPA’s MCL-Goal for arsenic is 0 
µg/L, meaning there is no level in drinking water which could be considered safe. 
Since private well water is considered a private responsibility, many well owners and 
users remain unaware of the risks posed by groundwater contamination, and particularly arsenic. 
Sensory and visibility factors are consistently the strongest prompt for private well users to 
investigate the quality or safety of their drinking water;41,42 prompts which are absent for arsenic 
which cannot be seen, smelled, or tasted in water. Well owners must be aware, willing, and 
capable of acting on their own to have their water tested and to take all actions necessary to 
ensure their water is of safe quality, bearing the costs along the way. At present the greatest 
barrier to arsenic exposure reduction remains a lack of testing; after universal screening is 
achieved and all unsafe wells are identified, the challenge will shift to mitigation. However, even 
in areas known to have frequent arsenic contamination of well water, surveys reveal that a 
majority of households have still never tested for arsenic.42,47,53  
Arsenic testing only detects a health risk and does not immediately reduce it, thus the 
factors influencing testing decisions can be more complicated than with other health behaviors. 
A close comparison is home radon testing, a similar action that requires subsequent protective 
action to effectively mitigate an invisible hazard. In radon testing, higher threat perceptions are 
correlated with testing behavior, yet individual risk perception is often optimistically biased.52 
This form of bias is assessed through comparative risk estimates, and is indicated when estimates 
of the risk to self are significantly lower than comparison group estimates.50 If the “self-other” 
risk comparison is not biased, claims of below-average risk will be balanced by those of above-
average risk, and the mean response in a representative sample will be “average;” however, 
research usually finds a shift towards “below-average.”201 In New Jersey people tended to 
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believe that their own risk for finding a radon problem was lower than their neighbors’, even if 
they lived in known high-risk areas.51 This same cognitive bias is observed for arsenic; survey 
participants more strongly agree with the risk that town wells are contaminated than with the risk 
for arsenic in their own well, regardless of whether they have tested.42,46 This may explain why 
even residents informed of local risks may still not feel enough personal risk to warrant testing 
action. The proportion of private well owners reporting they would test their water after hearing 
a neighbor’s well is contaminated is nearly twice that of hearing that wells in their town are,42,53 
indicating that more localized (sub-town-level) and personalized (“your neighbor”) risk 
messaging may be necessary to overcome biases. On the other hand, personal experience with 
the “good” quality of one’s drinking water can also serve to reinforce cognitive biases.54 
Moreover, community members are more likely to underestimate environmental hazards such as 
arsenic because the problem is naturally occurring, not industrial, and because remediation is 
their own responsibility and not a government or corporate one.42,52  
Research into precautionary action suggests that in the absence of personal experience 
with hazards, programs emphasizing concrete, personalized information about likelihood, 
severity, and precautions, and programs attacking unrealistic optimism will be more successful 
than traditional attempts to disseminate general hazard information to the public.59 Interventions 
that can incorporate “vivid” and “self-relevant” information may better influence personal-level 
judgements of risk.57 Private well water outreach activities, when they happen, are typically 
limited to general awareness-raising through mass media and occasional town-level testing 
events. Periodic community testing campaigns can be an effective trigger and convenient 
opportunity for those already thinking about arsenic testing, or for those most receptive to the 
behavior of testing but unaware of local arsenic risks, but are rarely designed to overcome other 
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testing barriers or confront cognitive biases. A targeted intervention that delivers personally-
relevant risk information, such as the high arsenic level in a neighbor’s well, may motivate at-
risk households previously unreached by other awareness-raising activities, to test their own 
water. While high degrees of spatial variability mean that neighboring wells are not consistently 
safe or unsafe, and therefore all wells must be tested, proximity to another well with elevated 
arsenic does suggest a higher risk of arsenic contamination due to the shared underlying geology 
of an area.202 The aim of this study is to describe and evaluate a pilot intervention to notify and 
offer arsenic testing to such high-risk neighbors of contaminated wells, assessing its short-term 
impact in terms of participation and contaminated wells identified. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Study area and background 
Although private well testing is a federally unregulated individual responsibility, there 
are local exceptions, such as New Jersey’s Private Well Testing Act (PWTA), which since 
September 2002 has required private wells be tested for specific contaminants during real estate 
transactions. Arsenic testing is required in the 12 northern counties of the state, where naturally 
occurring arsenic concentrations as high as 250 µg/L occur in the bedrock aquifers of the 
Newark Basin.185 The costs of testing can be covered by the seller, buyer, or both, and any 
mitigation actions, while not required by the law, are negotiated between parties during the 
contract of sale. PWTA test results must be submitted to the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and maintained in a database for the purposes of studying 
groundwater in the state. Results from a well that exceed any of the required parameters are also 
shared with the relevant county or local health departments who may contact any neighbors 
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living within at least 200 feet of the well to recommend they test their own water; however, these 
notices are at the sole discretion of the local authority. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
notifications have not happened in most areas, at least not for a naturally occurring contaminant 
like arsenic. Reasons include that there was no provision for additional funding or resources for 
local authorities to take on this work, and concerns over maintaining confidentiality when the 
neighboring property in question could be easily identified by the “for sale” sign on the front 
lawn. 
Due to the slow pace of housing turnover, only about 25% of private wells in New Jersey 
have been tested through the PWTA, and surveys suggest that the majority of wells unaffected 
by the PWTA have not been tested for arsenic independently.53 Yet since 2002 the PWTA 
database has amassed arsenic test results from over 35,000 private wells, including over 4,000 
with arsenic concentrations above the New Jersey MCL of 5 µg/L, yielding valuable spatial 
insight into the most at risk areas. Confidentiality concerns regarding potential identification of 
contaminated wells based on the timing of property sales are no longer relevant; this data 
presents an opportunity for targeted outreach to the neighbors of contaminated wells identified 
over the past 14 years. If neighbors of known arsenic-contaminated wells have not been 
contacted about the risk for arsenic in their own well, have not purchased their home since 2002 
when testing became required, and like the majority of private well households have not tested 
their well for arsenic on their own,95 there may be thousands of households in New Jersey 
unknowingly drinking water with elevated arsenic concentrations. The intervention described 
here was a collaboration between Columbia University’s Superfund Research Program, the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, and the New Jersey Department of Health. 
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2.2 Sample selection 
NJDEP maintains the database of results from testing performed under the PWTA; results 
are submitted electronically by certified private laboratories, geocoded with GPS coordinates of 
the well, and linked to block and lot numbers to identify the property parcel. The PWTA 
database was first reduced to wells containing 5 µg/L of arsenic or higher, and all property 
parcels from the NJ tax register that intersect with or are wholly located within a 1000-foot 
buffer zone around each high arsenic well were exported to a new file. Parcels intersecting with 
the buffer zone were included because the exact location of the untested well on the property, if 
there is one, is not known; it may be within the 1000-foot buffer or just beyond. The resulting 
parcels were cross-referenced with the full PWTA database and any that have a PWTA test 
record of their own were removed, thereby excluding any properties with wells that have been 
purchased since 2002. Duplicate matches were also reduced so that each parcel was included 
only once in the final list, paired with its highest arsenic level neighbor. The final list contained 
over 60,000 parcel addresses. Addresses were selected randomly from this list, stratified by the 
arsenic level of the neighboring PWTA well (>25 µg/L, 10-25 µg/L, and 5-10 µg/L) and distance 
to the neighboring well (< 500 feet, 500-1000 feet). Again, any parcels intersecting with the 500-
foot zone were classified as neighbors “< 500 feet” away, and any within the 1000-foot zone 
were classified as “500-1000 feet” away. Selected addresses listed in the tax register as 
commercial or industrial properties were removed. Selection was weighed more heavily towards 
neighbors of PWTA wells with > 25 µg/L arsenic, to be approximately half of the sample, even 
though such levels of arsenic have only been found in approximately 5% of PWTA wells that 
exceed the standard. 
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 A total of n=2,000 addresses were selected for the mailing intervention, in 2 waves of 
n=1,000. After an error that misclassified the arsenic level of close (< 500 feet) neighbors in the 
initial sample, selection of the second 1,000 addresses was weighted more heavily towards 
neighbors within 500 feet of wells > 25µg/L. Addresses selected represented 99 municipalities, 
in 10 counties of New Jersey. 
 
2.3 Intervention design and implementation 
All selected addresses (n=2,000) were mailed a letter from Columbia University Lamont-
Doherty Earth Observatory notifying the current residents that a neighboring well exceeds the 
state’s drinking water standard for arsenic and offering a free arsenic test of their water through 
Columbia’s laboratory (see Appendix C). The test was voluntary and the results would be kept 
secure and confidential. The free test was meant to remove any financial barriers to 
participation.45,63 
Letters stated, “Test results collected as part of the Private Well Testing Act show that 
wells in your neighborhood have arsenic at levels above the state drinking water standard,” and 
emphasized that the arsenic is naturally occurring, many wells in their area exceed the state 
drinking water standard, drinking water with high levels of arsenic can increase risks for cancer 
and affect the development of babies and young children, and that affordable water treatment 
systems are available. Links to several online resources for additional information on arsenic in 
New Jersey were listed. Finally, each letter included a graphic image depicting neighborhood 
arsenic levels relative to the New Jersey drinking water standard. 
Included with the letters was a return postcard with which the resident could request or 
decline the free arsenic test. Residents also had the option to request the test by email. Those 
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who requested a test kit were then mailed bottles and instructions for sampling their tap water 
with a pre-paid return package. Included with the sample bottles was a brief survey on testing 
history, treatment use, and perceptions of objective and comparative arsenic risk likelihood rated 
on a Likert scale (Appendix C). Participants were mailed or emailed results for their samples; 
those whose water exceeded the drinking water standard for arsenic (or any other parameter 
tested for) were provided with additional guidance on next steps. 
Notice letters were mailed to the first 1,000 selected addresses in November 2016 with a 
deadline to respond within 3 weeks, although late requests for test kits were still accepted. After 
low response, reminder postcards extending the deadline were mailed to a random subset of non-
responders (n=420) in late December. The second set of 1,000 addresses were selected and 
mailed letters in late December, with a deadline to respond within 4 weeks. Reminders were not 
mailed to non-responders in the second group. When requests for tests were received, sample 
bottles and return packages were mailed out with instructions to return the samples by a specific 
date, at least 2 weeks from the time the kit was mailed, although samples submitted late were 
still accepted. There were no follow-up contacts to return samples. 
 
2.3.1 Variable risk message 
 Selected addresses were mailed one of 3 versions of the letter based on the arsenic level 
of their neighboring PWTA well. The only difference in letter text was the second half of the 
statement notifying of the arsenic in neighborhood wells – “arsenic at levels above…” became 
“arsenic at levels several times higher than” if their neighboring well had an arsenic 
concentration of 10 to 25 µg/L, and became “arsenic at levels over 5 times higher than” if the 
neighboring well had an arsenic concentration greater than 25 µg/L (see Appendix C). Each 
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letter also included one of 3 versions of a color-coded visual scale graphic, adapted from a study 
by Severtson and Henriques203 which found that using this plain scaled image to express drinking 
water test results conveyed a stronger risk message to participants than a typical alphanumeric 
lab report or a more detailed graded image, and prompted meaningful risk reduction intentions 
among participants with optimistically biased safety threshold beliefs. The adapted images 
indicated the “range of arsenic level” in the neighborhood well, which varied based on the 3 
arsenic level categories (Figure 4.1). 
 
2.4 Water sample analysis 
Water samples collected from participants were acidified to 1% HNO3 (Optima Grade) 
before analysis by high resolution inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) by 
Columbia University following previously established protocol.204 Repeated analyses of the 
standard solution 1643e (n=6) with 60.5 µg/L and a check sample (n=6) with 9.5 µg/L of arsenic 
revealed an accuracy within 2.7% and a precision within 1.8%. The detection limit for arsenic 
was < 0.02 µg/L.  
 
2.5 Statistical analysis 
Descriptive analysis, correlation, and regression analyses employed STATA IC v14. All 
statistical tests were two-tailed and p-values < 0.05 were considered significant. Significant 
differences in participation by risk message were identified by chi-square tests and pairwise 2-
proportion z-tests. Logistic and linear regression were used to predict arsenic exceedance and 
concentration, respectively, from neighbor’s arsenic level, neighbor’s distance, and town 
exceedance rate based on PWTA testing records. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Response to intervention 
Of the 2000 addresses selected, 181 letters were returned as undeliverable (Table 4.1). 
Several (n=35) postcard responses indicated there was not a private well at that address. An 
additional 50 non-responding addresses were excluded post-mailing as potentially not residential 
after review of property values in the NJ state tax database found that they had a total property 
value of less than $50,000 with an “improvement value” above land value of zero, indicating 
there are no buildings on the property. Only 5 postcards were received declining a test without 
indicating there is no private well on the property, several because they had already tested for 
arsenic. 
A total of 274 letter recipients, or 16% of the households notified (total letters mailed – 
undeliverable – no well – non-residential), requested a test kit. Most requests came by postcard, 
with only 13% by email. The median time until kit request was 18 days (range 3 to 239), with 
23% of requests received after the initial deadlines. Seven additional test kits were mailed to 
addresses not selected in the target sample at the request of participants, 3 for family members 
nearby and 4 for neighbors, and several additional requests were turned down. Six letter 
recipients who returned the postcard more than 4 months after the deadline were not mailed a test 
kit. 
224 households who received the initial letter did ultimately submit water samples, 84% 
of those who requested a kit, and 13% overall among those notified of the test offer. An 
additional 6 samples were received from the extra kits mailed, for a total of 230 well water 
samples collected. Two kits mailed out were returned as undeliverable despite a kit requested 
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from that address. At least two returned samples are believed to be public water and not private 
well water, based on the information provided by the recipients with their sample form. 
 
3.2 Influence of risk messaging 
Receipt of the high-risk letter was statistically significant (Table 4.2) for requesting a test 
kit compared to receiving the lower risk letter (17.4% vs. 12.8%, p<.05), and significant 
compared to the medium and low risk letter groups combined (17.4% vs. 13.6%, p<.05). 
Although there was no difference in the rate of returning water samples among those who 
requested test kits, overall participation (samples sent out of those notified) was significantly 
higher among those receiving a high arsenic letter compared to each of the alternative letters and 
both combined (14.9% vs. 10.5%, p<.01).  
 
3.3 Characteristics of participants 
Most participants (97%) who sent samples live in a home that they or another family 
member own. Only 7 samples were sent from rental properties. The participants are highly 
educated (66% with a bachelor’s degree); unfortunately, there is no education information on the 
non-responders for comparison. Although no household income information is available for any 
selected addresses; property values from state tax records can be used to compare those who 
requested a test kit to non-responders as a proxy measure for socioeconomic status (Table 4.3). 
The median home value among those who requested a test kit is significantly higher than the 
median among selected addresses with no response (p<.05) and a Mann-Whitney test confirms 
the distributions of property value are significantly different between groups (p<.05); however, 
property value is not a significant predictor of test kit requests in a logistic regression model. 
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Only 30% of participants report having tested their well water for arsenic before, 
although another 25% do not know if it has been tested (Table 4.4). Among those who have 
tested for arsenic, the median for time of last test was 4 years ago, with a range between 1 and 25 
years. About 17% of these wells were last tested by the seller of the property, and one third were 
last tested by third parties, most commonly the township, county, state, or a treatment company. 
One third of wells previously tested for arsenic reportedly exceeded the NJ state standard of 5 
µg/L, and 21% were reportedly being treated for arsenic. Testing history is significantly different 
by education level; participants with a bachelor’s degree have 2.6 times greater odds (95% CI 
1.3-5.2) of having tested for arsenic previously compared to those with lesser education. Among 
those who have not tested for arsenic before, the most common reason given was not knowing 
arsenic was a problem in their area (80%), and second that they kept forgetting or hadn’t gotten 
around to testing (11%). Nearly half of participants do not treat their water at all, and water 
softeners are the most common treatment used (34%). Only 6% of overall participants report 
they use arsenic removal treatment. There was no arsenic treatment use reported among those 
who had not tested their well water for arsenic before. 
 
3.4 Risk perceptions 
Among private well users who have not tested their water for arsenic before, receiving a 
high arsenic letter is a significantly associated (p<.05) with belief in likelihood of having arsenic 
above the NJ standard, compared to those receiving the low arsenic letter (Figure 4.2). The high 
arsenic letter remains a significant predictor after controlling for education. However, there is no 
difference between letter categories in the proportion of recipients who believe they are likely to 
have arsenic above the standard (~9%). The differences are in the proportion of respondents who 
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believe they are “unlikely” or “very unlikely” to have arsenic. The optimistic biases amongst 
people who have never tested remain very strong despite the message version they received; 
those notified of a neighbor with arsenic over 5 times higher than the standard are only more 
likely to admit that they have even chances at an arsenic problem. 
When asked how they think their arsenic level compares to other wells in their 
neighborhood, the differences by letter category are not significant. One third said they had no 
idea how their level compares. Among those who gave a response (Figure 4.3), 94% believe their 
arsenic level is either about average or lower than average.  
 
3.5 Arsenic results 
The 2 samples suspected of being tap water are excluded from the below analyses, as are 
the 14 reportedly being treated for arsenic. Among untreated wells, sampled arsenic 
concentration is significantly correlated with neighbor’s arsenic concentration (r=0.272, p<.001). 
Significance remains when limiting to close neighbors within 500 feet (r=0.316, p<.001), but not 
for neighbors between 500 and 1000 feet (r=0.031, p=0.8) (Figure 4.4). Sampled arsenic 
concentrations are significantly predicted by neighbor’s concentration (β=0.08, p<.001) and 
neighbor’s close distance (β=4.75, p<.001) in a linear regression model. 
Overall, 26% of the tested wells not being treated for arsenic (n=214) were found to 
exceed the arsenic standard of 5 µg/L; 33% among those with neighbors >25 µg/L, 22% among 
those with neighbors 10-25 µg/L, and 18% among those with neighbors 5-10 µg/L, although 
those differences between groups are only marginally significant (p<.09). A high (>25 µg/L) 
arsenic well does significantly predict (p<.05) an arsenic exceedance compared to a neighbor 
with arsenic between 5 and 10 µg/L (OR=2.30), even more strongly when adjusting for 
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neighbor’s distance (OR=3.19) (Table 4.5, Model 1). Neighbor’s arsenic concentration as a 
continuous variable is only a marginally significant predictor (p<.06) of arsenic exceedance, 
regardless of whether distance is controlled for. However, the most significant predictor of 
exceedance is being within 500 feet of the neighboring arsenic well; when adjusting for 
neighbor’s arsenic category, a well within 500 feet has 7.4 times the odds of exceeding the 
arsenic standard than one between 500 and 1000 feet away. Arsenic was detectable in 91% of 
wells within 500 feet and 80% of wells within 500 to 1000 feet of a PWTA well. Arsenic was 
detectable in 94% of wells with a 5-10 µg/L neighboring PWTA well, 87% of wells with a 10-25 
µg/L neighbor, and 86% of wells with a >25 µg/L neighbor. The median arsenic concentration of 
wells sampled was 1.9 µg/L, mean was 4.7 µg/L, and the maximum arsenic concentration 
measured was 66 µg/L. The rate of arsenic exceedance among wells never tested before (n=160) 
was 25%.  
Town arsenic rate, the percentage of PWTA tested wells in each municipality which 
exceed the arsenic standard, is a significant predictor of both arsenic concentration and arsenic 
exceedance among sampled wells not treating for arsenic. Each 5% increase in town exceedance 
rate is associated with a 0.7 µg/L increase in arsenic concentration and 26% greater odds of the 
sample exceeding the standard (Table 4.5). Town rate remains a significant predictor of 
concentration and exceedance after adjusting for neighbor’s arsenic value and distance, which 
also remain significant predictors in the adjusted model (Table 4.5, Model 2). 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Increased testing  
Although the overall participation was lower than expected given that 75% of 
respondents to a recent survey in this area indicated that learning their neighbor had 
contaminated well water would prompt them to test their own,53 this outreach strategy did 
succeed in generating 230 tests of private wells, 70% previously untested, through a single 
mailed letter with a free testing offer. This previously tested rate is consistent with a recent 
survey in northern New Jersey where only 35% of private well owners who purchased their 
home prior to the PWTA report their water has been tested for arsenic.53 Considering most 
untested participants reported their reason for not previously testing was because they weren’t 
aware that arsenic was a problem in their area, this intervention succeeded in motivating 
households unreached by any community testing or awareness activities in the 14 years since the 
PWTA first confirmed widespread arsenic contamination in northern New Jersey.  
Typical testing campaigns, when held, remain small scale, and although published 
evaluations of these programs are rare, evidence suggests their success is limited as usually only 
a fraction of at risk wells in a community will be tested. For example, in New Jersey, the Raritan 
Headwaters Association (RHA) Community Well Testing (CWT) Program regularly partners 
with townships to provide convenient annual testing opportunities whereby test kits are picked 
up and dropped off on set days, typically at the municipal building. Their basic test is for bacteria 
and nitrates, recommended annually, and is available for $70. Arsenic and other contaminants 
are available to add on for a fee. According to RHA, typically only 2-5% of the private wells in a 
township are tested during a CWT event, even fewer for arsenic (M. Tippett, personal 
communication). The few published evaluations of other community testing campaigns suggest 
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that more intensive outreach efforts can generate higher participation. For example, a 
community-based intervention following a mass media campaign increased the arsenic screening 
rate from 4 to 16% in one municipality of Québec.60 A 2-year community informational and 
testing campaign in the small town of Tuftonboro, NH tested 28% of the wells in the town.61 In 
Wisconsin a 3-year educational arsenic well test program in 19 towns of an arsenic advisory area 
was able to motivate about 30% of residents to participate.62 However, introducing and 
expanding more intensive outreach efforts may be beyond the means of many local governments 
and organizations. Complementing general community awareness-raising and testing 
opportunities with targeted outreach to households of known risk may provide a more effective 
balance of efforts. 
Although there are no income or education measures to compare participants to non-
responders, the difference in their median property values is consistent with our prior findings 
that higher-income households are more likely to participate in testing opportunities, even when 
the test is free.45 A recent survey of private well owners in Minnesota suggests that participation 
in testing programs may also be influenced by the method in which test kits are requested and 
returned. The investigators found that higher income, higher education, and younger individuals 
were significantly more likely to prefer ordering a test kit online and returning the sample by 
mail, whereas lower income, lower education, and older participants preferred to pick up and 
return test kits at a local location.198 Here, participants with a bachelor’s degree were also 
significantly more likely to have tested their well for arsenic before, as has been observed by 
surveys in New Jersey and Maine.63 This confirms the need to develop testing outreach strategies 
that are better targeted to more socially vulnerable populations and to overcoming their specific 
barriers to testing. Furthermore, policy change efforts towards requiring private well testing at 
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more occasions may be necessary to overcome the SES-patterned self-selective behavior 
observed when testing is voluntary. 
Although the PWTA requires that private wells serving rental properties be tested every 
five years and that the most recent results be provided to tenants upon signing a lease, there is no 
monitoring or enforcement mechanism provided for in the law. Of the 7 study participants living 
in a rental home, none reported having ever seen a report on their water quality and none were 
aware of the level of arsenic in their water. One of the water samples they provided ended up 
having the highest concentration of arsenic in this study (66 µg/L). This is clearly a weakness in 
the implementation of the law. 
 
4.2 Persistent optimistic biases 
The significantly higher response among those notified that their neighborhood well had 
arsenic over 5 times higher than the drinking water standard indicates that describing levels in 
this way as comparatively high may be perceived as a greater risk than simply “exceeding” a 
standard, thus warranting action. Although there is no measure of risk perceptions among 
participants prior to receiving the letter, the random selection of addresses suggests that the 
observed significant differences in perceived objective risk likelihood may be attributable to the 
variation in letter message. While few recipients of high arsenic letters believed that their own 
well is likely to exceed the arsenic standard, the notice does appear to have reduced their 
resistance to that possibility, with more reporting that it is “about as likely as not” rather than 
“unlikely” or “very unlikely,” compared to those receiving other versions of the letter (Figure 
4.2). Emphasizing and interpreting such comparative risks relative to standards when local 
information is available may help to overcome testing reluctance. Even so, the strong optimistic 
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bias against having a high arsenic well among those who received notice of their neighbor’s high 
level and chose to participate in this testing opportunity, suggests major challenges to 
overcoming this barrier in the general population. Even more so if testing is not offered for free. 
Out of all previously untested participants, 94% of those who gave a response believed that their 
arsenic level would be average or lower compared to wells in their neighborhood, reflecting the 
strong optimistic belief that even if their neighbor has high arsenic, their own water must be 
comparatively safer. 
 
4.3 Effect of targeting 
Random testing of private wells in the northern half of New Jersey, if possible, would 
presumably yield a similar exceedance rate to the 8.9% found to exceed the state MCL among 
the 35,000 arsenic tests required by the PWTA during real estate transactions. With an 
exceedance rate of 25%, or 31% if including the treating households, the targeting strategy 
evaluated here is more effective at identifying problem wells than blanket testing requirements; 
however, the benefit of a regulation such as the PWTA is that eventually every well will be 
tested over a long enough time horizon. While the PWTA has identified only 175 residential 
wells in New Jersey with arsenic concentrations above 25 µg/L, 0.5% of all wells tested, 9 of 
228 wells sampled through this intervention, or 4%, had arsenic above that level. 
What about other strategies to geographically-target testing? Of the 10 counties 
represented in this study, the range of failed PWTA arsenic tests is between 1.3% and 16.3%, 
with only 6 counties above a 2% rate. County-based targeting would understandably focus on the 
few with the highest rates. Yet close neighbors of a PWTA well with > 25 µg/L arsenic were 
selected for this intervention from all 10 counties. Although sample selection across the state was 
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not meant to be representative at the county or town level, the results of this study do provide an 
interesting comparison to the PWTA rates. In Warren County, where only 1.6% of 1,947 PWTA 
wells exceeded the arsenic MCL, 5 of 12 wells sampled in this study (42%) exceed 5 µg/L. In 
Vernon Township, 1.7% of 542 wells tested under the PWTA exceeded the MCL, whereas 4 of 9 
wells sampled (44%) here exceed the standard. With such a low town rate from PWTA 
sampling, Vernon would not likely be a priority for testing outreach, and arsenic would not be a 
priority within Vernon’s local health department. Yet targeting outreach to the neighbors of 
known high arsenic wells could more efficiently identify the households most likely to have a 
problem in low exceedance areas. Even in towns with high arsenic failure rates, such as Raritan 
township where 24.6% of PWTA tests have exceeded the MCL, initially targeting outreach to 
neighbors of known problem wells can identify more affected households (41% of n=22 wells 
tested) and help build testing norms and awareness in the larger community. Knowing someone 
with an arsenic problem is a significant predictor of testing one’s own well for arsenic;42,53 
identifying more wells with problems can only help to drive testing rates in a community as more 
people learn of their own risks through interpersonal channels and social networks. 
NJDEP has tried to publicly expose these local variations in arsenic-risk, while protecting 
the confidentiality of individual wells, by mapping arsenic exceedance rates from PWTA testing 
within 2x2 mile areas. This has highlighted local hotspots that could be targeted in future 
outreach, although even at such a scale the problem can be obscured. While one out of 20 PWTA 
wells tested in a hypothetical 2 square miles area may exceed the MCL (5% rate), that well may 
be on a block of 10 homes that all have high arsenic but haven’t been tested yet; it is important 
that the remaining 9 households know to test their water too. Indeed, several high arsenic wells 
identified in this study are in squares where less than 10% of tested wells exceed the MCL 
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(Figure 4.5). This study found that distance is a significant predictor of arsenic exceedance, even 
comparing wells within 500 feet to those within 1000; two miles away may be less meaningful. 
Nearly half (44%) of wells sampled in this study that were located within 500 feet of a high (>25 
µg/L) arsenic well were found to exceed the MCL; this is a high priority group that should be 
informed of their risks as soon as possible. Yet this study found that most participants were not 
even aware that arsenic was a problem in their area. Certainly, all private wells should eventually 
be tested for arsenic, but efforts over the past decade and a half have made little progress. 
Targeting neighbors is a strategy that can be done easily and effectively, and can complement 
more general outreach targeted to high risk towns and counties. Local county and town health 
departments have access to the locations of PWTA wells that exceed standards. The information 
is available to make these contacts, but the resources to do so and to assist with the costs of 
testing or mitigation may not be. 
 
4.4 Limitations 
The low response rate is disappointing considering this was a free test offer targeted to at-
risk households; unfortunately, the random selection of addresses across the state precludes 
comparison between participants and non-responders on measures beyond property value. 
Another recent free testing offer in New Jersey achieved 47% participation, although sample 
bottles were mailed directly without asking for a request to be made; residents at selected 
addresses were known to have a private well, a valid mailing address, and to have never tested 
for arsenic based on their participation in a previous mailed survey; and follow-up letters 
extending deadlines for participation were sent.45 There are several additional factors that could 
have contributed to the present low response. First, an unknown portion of non-responding 
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households may not have a private well, since addresses were selected by location only. Second, 
addresses were selected from property tax records; the number of letters returned as 
undeliverable shows that those addresses are not always accurate as mailing addresses; many 
properties could be vacant and more letters undelivered. Third, the timing of the mailings and 
sample collection, over the Thanksgiving and Christmas/New Year holidays, may have reduced 
attention paid to the letters and to returning samples. Others may have been away when the 
letters were delivered and then figured they had missed the window for participation based on 
the listed deadlines in the letter. The continued return of postcards months after the deadlines 
suggests long delays in delivery and recipient attention/action. A different time of year, 
additional follow-up reminders, and longer response windows may have corrected for this.  
Lastly, further variations in the messages, images, and messenger may have a significant 
effect on response rate; however, exploring further combinations of these was beyond the scope 
of this pilot intervention. Due to delays and reluctance in administrative approvals, New Jersey 
government partners were not specified by name in the letter, which may have introduced 
uncertainty or suspicion into who was making the test offer and why. Replicating this 
intervention strategy with local health departments as the messenger (as is prescribed in the 
PWTA) may have a positive effect on response. New Jersey private well owners rank their local 
government office as their primary source for information on maintaining the safety and quality 
of their well water, above state-wide agencies and the private sector.53 Interventions relying on 
more direct and interpersonal means of contact beyond direct mailing, and that offer other 
options to collect and return test kits, may also generate greater participation. 
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5. Conclusions 
New Jersey’s PWTA was the first law of its kind in the nation, yet since 2002 it has 
required testing for only about 25% of private wells in the state. Of the majority of wells not yet 
required to be tested under the law, only about a third may have tested for arsenic on their own.53 
While there may be a variety of barriers to testing faced by private well owners, this study 
highlights an obvious lack of awareness about the widespread occurrence of arsenic in the 
region; current efforts to promote the need for testing have been insufficient. The study also finds 
that messages of comparatively high arsenic, relative to standards, can be more compelling than 
messages of generally high risk.  
The PWTA has produced a wealth of data that can be used to target efforts toward those 
most likely to be affected, while building testing norms and raising awareness in the rest of the 
community. The majority (70%) of participants in this study had never tested their water for 
arsenic before; and almost all reported they were not aware arsenic was a problem in their area. 
One fourth of those untested wells ended up having arsenic that exceeded NJ’s drinking water 
standard. Those problems could have been identified sooner if local health departments used 
their discretionary power to contact residents about problems in neighboring wells as described 
in the PWTA. But it is not too late. Many more contaminated wells can be discovered if the 
PWTA’s database is used to the full extent it was intended to be and if residents are given timely 
notification of their risks, support, and opportunities to test their water when a nearby well 
exceeds a health-based drinking water standard. 
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Figure 4.1: 2 of 3 variations in risk graphic included in notice letters 
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Table 4.1: Summary of notices mailed and response 
 Number 
Notices mailed 2,000 
By letter message  
> 25 ppb 1,100 
10-25 ppb 529 
5-10 ppb 371 
By neighbor actual†  
> 25 ppb, < 500 ft 487 
> 25 ppb, 500-1000 ft 400 
10-25 ppb, < 500 ft 323 
10-25 ppb, 500-1000 ft 206 
5-10 ppb, < 500 ft 196 
5-10 ppb, 500-1000 ft 175 
Non-deliverable addresses 181 
Potential Non-residential 50 
No Private Well 35 
Kit Requests 274 
Samples Received 230 
† Neighbor’s arsenic level was misclassified for <500 ft households in first mailing. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Response by letter risk message 
 Low (5-10 ppb) Medium (10-25 ppb) High (> 25 ppb) Overall 
Notified† 336 465 942 1,743 
Requested Test 43 (13%) 66 (14%) 165 (17%)* 274 (16%) 
Sent a Sample 34 (10%) 50 (11%) 140 (15%)** 224 (13%) 
† Notified = (Mailed – Non-delivered – No wells – Potential non-residential) 
* Significantly different from other groups (p<.05) ** (p<.01) 
 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of property values among notified addresses (n=1,743), by kit request 
Property Value Requested Kit Notified, No Request 
25th Percentile $240,400 $229,100 
Median $370,200 $343,100 
75th Percentile $519,600 $515,600 
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Table 4.4: Characteristics of testing participants (n=230) 
 Percent 
Education  
Some high school or less 1% 
High School/GED 7% 
Some college 25% 
Bachelor’s degree 28% 
Graduate Degree 38% 
Arsenic Tested Before?  
Yes 30% 
No 45% 
Don’t know 25% 
If tested, did water exceed 5 µg/L? (n=68)  
Yes 32% 
No 46% 
Don’t remember 22% 
Why has your well not been tested for arsenic 
before? (n=162) 
 
I had never heard of arsenic before 7% 
I didn’t know arsenic was a problem in my area 80% 
The health risks from arsenic did not seem serious 1% 
Arranging a test was too difficult or inconvenient 1% 
Testing is too expensive 5% 
Kept forgetting/Never got around to it 11% 
Other 17% 
Treatment Use  
None 47% 
Water Softener 34% 
Reverse Osmosis 4% 
Neutralizer 4% 
Arsenic Removal 6% 
Carbon Tanks 3% 
Iron Removal 4% 
Anion Exchange 1% 
Chlorinator 1% 
Other1 17% 
1e.g. UV light (9), sediment filter (12), etc. 
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Figure 4.2: Perceived risk likelihood among untested only by letter category received, high (n=84), medium (n=38), 
and low (n=22) 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Perceived comparative risk among untested with an opinion only (n=94) by letter category received, high 
(n=56), medium (n=25), low (n=15) 
 136 
 
 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
5
0 50 100 150 200 250 0 50 100 150 200 250
<500 ft 500 to 1000 ft
S
a
m
p
le
d
 w
e
ll 
a
rs
e
n
ic
 c
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
 (
u
g
/L
)
Neighbor PWTA well arsenic concentration (ug/L)
Distance to Neighbor
Figure 4.4: Scatterplot of sampled arsenic concentration vs. neighbor's arsenic concentration by distance (n=211), 
excluding those reporting arsenic treatment 
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Table 4.5: Unadjusted and adjusted odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals for sample exceedance 
of 5 µg/L by neighbor arsenic level, neighbor distance, and town arsenic exceedance rate (n=211) 
 Unadjusted ORs Model 1 Model 2† 
Neighbor Arsenic Level (µg/L)    
5 - 10  1.00 1.00 1.00 
10.1 - 25 
1.33 
(0.51-3.50) 
1.27 
(0.47-3.38) 
1.56 
(0.56-4.32) 
>25 
2.30* 
(1.01-5.25) 
3.19** 
(1.34-7.57) 
3.50** 
(1.42-8.61) 
Neighbor Distance (feet)    
< 500  
5.61** 
(2.11-14.88) 
7.44*** 
(2.72-20.37) 
6.95*** 
(2.48-19.51) 
500 - 1000  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Town Exceedance Rate  
(5% increase) 
1.26*** 
(1.11-1.42) 
 1.23** 
(1.08-1.40) 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
† Model 1 adjusted for town exceedance rate 
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Figure 4.5: Location and arsenic level of wells sampled in this study. Local rates of arsenic exceedance are based on 
over 35,000 PWTA tests (Source: NJDEP) 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Summary of aims and lessons learned 
 
Aim 1. Analyze the circumstances under which the state of New Jersey adopted the 
PWTA in 2002, and compare to those under which other states, such as Maine, failed to pass 
similar legislation. 
Chapter 2 is the first in-depth case study examining the origins of New Jersey’s Private 
Well Testing Act (PWTA), the strongest state-level arsenic testing law in the country. Viewed 
through Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework, the PWTA was the result of problem, policy, 
and politics streams successfully brought together during a significant political window of 
opportunity. There was a widespread recognized problem, there were established local policies to 
model after, and there was a public mood buoyed by persistent media coverage and 
environmental advocacy groups that demanded action; it is unknown if these elements on their 
own would have been enough to achieve the same outcome. Nevertheless, the significant 
window of opportunity afforded by the timely gubernatorial aspirations of two powerful state 
legislators is likely the most critical reason why the PWTA passed when it did, in the form it did. 
Without these streams coming together during that brief window, the opportunity probably 
would have been spent on another political issue; without the window, if and when the PWTA 
would pass, and in what form, is difficult to say. Notably there have been no similarly successful 
cases of state-level private well testing legislation in New Jersey at any time before or since.  
The case study of Maine provides an interesting contrasting situation and outcome. The 
nature of the problem, primarily naturally occurring arsenic; the lack of grassroots activists 
raising the issue to the political agenda; powerful private sector lobbying from realtors, well 
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drillers, and testing labs; no within-state local policies to model after; and an obstructive 
administration fundamentally resistant to any government involvement in “private” 
responsibilities; were all in many ways insurmountable challenges for private well testing 
legislation in Maine. Coalition building and compromise succeeded in passing a very modest 
education and outreach bill on the second try, but also highlighted the considerable work 
remaining to facilitate or overcome the philosophical evolution required for further private well 
legislative action to be taken. 
Aim 2. Assess the arsenic mitigation behavior of households with wells identified by the 
PWTA as having arsenic concentrations exceeding the New Jersey drinking water standard, and 
estimate PWTA-related exposure reduction. 
The PWTA has resulted in tens of thousands of wells being tested for arsenic since 2002, 
but because of the compromises required for it to become law, there are no requirements for 
remediation of any problem wells identified. The follow-up survey of 486 high arsenic 
households in Chapter 3 revealed that most current homeowners are aware of the testing that 
occurred during their real estate transaction and have taken some mitigation action, a real 
achievement of the legislation. However, without a mandate for remediation or compliance, a 
significant portion (28%) of surveyed households are not acting to reduce their arsenic exposure. 
In some cases, well owners may not be aware the test has happened or have not understood the 
implication of their arsenic results. Part of this may be a legacy of the early years of the law in 
which confusion over relevant drinking water standards may have obscured the risks, part may 
be a lack of attention or interest among homebuyers or of effort to bring their attention to it 
among the various parties involved. Additionally, non-acting households may not consider their 
arsenic level to be a problem, or they view the costs and challenges to reduce exposure as too 
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great. Regardless, those not acting to reduce their exposure have lower perceptions of 
susceptibility, severity, and benefits; perceive greater barriers; and express lower levels of self-
efficacy and commitment to reduce exposure than those who are taking some mitigation action. 
Among those who bought their home many years ago and have not taken any mitigation action, 
perceived barriers to treatment are stronger and interventions to change beliefs and behavior now 
are likely to face additional challenges. 
Poor monitoring and maintenance behaviors among those that have treatment installed to 
remove arsenic, particularly those with previous owner-installed systems, threaten to undermine 
initial efforts to reduce exposure following arsenic testing. Only 57% of respondents with 
treatment systems report that maintenance is being performed as recommended, only 31% report 
that the treated water has been tested within the last year to ensure compliance, and only a small 
portion of all respondents (15%) report treatment and both important behaviors. The ongoing 
costs of water treatment may contribute to this, as could other barriers to the self-efficacy beliefs 
and commitment required to manage these ongoing responsibilities or to arrange for a service 
contract, a strong predictor of appropriate monitoring and maintenance behavior.  
By mandating more arsenic tests, the PWTA has multiplied the number of households 
that must manage the ongoing responsibility to protect themselves from arsenic in their drinking 
water. The mitigation challenges identified in previous private well arsenic studies are still 
relevant;9 we cannot expect that a testing mandate on its own will solve them. However, as most 
private wells in New Jersey have still not been tested under the PWTA, this requirement to test at 
home purchase does provide an ongoing opportunity to influence mitigation behavior from day 
one, before decisions on action are made or become more entrenched. Additional effort, 
resources, and support to make sure that new home buyers pay attention to, understand, and act 
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on test results at the time they are performed could lead to higher mitigation rates and help to 
instill the commitment required to manage arsenic water problems over the long term, thereby 
more effectively leveraging the PWTA’s testing mandate to reduce population exposure. 
Aim 3. Pilot and evaluate a mailed arsenic testing intervention targeting high risk wells 
not tested under the PWTA, “neighbors” of wells exceeding the drinking water standard, and 
assess short-term impact. 
Despite requiring tens of thousands of private wells be tested for arsenic, the PWTA only 
reached about 25% of the private wells in the state due to slow housing turnover. Of the majority 
of wells not yet reached by the law, only a third may have tested for arsenic on their own.53 In 
Chapter 4, 16% of residents of properties (n=1743) notified that a well in their neighborhood was 
found to have arsenic above the New Jersey standard of 5 µg/L requested a free test kit and 13% 
submitted a water sample. Significant differences in participation based on the wording of the 
notifications suggested that messages of comparatively high arsenic, relative to standards, may 
be more compelling than messages of generally high arsenic risk. Most testing participants had 
never tested their well for arsenic before and did not know arsenic was a problem in their area, 
highlighting a lack of awareness about the widespread occurrence of arsenic in well water in the 
region and that current efforts to promote the need for testing have been insufficient. Overall 
25% of wells tested exceeded the standard for arsenic; both the arsenic level of and distance to 
the neighboring well were significant predictors of an arsenic exceedance. This intervention 
succeeded in motivating many households unreached by any previous awareness-raising 
activities to test their well and identified a significant portion to be contaminated with arsenic, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of targeting testing outreach and messages to wells at high risk 
of contamination. Many more contaminated wells can be discovered if the PWTA’s database is 
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used to the full extent it was intended and if residents are given timely notification of their risk 
and opportunities to test their water when a nearby well exceeds a health-based drinking water 
standard. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
Case study methodology was most appropriate to achieve Aim 1 in Chapter 2, an in-
depth investigation to describe the contexts in which the PWTA became law in New Jersey and 
in which attempts to pass private well testing requirements in Maine were unsuccessful. A 
strength of the study was a reliance on multiple sources of evidence for construct validity, 
including key informant interviews, given the limitations in studying historical events where 
there may be gaps in both public documentation and memory. Another strength was the selection 
of two cases representing contrasting outcomes, which helped strengthen the findings beyond a 
single case study focused on the New Jersey PWTA alone. While the lack of additional cases 
was a limitation in drawing cross-case conclusions and generalizing beyond the states examined, 
the findings do raise important considerations for how to frame future investigation into and 
attempts at private well policy-making, such as what should even be considered a successful 
policy outcome. 
The survey research in Chapter 3 is limited by a reliance on self-reporting, on 
respondents’ willingness and ability to recall past events and accurately report their current 
behavior. Although a thorough in-home inspection and water sample collection would be the 
most accurate way to assess current treatment use and arsenic exposure, it was beyond the means 
of this study and would have taken more time and resources to reach even a fraction of the 
number of households represented in Chapter 3’s survey. Therefore, a strength of the survey 
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approach used was the large sample of responses generated from a previously unstudied 
population, increasing the generalizability of findings and identifying questions for further 
research. Furthermore, there is lower risk of non-response bias among participants in a self-
administered survey compared to those in a more intensive home-visit. Considering the inherent 
risk of non-response bias in survey research, the measures taken to both reduce non-response and 
to evaluate potential bias can be considered another strength of the study. Lastly, while these 
mitigation behavior findings may be generalizable to the arsenic-affected population in northern 
New Jersey, the high education and high household incomes in this study area may limit 
application to other less affluent private well populations where the costs of mitigation and 
maintenance may be increasingly burdensome. 
Chapter 4 described and evaluated a simple intervention to notify and offer testing to 
neighbors of high arsenic wells as a proof of concept for a notification strategy already written 
into the PWTA but not commonly practiced. Including a free test offer with the notice, beyond 
what the PWTA proposes, allowed for tracking response and evaluating the effect of targeting in 
terms of high arsenic wells identified, relative to neighboring well characteristics. Tracking 
response also allowed for measuring statistically significant differences based on letter messages 
of varying comparative risk. Limitations in time, resources, and approvals precluded exploring 
further variations in the messages, messenger, and contact strategy, which may all affect 
participation rates and should be explored in further research. 
 
Relevance of findings 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the utility and the potential, as well as the 
limitations, of New Jersey’s Private Well Testing Act. The PWTA was modeled after a local 
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ordinance which tied testing requirements to real estate transactions and required certificates of 
water supply for the close of sale. Despite calls to expand such protections state-wide, political 
compromises resulted in a testing mandate without a requirement for compliance. Although 
weaker than proposed, advocates still hail the achievement as a step finally taken towards 
addressing private well problems and a significant advance over the previous status quo. Despite 
legislative compromises, New Jersey still has the strongest state-level testing law for arsenic in 
the country and these studies have demonstrated the benefits that even a basic testing mandate 
can have. Presently the greatest barrier to arsenic exposure reduction is a lack of testing; even 
homeowners willing to take protective actions need to know of the risks in their area and of the 
contaminants in their own well. Current efforts to raise public awareness and motivate action are 
clearly insufficient. A mandate like the PWTA results in more tests, without the self-selective 
bias of voluntary testing and its resulting disparities in exposure.98 More tested wells means more 
informed homeowners who are going to take action to reduce their exposure, even if those 
subsequent actions are not also required. 
The study in Chapter 3 follows-up with homeowners whose wells were tested under the 
PWTA and found to have high arsenic, and confirms that like after voluntary testing programs, a 
majority of well owners notified of test results will report subsequent actions to reduce 
exposure.54,196 This study also confirms what those other studies have noted, that the monitoring 
and maintenance behavior of well owners treating for arsenic will be critical to capitalize on 
initial protective actions taken in response to test results.9 That effective arsenic mitigation 
requires ongoing homeowner vigilance and effort will remain a challenge regardless of how and 
why the initial testing was done, as will the fraction of well owners who do not act in response to 
test results. However, this study is the first to note the association between previous owner-
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installed arsenic treatment and reports of poor current owner maintenance behavior. A previously 
installed system has half the odds of being maintained as recommended, and 3 times greater odds 
of maintenance never having been performed, compared to a system installed by its current 
owner. Again, this is not a result of the PWTA mandate per se, but reflects that as well screening 
becomes more common the likelihood that home buyers will encounter previously installed 
arsenic treatment systems increases. Poor maintenance and monitoring behavior raise the risk of 
treatment failure and persistent exposure.196 Educational and behavioral interventions leveraging 
the window opened by a testing mandate at home sale could try to address some of these 
emerging treatment issues; however, a testing mandate alone is not the final solution to those 
challenges. 
Case study respondents pointed to the potential “wealth of information” the database of 
PWTA results would provide, and the 35,000 geocoded arsenic tests collected since 2002 is a 
testament to its value. Any testing mandate that requires reporting, or even a reporting mandate 
alone, can be a valuable source of data for groundwater study and for public health outreach, 
revealing the quality of water relied on by a significant portion of the population which is 
otherwise unknown without the routine monitoring of public water systems. Respondents 
identified the PWTA’s neighbor notification provision as one of its most important components, 
because it would extend the benefits of the law’s mandate beyond those directly affected during 
home sales. One advocate explains,  
“While the PWTA wasn’t requiring every private well to get tested all the time, over time 
it provided that level of protection and security, such that if a problem was discovered in 
an individual well, under the law it’s disclosed to nearby properties that might have the 
same problem. So that’s providing a level of protection not just for the buyer of a new 
property, but overtime to folks that bought a house 20 years ago and have intentions of 
living there for the next 20 years.”  
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However, this notification mechanism was written in the law as being at the sole discretion of 
county health departments, who were not appropriated additional resources for the responsibility. 
While there are reported cases of contamination from dry cleaning solvents uncovered because 
of such county health department notifications and follow-up testing,182 the findings of Chapter 4 
suggest that this type of active local outreach may not be happening for arsenic; most 
participants were not even aware that there were arsenic problems in their area, much less a high 
result in a neighboring well. A report on the PWTA’s first 5 years found that arsenic was the 
most commonly exceeded primary standard for drinking water, in 12% of wells tested, while 
VOCs (1.4%) and mercury (0.9%) were the least common.182 While arsenic was not at all a 
driving cause for the PWTA legislation, the mandated testing has since helped reveal the extent 
of arsenic contamination in New Jersey. Since arsenic is a frequent and naturally occurring 
chemical in groundwater, one could reasonably assume that county health departments are 
saving limited resources by notifying and investigating neighboring properties only where 
standards for unnatural contaminants like VOCs and mercury are exceeded, especially because 
any necessary remediation and drinking water treatment costs would be covered by NJDEP’s 
Spill Compensation Fund.182  
This “Spill Fund,” established by the NJ legislature in 1976, is generated from a tax 
levied on the petroleum and chemical industries, and can only go towards remediation for 
contamination caused by the discharges of hazardous substances; a naturally occurring 
contaminant like arsenic would not qualify. Other states with similar funds likewise exclude non-
anthropogenic chemicals from remediation assistance. Such discrimination between naturally 
occurring and man-made chemical contamination of residential well water, although in all cases 
toxic and through no fault of the well owner, contributes to the financial barriers faced by 
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arsenic-affected households and underscores their difficulty in obtaining any kind of assistance 
when there is not a guilty party to blame. 
The case studies of legislative attempts to regulate private well testing in New Jersey and 
Maine highlight this fundamental challenge in seeking recognition for any government role, 
however limited, in private well water. Since 1974’s Safe Drinking Water Act, federal and state 
governments have taken a firm stance on the need for regulation and oversight of public water 
supplies to protect the health of the public. But there is a long history of government staying out 
of the private realm. For this reason, Mike Belliveau of the Environmental Health Strategy 
Center in Maine avoids using the term “private wells,” opting instead for “residential drinking 
water wells” or “household drinking water wells.” He explains that a fundamental advocacy 
communication lesson is to not “use words and phrases that advance your opposition’s message. 
The ‘private well’ feeds into this ideology that it’s a matter of personal responsibility, everyone’s 
on their own, government does not have a role in this issue… If it’s a private well, that means 
it’s your responsibility, it’s not a public responsibility.” All interview participants at some point 
mentioned that no opponent could openly deny the contaminated drinking water problem in 
either state or the experiences of those affected by it; furthermore, all on the record statements of 
opposition expressed to news media, in submitted committee testimony, or in legislative floor 
debate, included some acknowledgement that this contamination was a threat to health and that 
more well testing was needed. However, all respondents similarly identified the fundamental 
question of “who’s really responsible here?” as underlying the debate over any proposed 
legislation. Bill advocates argued that the state needed to take some responsibility, which is why 
the real achievement in Maine’s 2017 bill establishing a small fund to support educational 
outreach is that it made it through the legislature at all; it got an issue which many didn’t believe 
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deserved government attention, on the table, and lays the groundwork for future efforts. Half the 
population of Maine drinks from residential wells, the highest proportion of any state, yet many 
legislators still needed convincing that drinking water quality is a public health issue requiring 
public response. 
Arguments of precedence for government involvement in private homes to ensure public 
safety can be made in both directions. True, there are many home safety precautions that 
homeowners are not required to take, where counting the potential lives saved by such a 
requirement would be easier than counting illnesses or deaths attributable to high levels of an 
invisible poison like arsenic in drinking water. At the same time, there are many examples where 
laws have been passed with requirements for the good of the individual and the community. 
Respondents gave examples like smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, standards for septic 
systems, car emissions inspections, rabies shots for dogs, seatbelts, etc. Each precedent probably 
reflects the political interest, will, and feasibility of such policies at the time they were 
implemented, but also demonstrates the potential for effective policy intervention when those 
forces align. The fact that several local ordinances across the country already go beyond state-
level private well regulations to require compliance with drinking water standards, such as for 
the issuance of residential occupancy certificates, indicates that political and logistical hurdles 
can be overcome, at least at the local level. More efforts to investigate and replicate these local 
level successes are needed.  
Realistically, a sea change on how private well water is viewed and treated legislatively 
is unlikely to happen any time soon, although there are other perspectives available. For 
example, we accept as a society that publicly funded oversight, although imperfect, is necessary 
to protect the safety of public water supply; however, millions of taxpayers on private water are 
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denied the benefit of equal assurances. Andy Smith, state toxicologist in Maine, pointed out that 
“public water systems are subsidized by the tax dollars and bonds that we all pay into, whether 
we’re on public water or not,” so why shouldn’t private well owners be entitled to a cut of that to 
ensure their wells are safe too? As taxpayers, the private well population is paying into a system 
that acknowledges safe drinking water as a fundamental need of all citizens, but receiving no 
protections in return. Ultimately settling the question of responsibility means providing similar 
public support to private well users too; assistance for regular well screening at a minimum, even 
further, assistance for water treatment and remediation, regardless of contamination source. If the 
mechanism for extending protections is to require actions of individuals, then there must be 
institutional and financial support available to make compliance easily achievable, not a burden. 
As one New Jersey mother was quoted in response to the proposed expansion of the PWTA to all 
wells, “If the state’s going to require it, the state’s got to find a way to make it affordable.”154  
Another approach could be to first close regulatory loopholes on paper by extending 
drinking water standards to all water sources without exclusion. While the actual impact and 
burden of such a move will depend on the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to follow, if 
any, doing so would set the tone that all citizens deserve safe drinking water, regardless of 
supplier or source. Applying MCLs to all drinking water sources reframes the debate from the 
fundamental question of whether the safety of water from residential wells is a public concern, to 
a question of the degree of government involvement needed to ensure compliance. As written, 
the Safe Drinking Water Act does not apply to all drinking water; it excludes millions from the 
public health protections it establishes, and legally distinguishes based on drinking water source 
between the majority population whose health is determined to be in the public interest, and the 
sizeable minority left out. Making drinking water standards applicable to all is the first step 
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towards drinking water equity and would create new urgency to address the water problems 
faced by millions of Americans.  
Practically, significant change in the world of private well water may require many 
incremental, modest, and/or symbolic steps, such as those recently taken in Maine, by many local 
and state governments across the country. Models may need to be tested at local levels first, to 
set precedent for expanding them statewide, as demonstrated in New Jersey, and policy models 
will almost certainly need to be proven at state level before there is any federal consideration of 
the issue. The case studies of New Jersey and Maine suggest the time, effort, and conditions 
required for legislative progress to happen. While proposals for radical policy change will 
certainly provoke a backlash from one end of the political spectrum, potentially sabotaging any 
efforts, there is also a danger that after success in the “first step” alone, complacency may 
reestablish itself as grassroots demands are placated, political will expires, or advocacy priorities 
shift once something has finally been done on the issue. Nevertheless, these studies demonstrate 
that a first step like the PWTA, even if there are no follow-up steps taken, can still make a 
significant contribution towards well screening and can be leveraged in many ways to reduce 
arsenic exposure in the private well population, beyond those directly affected by the law. It is a 
proven model that other states can now build on. 
The United Nations General Assembly voted in 2010 to recognize “the right to safe and 
clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life 
and all human rights;”205 however, the United States and 40 other countries abstained from the 
vote, in part because the U.S. delegation felt that the Assembly had not yet fully considered the 
legal implications of such a declared right. The fact that 45 million Americans are excluded from 
the federal and state regulations that protect the right to safe drinking water in this country is an 
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overlooked public health crisis. The regulatory gap through which a significant portion of our 
population falls must be acknowledged and acted on. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Description of case identification and selection 
Sections of the Administrative Code relevant to private wells in all states were reviewed 
for any required private well water sampling and analysis (Table A.1). Fourteen states were 
found to have requirements for private wells to undergo sampling when they are constructed or 
altered, most commonly a simple test for total coliform. Three states have requirements that 
private wells be tested during a real estate transaction, and New Jersey is the only state we are 
aware of that requires regularly testing the private well water on rental properties. Only five of 
these states specify that the required test must include arsenic as a parameter – New Jersey, 
Oregon, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Carolina. New Jersey is the only state to require 
testing private wells for arsenic at real estate transaction, at construction, and for rental 
properties. Oregon also requires testing for arsenic at home sale but unlike in New Jersey, where 
sales are contingent upon completion of the test, there is no enforcement mechanism and 
therefore only 10-20% compliance is estimated.206 Although there has been limited action at state 
level, a targeted internet search reveals at least 21 states where local counties or municipalities 
require additional testing than what is required at state level, and in some cases, require that 
water meet certain quality standards before it can be used as a source for drinking. These local 
ordinances suggest there is growing precedent for government involvement in private well water. 
To identify efforts to introduce testing requirements that aren’t reflected in current law, i.e. 
failed cases, a search was conducted in the National Conference of State Legislature Database 
for any bills regarding private well water introduced since 2009; unfortunately, there is no 
available national database of bills proposed earlier. Since 2009, bills to require testing during 
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construction have been introduced in 4 states, to require testing during real estate transaction in 6 
states, and requiring testing of rental properties in 4 states (Table A.1). Only two states – Maine 
and New York – have introduced bills to require testing at each of the three occasions required in 
New Jersey, and included arsenic as a specified parameter.
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Table A.1: National overview of states with current requirements to test private well water, states where bills have been introduced to require 
testing, and states where there are local requirements 
 
State 
Currently Require Testing For Bills Introduced* Required Testing For Additional Testing 
or Quality 
Required Locally 
Construction 
Real Estate 
Transaction 
Rental 
Properties 
Construction 
Real Estate 
Transaction 
Rental 
Properties 
Alabama                
Alaska              X 
Arizona                
Arkansas                
California              X 
Colorado                
Connecticut  X             
Delaware                
Florida                
Georgia                
Hawaii                
Idaho                
Illinois             X 
Indiana              X 
Iowa  X       X     
Kansas              X 
Kentucky  X             
Louisiana                
Maine        X X X   
Maryland  X           X 
Massachusetts X           X 
Michigan  X           X 
Minnesota  X           X 
Mississippi                
Missouri              X 
Montana           X   
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State 
Currently Require Testing For Bills Introduced* Required Testing For Additional Testing 
or Quality 
Required Locally 
Construction 
Real Estate 
Transaction 
Rental 
Properties 
Construction 
Real Estate 
Transaction 
Rental 
Properties 
Nebraska                
Nevada                
New Hampshire        X X   X 
New Jersey  X X X       X 
New Mexico              X 
New York        X X X X 
North Carolina  X       X X   
North Dakota                
Ohio  X             
Oklahoma                
Oregon    X           
Pennsylvania       X     X 
Rhode Island  X X           
South Carolina                
South Dakota  X             
Tennessee              X 
Texas              X 
Utah              X 
Vermont        X X     
Virginia  X           X 
Washington              X 
West Virginia                
Wisconsin  X           X 
Wyoming               
*Since 2009 
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Common legislative process 
New Jersey and Maine share a common legislative process at state-level. Each state has a 
bi-cameral legislature, consisting of a Senate and either a House of Representatives (Maine) or 
an Assembly (New Jersey), and follows a generally similar legislative process for how a bill 
becomes a law.207,208 First, a legislator decides to sponsor a bill, which is drafted by an office of 
legislative services at their direction. Other legislators may add their names as co-sponsors to 
show support for the bill. The bill is then introduced during a session of one legislative chamber, 
is assigned a number, printed, and released to the public. Occasionally identical or similar bills 
may be introduced to both legislative chambers simultaneously. The bill gets referred to a 
committee for review; New Jersey has separate Assembly and Senate committees but Maine uses 
Joint Standing and Select Committees. When scheduled by chairs, the committee considers the 
bill at meetings open to the public or conducts hearings accepting testimony in support or 
opposition to the pending legislation. Committees may then report the bill back to the original 
chamber floor for reading as is, with amendments, or by a substitute bill. In New Jersey, the bill 
remains in committee if not considered or reported. In Maine, the bill can also be reported out of 
committee with a divided report or a unanimous recommendation of Ought Not to Pass. Bills 
reported out of committee are then read and considered on the floor, and additional amendments 
may be offered. The bill passes when approved by a majority of the authorized members in a 
body and then is sent to the other house for consideration. The bill goes through a similar process 
in the second chamber, if the second body amends the bill it is returned to the first for a vote on 
the changes. The bill receives final legislative approval when it passes both chambers in identical 
form. After final passage, the bill is sent to the Governor who can sign it, allow it to become law 
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without signing it, or veto the bill. An approved bill becomes a law; a vetoed bill can be 
overridden by a 2/3 vote in each chamber of the Legislature. 
  
New Jersey bill versions and timelines 
Table A.2: Timeline of major legislative actions on the New Jersey Private Well Testing Act 
Date Action Outcome 
 
1998 – 1999 Legislative Session (A2635 / S2007) 
 
11/9/1998 Introduced and referred to Assembly Environment Committee  
3/25/1999 Reported out of Assembly Environment Committee with 
amendments, 2nd reading 
Amended 
5/24/1999 Passed by Assembly 68-7-2  
5/24/1999 Received in Senate, referred to Senate Environment Committee Died 
 
2000 – 2001 Legislative Session (A1306 / S635) 
 
1/11/2000 Introduced, referred to Assembly Environment Committee  
1/11/2000 Introduced in Senate, referred to Senate Environment Committee  
3/2/2000 Reported out of Assembly Environment Committee with 
amendments, 2nd reading 
 
5/25/2000 Passed by the Assembly (67-6-0), received in Senate, referred to 
Senate Environment Committee 
 
12/4/2000 Reported from Senate Environment Committee with amendments, 2nd 
reading, referred to Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee 
Amended 
12/14/2000 Reported from Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee with 
amendments, 2nd reading 
 
2/15/2001 Passed by Senate (38-0), received in Assembly, 2nd reading on 
concurrence 
 
3/8/2001 Passed by Assembly (72-5-0) Approved 
3/23/2001 Signed into law by Governor P.L. 2001, c.40 Law 
 
2002-2003 Legislative Session (S2414) 
 
3/17/2003 Introduced, referred to Senate Environment Committee Died 
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Table A.3: Sponsorship of Private Well Testing Act during the 208th (A2635, 1998-1999) and 209th 
(A1306, 2000-2001) legislatures 
A2635 Requires testing of potable water supplied to dwelling units from private wells; 
appropriates $75,000 
George F Geist (Primary) Assembly Republican – 4th 
Jack Collins (Primary) Assembly (Speaker) Republican – 3rd 
Gerald J Luongo Assembly Republican – 4th 
Mary T. Previte Assembly Democrat – 6th 
John C. Gibson Assembly Republican -1st 
Louis D. Greenwald* Assembly Democrat – 6th 
Nilsa Cruz-Perez* Assembly Democrat – 5th 
Joseph Azzolina* Assembly Republican – 13th 
S2007 (Identical Bill) 
John Matheussen (Primary) Senate Republican – 4th 
John Adler (Primary) Senate Democrat – 4th 
Richard Codey Senate Democrat – 27th 
Joseph Vitale Senate Democrat – 19th 
Diane Allen Senate Republican – 7th 
Martha Bark Senate Republican – 8th 
A1306 The “Private Well Testing Act”; appropriates $1 million from Safe Drinking Water 
Fund 
George F Geist (Primary) Assembly Republican – 4th 
Jack Collins (Primary) Assembly, Speaker Republican – 3rd 
Mary T. Previte Assembly Democrat – 6th 
John C. Gibson Assembly Republican -1st 
Louis D. Greenwald Assembly Democrat – 6th 
Nilsa Cruz-Perez Assembly Democrat – 5th 
Joseph Azzolina Assembly Republican – 13th 
Francis L. Bodine Assembly Democrat – 8th 
Steve Corodemus Assembly Republican – 11th 
Bob Smith Assembly Democrat – 7th 
David Wolfe Assembly Republican – 10th 
John Matheussen Senate Republican – 4th 
John Adler Senate Democrat – 6th 
Richard Codey Senate Democrat – 27th 
Joseph Vitale Senate Democrat – 19th 
Diane Allen Senate Republican – 7th 
Martha Bark Senate Republican – 8th 
John Bennett Senate Republican – 12th 
Henry McNamara* Senate Republican – 40th 
Norman Robertson* Senate Republican – 34th 
Peter Inverso* Senate Republican – 14th 
James Cafiero* Senate Republican – 1st 
Jack Sinagra* Senate Republican – 18th 
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Robert Singer* Senate Republican – 30th 
Louis Kosco* Senate Republican – 38th 
Linda Greenstein* Assembly Democrat – 14th 
Robert J. Smith* Assembly Republican – 4th 
*Added after committee amendment 
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Table A.4: Components of proposed and amended New Jersey bills.  
Dark grey boxes are missing components, light grey boxes denote no significant changes from previous version of bill, underlined text 
marks language changes from previous versions. 
Inclusions 
A2635 Proposed 
 Nov 1998 
A2635 Amended Mar 1999 
S2007 Proposed May 1999 
A1306 Proposed Jan 2000 
S635 Proposed Jan 2000 
A1306/S635 Amended Dec 
2000 
Approved March 2001 
S2414 Proposed Revision 
March 2003 
Testing required: 
Real estate sale 
Dwellings with private 
wells cannot be sold 
without a certificate of 
water quality in force, or 
agreement to bring water 
supply into compliance 
within 60 days 
Dwellings with private wells 
cannot be sold without a 
certificate of water quality in 
force, or agreement to bring 
water supply into compliance 
within 60 days 
Contract of sale must include 
provision as a condition; 
closing shall not occur unless 
both buyer and seller certify in 
writing that they received and 
reviewed results 
Contract of sale must include 
provision as a condition; 
closing shall not occur unless 
both buyer and seller certify in 
writing that they received and 
reviewed results 
Testing required: 
New wells drilled 
New private wells cannot 
be used without a 
certificate of water quality 
New private wells cannot be 
used without a certificate of 
water quality 
    
Testing required: 
Rental properties 
Dwellings with private 
wells cannot be leased 
without a certificate of 
water quality in force, or 
agreement to bring water 
supply into compliance 
within 60 days 
Wells of dwellings leased for 
one year or longer must be 
tested yearly for bacteria and 
nitrates, every five years for 
VOCs, mercury, and radium. 
No test required for <1 year.  
Wells must be tested at least 
once every five years and 
lessor provide written copy to 
tenants within 30 days, and of 
most recent test to new lessees. 
Wells must be tested at least 
once every five years and 
lessor provide written copy to 
tenants within 30 days, and of 
most recent test to new lessees. 
Testing required: 
All private wells 
      
All private well water must be 
tested at the tap at least once 
every 5 years 
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Inclusions 
A2635 Proposed 
 Nov 1998 
A2635 Amended Mar 1999 
S2007 Proposed May 1999 
A1306 Proposed Jan 2000 
S635 Proposed Jan 2000 
A1306/S635 Amended Dec 
2000 
Approved March 2001 
S2414 Proposed Revision 
March 2003 
Test requirements 
Certified laboratory must 
test for total coliform, 
nitrates, iron, manganese, 
pH, VOCs, mercury, and 
radium. Plus additional. 
Certified laboratory must test 
for total coliform, nitrates, 
iron, manganese, pH, VOCs, 
mercury, and radium. Plus 
additional. 
Certified laboratory must test 
for total coliform, nitrates, iron, 
manganese, pH, VOCs, lead 
and gross alpha to screen for 
radium. Plus additional for 
counties such as arsenic and 
mercury. 
Certified lab test must include 
total coliform, nitrates, 
manganese, VOCs, arsenic, 
mercury, lead, gross alpha to 
screen for radium. 
Reporting of test 
results 
DEP adopts Well Water 
Testing Reporting Form; 
lab submits results plus 
well info for PWTA tests 
to County 
DEP adopts Well Water 
Testing Reporting Form; lab 
submits results plus well info 
for PWTA tests to County 
DEP prescribes standardized 
water test reporting form with 
info on remediation funding 
alternatives available; lab 
submits results plus well info 
for PWTA tests to DEP within 
5 days 
DEP prescribes standardized 
water test reporting form with 
info on remediation funding 
alternatives available; lab 
submits results plus well info 
for PWTA tests to DEP within 
5 days 
Compliance 
required 
County will issue 
certificate of water supply 
if no standards are 
exceeded; valid 6 months.  
County will issue certificate 
of water supply if no 
standards are exceeded; valid 
6 months.  
    
Notification 
County notifies DEP if 
standards on test are 
exceeded. 
County notifies DEP if 
standards on test are 
exceeded. 
DEP notifies county of any 
exceedance within 5 days. 
County has sole discretion 
whether to issue general notice 
to property owners in vicinity, 
without identifying tested well 
DEP notifies county of any 
exceedance within 5 days. 
County has sole discretion 
whether to issue general notice 
to property owners in vicinity, 
without identifying tested well 
Confidentiality     
Water tests received by DEP 
and County are confidential; 
only general compilations 
available to public 
Water tests received by DEP 
and County are confidential; 
only general compilations 
available to public 
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Inclusions 
A2635 Proposed 
 Nov 1998 
A2635 Amended Mar 1999 
S2007 Proposed May 1999 
A1306 Proposed Jan 2000 
S635 Proposed Jan 2000 
A1306/S635 Amended Dec 
2000 
Approved March 2001 
S2414 Proposed Revision 
March 2003 
Data     
DEP compiles data from water 
test results submitted by labs 
for purposes of studying 
groundwater in the State 
DEP compiles data from water 
test results submitted by labs 
for purposes of studying 
groundwater in the State 
Water testing fee 
County may authorize 
collection of fees 
sufficient to recover costs 
of administration 
County may authorize 
collection of fees sufficient to 
recover costs of 
administration 
    
Penalties 
Sellers in violation of Act 
are liable for costs to 
bring water into 
compliance, civil penalty 
of $500-1000, lessee may 
void lease agreement 
Sellers in violation of Act are 
liable for costs to bring water 
into compliance, civil penalty 
of $500-1000, lessee may 
void lease agreement 
  
Penalty of at least $1,000 for 
each violation offense 
Remediation 
guidance 
DEP adopts rules 
establishing remedial 
measures that may be 
taken to bring private 
water into compliance 
DEP adopts rules establishing 
remedial measures that may 
be taken to bring private 
water into compliance 
    
Public 
information and 
education 
program 
    
DEP must inform public of act, 
potential health effects, 
potential presence of radium in 
groundwater, areas of potential 
threat, importance of testing 
regularly, suggested treatment 
techniques, and public funding 
sources available. Must make 
general compilation of test 
results available to public. 
DEP must inform public of act, 
potential health effects, 
potential presence of radium in 
groundwater, areas of potential 
threat, importance of testing 
regularly, suggested treatment 
techniques, and public funding 
sources available. Must make 
general compilation of test 
results available to public. 
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Inclusions 
A2635 Proposed 
 Nov 1998 
A2635 Amended Mar 1999 
S2007 Proposed May 1999 
A1306 Proposed Jan 2000 
S635 Proposed Jan 2000 
A1306/S635 Amended Dec 
2000 
Approved March 2001 
S2414 Proposed Revision 
March 2003 
Report to 
legislature 
    
DEP prepares report on 
implementation within 5 years, 
including recommendations for 
legislative action 
DEP prepares report on 
implementation within 5 years, 
including recommendations for 
legislative action 
Appropriations 
$75,000 from the General 
Fund to administer 
$75,000 from the General 
Fund to administer 
$1,000,000 from Safe Drinking 
Water Fund for initial costs of 
implementing and grants to 
Counties for implementation 
costs including new hiring. 
Sufficient sums to meet 
ongoing costs to be included in 
annual DEP budget request. 
$1,000,000 from Safe Drinking 
Water Fund for initial costs of 
implementing and grants to 
Counties for implementation 
costs including new hiring. 
Sufficient sums to meet 
ongoing costs to be included in 
annual DEP budget request. 
Fate 
Amended by Assembly 
Environment Committee 
A2635 Passed by Assembly 
1999 (68-7-2) 
S2007 Stalled in Senate 
Environment Committee 
A1306 Passed by Assembly 
2000 (67-6-0) 
S635 Amended by Senate 
Environment and Budget and 
Appropriations Committees 
Passed by Senate (38-0) 
Passed by Assembly (72-5-0) 
Stalled in Committee 
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Maine bill versions and timelines 
Table A.5: Timeline of major legislative actions on private well testing bills in Maine 
Date Action Outcome 
 
LD 1775 “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water from Private Wells” 
 
3/28/2007 Introduced in House  
3/29/2007 Referred to Joint Standing Committee on Health and Human Services 
by House and Senate 
 
5/7/2007 Public hearing held  
5/14/2007 Work session held, voted  
5/15/2007 Reported out Ought Not to Pass  
5/22/2007 Shelved in legislative files Died 
 
LD 1162 “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water for Maine Families” 
 
4/1/2015 Referred by House to Joint Standing Committee on Health and Human 
Services, concurred by Senate 
 
4/21/2015 Public hearing held  
4/28/2015 Work session held, tabled Amended* 
5/19/2015 Work session held, voted  
6/8/2015 Divided reported out of committee: Ought to Pass – As Amended / 
Ought Not to Pass (10-3) 
 
6/9/2015 Tabled in House pending motion to accept majority OTP-AM report  
6/10/2015 House accepted majority OTP-AM report after debate (108-40-3), 
Committee amendment “A” was read and adopted, 2nd reading, bill 
passed to be engrossed as amended by Committee, sent for concurrence 
 
6/11/2015 Motion to accept minority ONTP report (Failed) after debate (13-22-0), 
Senate accepted majority OTP-AM, Committee amendment “A” was 
read and adopted, 2nd reading, bill passed to be engrossed as amended by 
Committee 
 
6/12/2015 House passed to be enacted  
6/15/2015 Senate passed to be enacted in concurrence Approved 
6/26/2015 Governor’s veto  
6/30/2015 Veto sustained, 94-52-5 Died 
 LD 454 “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water for Families in Maine”  
2/7/2017 Referred by House to Committee on Health and Human Services, 
concurred by Senate 
 
4/7/2017 Public hearing held Amended* 
4/19/2017 Work session held, voted  
5/24/2017 Reported out of Committee Ought to Pass-As Amended / Ought Not to 
Pass (11-2) 
 
5/30/2017 Divided reports read in House, accepted report OTP-AM (117-25-8), 
Committee amendment “A” was read and adopted, 2nd reading, bill 
passed to be engrossed as amended by Committee, sent for concurrence 
 
5/31/2017 Divided reports read in Senate, tabled  
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6/1/2017 Senate accepted report OTP-AM in concurrence (34-0-1), Committee 
amendment A read and adopted, 2nd reading, bill passed to be engrossed 
as amended by Committee in concurrence 
 
6/5/2017 House passed to be enacted, sent for concurrence  
6/6/2017 Senate passed to be enacted, in concurrence Approved 
6/16/2017 Governor’s veto  
6/19/2017 Veto overridden (113-33-5 in House, 33-0-5 in Senate) Law 
*Amended to remove testing requirement 
 
Table A.6: Legislative sponsors of private well testing bills in Maine 
LD 1775 “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water from Private Wells” 
Gary Moore (Primary) Representative Republican – Standish 
Earle McCormick Senator Republican – Kennebec 
Kevin Raye Senator Democrat – Washington 
LD 1162 “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water for Maine Families” 
Drew Gattine (Primary) Representative Democrat – Westbrook 
Christopher Johnson Senator Democrat – Lincoln 
Anne Haskell Senator Democrat – Cumberland 
Christine Burstein Representative Democrat – Lincolnville 
Gary Hilliard Representative Republican – Belgrade 
Richard Malaby Representative Republican – Hancock 
Donald Marean Representative Republican – Hollis 
Karen Vachon Representative Republican – Scarborough 
LD 454: “An Act to Ensure Safe Drinking Water for Families in Maine” 
Karen Vachon (Primary) Representative Republican – Scarborough 
Kent Ackley Representative Independent – Monmouth 
Shenna Bellows Senator Democrat – Kennebec 
Janice Cooper Representative Democrat – Yarmouth 
Dale Denno Representative Democrat – Cumberland 
Drew Gattine Representative Democrat – Westbrook 
Frances Head Representative Republican – Bethel 
Gary Hilliard Representative Republican – Belgrade 
Brian Langley Senator Republican – Hancock 
Michael Thibodeau President of Senate Republican – Waldo 
Amy Volk Senator Republican – Cumberland 
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Table A.7: Components of proposed and amended Maine bills.  
Dark grey boxes are missing components, light grey boxes denote no significant changes from previous version of bill, underlined text 
marks changes from previous versions. 
Inclusions 
LD 1775 
Proposed  
March 2007 
LD 1162  
Proposed  
March 2015 
LD 1162  
Amended  
May 2015 
LD 454  
Proposed 
February 2017 
LD 454 
Amended  
Passed June 2017 
Testing 
required: 
Real estate sale 
As a provision of contract 
of sale. Must include 
arsenic and uranium; 
buyer and seller must 
certify they received and 
reviewed results at 
closing         
Testing 
required: 
New wells 
drilled 
  
Upon construction or 
alteration of private 
well, drilling company 
shall request certified 
lab test. Lab provides 
well owner with 
department-supplied 
info on health effects 
with test results. Must 
include arsenic, 
uranium, manganese, 
fluoride, and radon.       
Testing 
required:  
Rental 
properties 
At least once every 5 
years, lessor provides 
results to lessee when 
received and new rentals 
 
  
Every 3 to 5 years, 
lessor provides results 
to lessee when received 
and new rentals   
Disclosure of 
testing 
  
Landlords and sellers of 
property must disclose 
results of water test 
conducted within 
previous 3 years 
Landlords must 
disclose to tenants 
results of water test 
conducted within 
previous 3 years 
    
 168 
Inclusions 
LD 1775 
Proposed  
March 2007 
LD 1162  
Proposed  
March 2015 
LD 1162  
Amended  
May 2015 
LD 454  
Proposed 
February 2017 
LD 454 
Amended  
Passed June 2017 
Reporting of 
test results 
PWTA tests only; labs 
submit to DHHS within 5 
days info on location, 
sampling, and results 
Any private well tested 
for specific 
contaminants, copy of 
results forwarded to 
DHHS 
Any private well 
tested for specific 
contaminants, copy of 
results forwarded to 
DHHS by an annual 
date. DHHS maintains 
confidentiality of 
addresses and 
establishes system for 
facilitating data 
collection that avoids 
significant costs to 
private labs 
Any private well tested 
for specific 
contaminants, copy of 
results forwarded to 
DHHS by an annual 
date. DHHS maintains 
confidentiality of 
addresses and 
establishes system for 
facilitating data 
collection that avoids 
significant costs to 
private labs   
Data 
DHHS compiles data 
from water test results 
submitted by labs for 
purposes of studying 
groundwater 
  
    
Notification 
Department notifies local 
government entity of 
failure; local entity has 
discretion whether or not 
to notify nearby property 
owners; specific location 
of well confidential 
  
    
Confidentiality 
Water test results 
received by government 
entities are confidential 
 
DHHS keeps 
addresses for test 
results confidential 
and only uses for 
purposes of recording 
multiple tests from 
same well (waives fee) 
DHHS keeps addresses 
for test results 
confidential and only 
uses for purposes of 
recording multiple tests 
from same well 
DHHS keeps addresses 
for test results 
confidential and only 
uses for purposes of 
recording multiple tests 
from same well 
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Inclusions 
LD 1775 
Proposed  
March 2007 
LD 1162  
Proposed  
March 2015 
LD 1162  
Amended  
May 2015 
LD 454  
Proposed 
February 2017 
LD 454 
Amended  
Passed June 2017 
Water testing 
fee 
  
Up to $5 for any private 
water test; goes to 
Private Well Safe 
Drinking Fund to 
increase testing 
Up to $10 for tests 
through HETL only; 
goes to Private Well 
Safe Drinking Water 
Fund, percentage 
towards administrative 
costs for data 
collection from private 
labs 
Up to $10 for tests 
through HETL only; 
goes to Private Well 
Safe Drinking Water 
Fund, percentage 
towards administrative 
costs for data collection 
from private labs 
Up to $10 for tests 
through HETL only; 
goes to Private Well 
Safe Drinking Water 
Fund, percentage 
towards administrative 
costs for data collection 
from private labs 
Water treatment 
fee 
  
Up to 3% of installation 
cost; credited to separate 
water treatment fund 
established by Maine 
State Housing Authority 
to provide affordable 
treatment for the low-
income       
Private Well 
Safe Drinking 
Water Fund 
  
Fund is established to 
improve rate of testing, 
for educational outreach 
programs, and to defray 
department's 
administration costs 
Fund is established to 
improve rate of 
testing, for educational 
outreach programs, 
and to defray 
department's 
administration costs 
Fund is established to 
improve rate of testing, 
for educational 
outreach programs, and 
to defray department's 
administration costs 
Fund is established to 
improve rate of testing, 
for educational 
outreach programs, and 
to defray department's 
administration costs 
Water treatment 
fund 
  
Maine State Housing 
Authority shall establish 
and administer 
Maine State Housing 
Authority shall 
establish and 
administer     
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Inclusions 
LD 1775 
Proposed  
March 2007 
LD 1162  
Proposed  
March 2015 
LD 1162  
Amended  
May 2015 
LD 454  
Proposed 
February 2017 
LD 454 
Amended  
Passed June 2017 
Public 
information and 
education 
program 
DHHS must inform 
public of law, potential 
presence of 
arsenic/uranium/other in 
groundwater, areas of 
potential threat, potential 
health effects, importance 
of testing regularly, 
suggested treatment 
techniques. Must make 
water test results data 
available once a year. 
DHHS revises and 
updates outreach 
materials, and conducts 
outreach on need to test 
for contaminants, 
potential health effects, 
and options for 
treatment 
DHHS revises and 
updates outreach 
materials, and 
conducts outreach on 
need to test for 
contaminants, 
potential health 
effects, and options for 
treatment 
DHHS revises and 
updates outreach 
materials, and conducts 
outreach on need to test 
for contaminants, 
potential health effects, 
and options for 
treatment 
DHHS revises and 
updates outreach 
materials, and conducts 
outreach on need to test 
for contaminants, 
potential health effects, 
and options for 
treatment 
Uniform testing 
recommendation 
  
DHHS develops uniform 
recommendation for 
periodic testing of 
specific contaminants; 
must be clearly 
identified by others. 
Must include arsenic, 
uranium, manganese, 
fluoride, and radon. 
DHHS develops 
uniform 
recommendation for 
periodic testing of 
specific contaminants; 
must be clearly 
identified by others. 
Must include arsenic, 
uranium, manganese, 
fluoride, and radon. 
DHHS develops 
uniform 
recommendation for 
periodic testing of 
specific contaminants; 
must be clearly 
identified by others. 
Must include arsenic, 
uranium, manganese, 
fluoride, and radon. 
DHHS develops 
uniform 
recommendation for 
periodic testing of 
specific contaminants; 
must be clearly 
identified by others. 
Must include arsenic, 
uranium, manganese, 
fluoride, radon, 
bacteria, nitrates, 
nitrites, chloride, 
hardness, copper, iron, 
pH, sodium, and lead. 
Educational 
materials for 
well water 
professionals 
    
Maine Well Drillers 
Commission to adopt 
required educational 
literature on 
importance of testing 
for distribution when a 
private well is drilled 
Maine Well Drillers 
Commission to adopt 
required educational 
literature on importance 
of testing for 
distribution when a 
private well is drilled 
Maine Well Drillers 
Commission to adopt 
required educational 
literature on importance 
of testing for 
distribution when a 
private well is drilled 
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Inclusions 
LD 1775 
Proposed  
March 2007 
LD 1162  
Proposed  
March 2015 
LD 1162  
Amended  
May 2015 
LD 454  
Proposed 
February 2017 
LD 454 
Amended  
Passed June 2017 
Report to 
Legislature 
DHHS prepares report on 
implementation and 
include recommendations 
for legislative action 
        
Appropriations? 
        
Funding to DHHS for 
testing and duties 
related to bill 
requirements ($39k 
Year 1, $52k Year 2) 
Fate 
Died in HHS Committee 
(Ought Not to Pass) 
Amended by HHS 
Committee 
Divided Report from 
HHS Comm. (10-3); 
Passed by Legislature 
(108-40 House, 22-13 
Senate); 
Vetoed by Governor 
June 2015 
Amended by HHS 
Committee 
Enacted by House and 
Senate; 
Vetoed by Governor; 
Veto overridden June 
2017 
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APPENDIX B 
Survey documents 
Pre-survey notice letter: 
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Recruitment letter: 
 174 
Survey booklet: 
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Reminder postcard: 
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Final reminder letter: 
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Psychological constructs and confirmatory factor analysis 
Table B.1: Psychological constructs and confirmatory factor analysis 
 Mean SD Alpha Loading p-value RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Perceived Susceptibility   0.83   .041 .998 .015 
Households in this area often have arsenic-contaminated well water 4.40 1.63  .786 <.001    
Our household is at risk of drinking arsenic-contaminated well water 3.51 1.86  .639 <.001    
Household members are exposed to arsenic from our well water if left 
untreated 
4.49 1.72  .943 <.001    
The number of years we drink our untreated well water increases our risks 4.63 1.58  .755 <.001    
I know someone with a well arsenic problem 3.28 2.02  .468 <.001    
Perceived Severity   0.81   .036 .996 .023 
Arsenic-related health effects from our well water are likely to be serious 4.34 1.64  .855 <.001    
The health risks from arsenic are overblown (reversed) 4.39 1.42  .452 <.001    
I feel concerned about our well arsenic level 3.84 1.77  .624 <.001    
I feel worried about my well arsenic level 3.43 1.71  .482 <.001    
I am not concerned about my well water because I have been drinking it a long 
time with no problem (reversed) 
4.32 1.68  .501 <.001    
My untreated well water is perfectly safe to drink (reversed) 3.73 1.93  .787 <.001    
Children and pregnant women are especially vulnerable to arsenic-related health 
effects 
5.05 1.32  .347 <.001    
Drinking water quality is not a priority to me (reversed) 5.23 1.37  .284 <.001    
Perceived Benefits   0.72   .086 .993 .021 
Reducing arsenic in our drinking water would increase our home value 4.53 1.48  .538 <.001    
Drinking less of our untreated water is better for our health 4.35 1.72  .586 <.001    
Treating my water is good for my health 5.18 1.14  .789 <.001    
Treating my well water reduces my risk for disease 4.93 1.26  .795 <.001    
Perceived Barriers   0.71   N/A N/A N/A 
Treating my water is too expensive 3.56 1.80  .820 <.001    
Treating my water is too much hassle 2.90 1.64  .884 <.001    
It is hard to compare the pros and cons of arsenic treatment methods 3.60 1.53  .400 <.001    
Self-Efficacy   0.83   N/A N/A N/A 
I know how to find a company to install a water treatment system for arsenic 4.75 1.61  .547 <.001    
I am confident I can choose an appropriate water treatment system 4.78 1.42  .714 <.001    
I am confident I can maintain a water treatment system, even if there are 
additional costs 
4.82 1.33  .938 <.001    
Commitment   0.70   N/A N/A N/A 
I am committed to decreasing our arsenic exposure 4.91 1.31  .859 <.001    
I feel a personal obligation to make sure our well water is safe to drink 5.25 1.09  .658 <.001    
Cue to Action   N/A   N/A N/A N/A 
Local authorities have advised me to not drink my well water untreated 2.27 1.69  N/A N/A    
Overall Model   N/A   .051 .95 .061 
SD = standard deviation. Indication of acceptable scale reliability: Cronbach’s α≥0.7. Indication of acceptable CFA model fit: RMSEA<.08, CFI>.93, SRMR<.08
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Exploratory spatial analysis 
Rates of well arsenic exceedance by town are displayed in Figure B.1. A Moran’s I of 
0.503 (p<.001) indicates that arsenic exceedance is significantly clustered in space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rates of non-response to the survey (among towns with at least 4 surveys mailed) and 
reported treatment use (among towns with at least 3 surveys returned) are shown in Figures B.2 
and B.3. There is no evidence for significant spatial clustering of these variables and visually they 
do not seem to follow a similar pattern to each other or to arsenic exceedance in Figure B.1. 
Figure B.1  
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Figure B.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.3  
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Figure B.5  
Figure B.4  
When focusing only on the cluster of townships around Hunterdon County, NJ, the spatial 
clustering of arsenic exceedance in Figure B.4 is less strong (Moran’s I: 0.218, p=.04). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
While there is some slight clustering of survey non-response (Figure B.5) and less so of 
treatment rates (Figure B.6) in this smaller area, again they do not seem to follow a similar pattern 
as each other or as arsenic exceedance to indicate an association between these variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.6  
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Figure B.8  
Socioeconomic measures for this area such as percent of population >25 with a bachelor’s 
degree (Figure B.7) and median household income (Figure B.8) do show similar patterns of 
significant spatial clustering. There may be a slight association between median household income 
and rates of non-response in some towns, with higher non-response in higher income areas. Given 
the very high household incomes among the respondents to the survey, that pattern is unlikely to 
introduce bias in the sample. 
 
 
Figure B.7  
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Intervention documents 
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Water quality results 
In addition to arsenic, other elements analyzed and reported with relevant MCLs, federal 
health advisory levels, or secondary standards were: aluminum, antimony, barium, beryllium, 
boron, cadmium, chromium, copper, iron, lead, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, selenium, 
sodium, strontium, uranium, and zinc. Samples were collected from the kitchen sink to represent 
drinking water, and so in many cases are treated water. The most common exceedance was 
sodium (38%) (Table C.1), primarily due to the common use of water softeners. Arsenic was the 
second most common exceedance (25%). 
Table C.1: Number of exceedances among all samples (n=230), including treated water, plus standards 
Element 
Samples 
Exceeded 
% Samples 
Exceeded 
Maximum 
Contaminant Level 
Health 
Advisory 
Level 
Secondary 
Standard 
Aluminum 5 2.2% -- -- 50 to 200 
Antimony 1 0.4% 6 -- -- 
Arsenic 57 24.8% 5 -- -- 
Barium -- -- 2,000 -- -- 
Beryllium -- -- 4 -- -- 
Boron 7 3.1% -- 2,000 -- 
Cadmium -- -- 5 -- -- 
Chromium -- -- 100 -- -- 
Copper -- -- (Action Level) 1,300  -- 1,000 
Iron 4 1.7% -- -- 300 
Lead -- -- (Action Level) 15  -- -- 
Manganese 8 3.5% -- 300 50 
Molybdenum 3 1.3% -- 40 -- 
Nickel -- -- -- 100 -- 
Selenium -- -- 50 -- -- 
Sodium 87 37.8%   50,000 
Strontium 3 1.3% -- 4,000 -- 
Thallium -- -- 2 -- -- 
Uranium 2 0.9% 30 -- -- 
Zinc 3 1.3%  2,000 5,000 
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